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Abstract
The aim of my thesis is to explain why civil-military cooperation is practiced the way 
that it is by the Canadian Army. Civil-military cooperation (the practice by military 
forces of engaging with civilian actors in order to improve the relationship between the 
civilian populace and the military forces), largely in the form of relief and reconstruction 
activities, has come to be a hallmark of contemporary military interventions, both in war 
and peace support situations. My thesis looks at civil military cooperation as it is actually 
performed and includes not only an examination of doctrine, but also of practice.
In determining why civil-military cooperation is practiced in the way that it is, I use 
Clausewitz’s Trinity as the basis for my explanation. I focus on the secondary aspect of 
the Trinity; namely, its actors: the People, the Government, and the Military. By doing 
so, and including an analysis of the relationships between these actors, it is possible to 
see that civil-military cooperation is a product of the combination the people’s passion 
(which is ambivalent), the government’s direction (which is ambiguous), and the army’s 
skills (which they apply antagonistically). This resulting context is sufficiently 
indeterminate as to require significant interpretation on the part of those individuals 
conducting civil-military cooperation activities in the field. This runs counter to most 
established theories of civil military relations, which expect that government direction 
should determine military activity.
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Introduction:
The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation
“We had the experience but missed the meaning,
And approach to the meaning restores the experience 
In a different form... ” T.S. Eliot, The Dry Salvages
“There is no irony,” declared The Times editorial, “in the fact that those who are 
so supremely competent at war should also prove so adept at picking up the pieces after 
the conflict.”1 Speaking of the efforts of the British army following the combat phase of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (the U.S. led coalition’s intervention into and occupation of 
Iraq), the stoic editors captured, but failed to adequately resolve, the tension inherent in 
contemporary military ‘stability’ operations. There is something ironic in having soldiers 
act as peacebuilders, calling upon them to combine the management of violence with 
humanitarian relief, social development, and economic renewal.
An earlier war occasioned a similar juxtaposition. In 1999, during Operation 
Allied Force (NATOs bombing campaign over Serbia) Prime Minister Tony Blair visited 
the Alliance headquarters to see the staff and thank them for their efforts. He wanted to 
let the officers know that he appreciated not just “the military actions, but also the 
humanitarian work”2 that NATO was conducting in Kosovo, Serbia, and Albania. What 
an odd thing to say—the juxtaposition of high-level bombing and caring for refugees 
jangles our senses. How could the occasion arise whereby an organization designed with 
warflghting in mind, was not only carrying out so-called “humanitarian tasks”, but doing 
so while applying overwhelming and destructive military force at the same time?
1 The Editor, “Paradox o f  Peace: The Army is an instrument o f  welfare as w ell as warfare,” The Times, 26  
December 2003.
2 W esley Clark, Waging M odern War. (N ew  York: Public Affairs Press, 2001): xx.
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In Afghanistan, as a way of extending Western military control over the country, 
several Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been established, each comprised 
of civilian development experts and military personnel. Jointly these professionals 
engage in a variety of activities, ranging from monitoring the security situation, to 
(re)building infrastructure, to advising on matters of governance and security sector 
reform. These civil-military teams are seen as a vital component of success within 
Afghanistan, achieving the dual aim of improving the situation of the local population, as 
well as overseeing and pacifying them. However, the controversy surrounding civil- 
military cooperation has reached new heights in Afghanistan. During the air campaign of 
early 2002, American forces were chastised for dropping food as well as ordnance; much 
of the food was unsuited to the needs of the Afghan population and the yellow colour of 
the packages could be confused with unexploded components from cluster bomb units 
(CBU), often with catastrophic results. Furthermore, in a press release explaining their 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the international relief NGO Medecins Sans Frontieres 
(MSF) blamed US civil-military cooperation practices for an increase in the level of 
violence against aid workers in the country. American soldiers were operating out of 
white vehicles and wearing civilian clothes, distributing food and medicine. MSF 
believes they went beyond ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the Afghans, using aid as a 
lever to gain intelligence and cooperation in return for food.3 The military, according to 
MSF, endangered aid workers by confusing the distinction between humanitarian relief 
and more instrumental military activities.
3 Medecins Sans Frontieres, “MSF Pulls Out o f  Afghanistan,” Press Release 28 July 2004  
[http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm ?articleid=8851D F09-F62D -47D 4-A 8D3E B1E 876A 1EOD; 
accessed 1 Aug 2004]
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This confusion of role has been felt not only by NGOs. In the Balkans, for 
instance, the military, “found themselves embroiled in activities—whether intentionally 
or otherwise—traditionally outside [their] remit.”4 A senior military officer frankly 
admitted “it is still difficult engaging with the staff of international organisations and 
NGOs.. .This is a two way problem.”5 On ‘both sides’ of the debate, practitioners and 
commentators were asking what role, if any, the ‘other’ should play in these complicated 
and overlapping missions.6 A review of some of the titles of recent articles reveals the 
extent to which civil-military cooperation is regarded as an uncomfortable practice, with
7 8observers remarking on its “impossible necessity,” likening it to “herding cats,” 
speaking of “uncertain partners”9 or “strange bedfellows,”10 and commenting on a 
relationship plagued by “cultural dissonance.”11 In sum, as Micheal Pugh notes, “the
1 7certainties of military and civilian roles...have become hazy”.
4 J.W. Rollins, “Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in crisis response operations: the implications for 
NATO,” International Peacekeeping. 8.1 (2001): 122.
5 Rollins, 128 .
6 Douglas E. Delaney, “CIMIC operations during Operation ‘Kinetic’,” Canadian M ilitary Journal. Winter 
2000-2001: 29; Andrew Rigby, “Humanitarian assistance and conflict management: the view from the 
NGO sector, ” International Affairs. 11A  (2001): 960.
7 Par Eriksson, “Civil-military coordination in peace support operations— an impossible necessity,” Journal 
o f  Humanitarian Assistance. 2000 (September) [http://www.jha.ac/articles/a061.htm; accessed 4 Mar 2002]
8John H. Eisenhour and Edward Marks, “Herding cats: overcoming obstacles in civil-military operations,” 
Joint Force Quarterly. Summer 1999: 86-90.
9 Daniel L. Byman, “Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military,” Survival 43.2 (2001): 97-114.
10 Francis Abiew and Tom Keating, “NGOs and UN Peacekeeping Operations: Strange Bedfellow s,” 
International Peacekeeping. 6.2 1999: 90-105; Donna Winslow, “Strange Bedfellows in Humanitarian 
Crises: NGOs and the Military,” in Natalie Mychajlyzyn and Timothy M. Shaw, Twisting Arms and  
Flexing Muscles: Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding in Perspective. (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2005): 113-130.
11 R.K. Tomlinson, “Reversing the Downward Spiral: Exploring Cultural Dissonance Between the Military 
and NGOs on Humanitarian Operations,” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Cranfield University. 2000.
12 Michael Pugh, “Civil-military relations in the Kosovo crisis: an emerging hegemony?” Security 
Dialogue. 31(2) 2000: 229; see also Abiew and Keating, 98.
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Key Terms and Concepts
Hazy or not, the performance or coordination of humanitarian or development 
related tasks by military personnel, known (within NATO countries at least) by the 
military term ‘civil-military cooperation’ (or CIMIC as it is abbreviated) is a 
characteristic of contemporary military operations. Civil-military cooperation can be 
defined as
all measures undertaken between commanders and national authorities, civil, 
military and para-military, which concern the relationship between [military 
forces], the national governments and civil populations in an area where... 
military forces are deployed or plan to be deployed, supported, or employed. Such 
measures would also include cooperation and co-ordination of activities between 
commanders and non-governmental or international agencies, organizations and 
authorities.13
I will use the term civil-military cooperation (and its acronym CIMIC), throughout this 
thesis because it is the current term of art, despite the fact that it is problematic for two 
important reasons. First, the term is a value laden one, in that it assumes a degree of 
cooperation or partnership that is by no means universally present. However, it is the 
term most used by the participants themselves, especially in military and government 
circles. Other authors have used other terms such as ‘civil-military interactions’ and 
‘civil-military relations’.14 These terms eschew the normative assumptions of ‘civil- 
military cooperation’ but they are not widely known (not to mention recognized or 
adopted) by the military organizations conducting the activity in question.
13 Canada, Information Operations in Land Operations. B-GL-300-005/FP-001 (Ottawa: Department o f  
National Defence): 55. I use a Canadian definition here because I intend to evaluate CIMIC practice as 
performed by the Canadian military.
14 See Thomas G. Weiss, M ilitary-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises. 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); Michael C. Williams, “Civil-Military Relations and 
Peacekeeping,” International Institute o f  Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper'Ho. 321. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1998); and Michael Pugh, “Civil-military relations in the Kosovo crisis: an emerging hegemony?” Security 
Dialogue. 31(2) 2000: 229-242.
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Second, the term connotes collaboration or coordination of, not necessarily direct 
involvement in, a range of activities. This does not accord with the practice of 
contemporary civil-military cooperation. As Donna Winslow notes, “military mandates 
have become wider and more ambiguous and the tasks more multi-dimensional and 
multi-functional.”15 I intend to use civil-military cooperation in its widest possible sense, 
noting the term “all measures” in the definition provided above. Civil-military 
cooperation, then, describes those practices where elements of armed forces coordinate or 
engage with civilian entities, such as local authorities or other government agencies; non­
governmental organizations, international/intergovernmental organizations; and local 
populations. This practice takes place during some form of crisis situation, whether it be 
after a natural disaster, during or after a war, or, increasingly, during complex peace 
support and stability operations. It can take the form of contingency planning or the high 
level coordination of resources and objectives, but can also manifest itself as aid delivery 
or reconstruction activity by military forces, with or without the involvement of other 
agencies or organizations.16 Paradoxically, civil-military cooperation does not always 
involve cooperation at all.
It is important to note here that in order to understand the full dimension of civil- 
military cooperation it must be examined not merely as an idea, a theory or a doctrine, 
but rather as practice. Doctrine is important, of that there can be no doubt. As John 
Gooch rightly states, “doctrine is the bridge between thought and action. It interprets the 
higher conceptualization of war, embodied in strategic theories and operational plans,
15 Winslow, 113.
16 This is an evolution o f  a previous concept put forward in Christopher Ankersen, “Introduction: 
Interrogating CIMIC,” in Christopher Ankersen, ed. Civil-m ilitary cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations 
(London: Routledge, 2007): 1.
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• 17into working guidelines for action. In a word, doctrine articulates war.” Christopher
Lord further highlights the importance of doctrine by reminding us that “doctrine ideally
combines experience.. .in a balanced and reasoned whole, in such a manner as to provide
a framework of understanding.. .Military doctrine.. .is a curious hybrid of analysis and
• 18folk wisdom, tradition and careful innovation.”
However, an investigation that looked solely at doctrine would only examine part 
of the picture. In terms of Gooch’s metaphor, by looking only at the bridge of doctrine, 
and not the abutments critical to its existence (namely thought and action), much would 
be lost. This is extremely important in an area where, as we shall see, doctrine is 
sparse—and not necessarily followed. Lord is correct when he states that ideally doctrine 
combines a number of important pieces of information. The reality can be far from ideal, 
however; doctrine is often unconnected from operational requirements and may not 
reflect ‘what actually happens’. As Dominick Donald helpfully points out “doctrine can 
only achieve so much; the best doctrine is of no use at all if soldiers, or their political 
masters, will not apply it.”19
My focus, then, is on civil-military cooperation as practice, incorporating its 
ideas, its doctrine, and its actions. This reflects Iver Neumann’s assertion that examining 
only “textual approaches.. .brackets out the study of other kinds of action, and so cannot
17 John Gooch, “Introduction: Military Doctrine and Military History,” in John Gooch, ed. The Origins o f  
Contem porary Doctrine. Security and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper 30. (Camberley: SCSI, 
1997): 5.
18 Christopher Lord, “Intermediate Deployments: The Strategy o f  Doctrine o f  Peacekeeping-type 
Operations,” Security and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper 25. (Camberley: SCSI, 1996): 11.
19 Dominick Donald, “The Doctrine Gap: The Enduring Problem o f  Contemporary Peace Support 
Operations Thinking,” in Colin M clnnes and Nicholas J. Wheeler, eds. Dimensions o f  Western M ilitary 
Intervention. (London: Frank Cass, 2002): 128.
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account for social life understood as a whole.” He continues by calling for International 
Relations scholars to examine “not just.. .narrative discourse and rhetoric, but how 
politics is actually effected... [This] must include the analysis of practice understood as
9 1the study of social action itself.”
One difficulty in presenting civil-military cooperation in an institutionalized form 
is that it connotes that it is a coherent, well-oiled set of practices. In fact, it is not, but 
rather depends on “the creativity and improvisational skills of its practitioners” for its
99success. Civil-military cooperation appears highly differentiated across national
approaches and variable across the geographies in which it has been deployed. Observers
speak of peacekeeping missions as being ad hoc affairs23 and comment on how different
personalities and perspectives have enormous effect on the conduct and outcome of such
practices. For example, in Somalia, the ham-fisted and unsuccessful efforts of the US
Army can be contrasted with the nuanced, and consequently more harmonious, approach
of the US Marine Corps.24 Stuart Gordon states that civil-military cooperation practices
are “highly context dependent” and while there has been a move towards its
institutionalization, it is at best incomplete:
[Western states] have begun the process of creating civil affairs-type capabilities 
that may, with time, enable a more structured, predictable, and enduring civil-
20 Iver Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case o f  Diplomacy,” Millennium: 
Journal o f  International Studies. 31.3 (2002): 627.
21 Neumann, 628.
22 Shashi Tharoor and Ian Johnstone, “The Humanitarian Security Dilemma in International Peacekeeping,” 
in D.S. Gordon and F.H. Toase, eds. Aspects o f  Peacekeeping  (London: Frank Cass, 2001): 3-18.
23 Philip Wilkinson, “Sharpening the Weapons o f  Peace: Peace Support Operations and Complex 
Emergencies,” in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds. Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution. 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000): 68. See also Stephen Ryan, “United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter o f  
Principles?” in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds. Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000): 27-47.
24 Kevin M. Kennedy, “The Relationship Between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in 
Operation Restore Hope,” in Walter M. Clarke, Jeffrey M. Herbst, eds. Learning from Somalia: The 
Lessons o f  Armed Humanitarian Intervention. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997): 104-105.
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military relationship to be created...Nevertheless...this...relationship [between 
military forces and aid agencies]...is likely to continue to defy predictability.25
There is no single version that has been institutionalized, but rather several coexisting
brands o f civil-military cooperation, as James Landon illustrates in Figure 1.1 below.
Even in situations governed by a common mandate and, presumably, similar situational
demands (e.g. the need to provide emergency shelter, the need to feed hungry
populations, etc.) the existence o f national perspectives lead to a host of different mission
interpretations, and therefore, different civil-military cooperation practices.
Figure 1.1: National Perspectives and CIMIC Mission Interpretation26
Mandate
Strict fLimited) Iuteipratatioa: Etbaoceiitrrc CIMIC ~| 
S w f f l jU.S Force Protection. Liaison: Limited Direct Support 1
[U.K.: CIMIC by Ccsvetitijn.a] Troop',; Ouect Av.::tance
iNorcLc Niche'
F ra n c e  ^  M ija ry  Mission - Isisson. Movsaent Control
‘ ” Mil-Civ: Nonazlirv Procacdoa - Direct A iu k e d c a  Pr»j»rts
Mission: Strict Neutrality: Mediation 
Observation; Interposition: Transition Assistance
N ational Perspectives A ,• .. T .Mission Interpietation
This is because civil-military cooperation is not simply motivated by an 
overarching globally connected master narrative (whether that is neo-liberalism or
25 Stuart Gordon, “From Antipathy to Hegemony: The Impact o f Civil-Military Cooperation,” in Stephen 
Badsey and Paul Latawski, eds. Britain, NATO and the Lessons o f  the Balkan Conflicts 1991-1999. 
(London: Frank Cass, 2004): pp. 181-202. See also Dominic Donald, “The Doctrine Gap: The Enduring 
Problem o f Contemporary Peace Support Operations Thinking,” in Colin M clnnes and Nicholas J. 
Wheeler, eds. Dimensions o f  Western Military Intervention (London: Frank Cass, 2002): 107-139; and K. 
Van Brabant, “Understanding, promoting and evaluating coordination: an outline framework,” in D.S. 
Gordon and F.H. Toase, eds. Aspects o f  Peacekeeping  (London: Frank Cass, 2001): 141.
26 James J. Landon, “CIMIC: Civil Military Coordination,” in Larry Wentz, ed  Lessons fro m  Bosnia: The 
IFOR Experience (W ashington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997): 128.
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cosmopolitanism), nor is it an ‘objective’ response to situations on the ground. It is a 
reflection of the people who carry it out; civil-military cooperation is a based upon the 
norms and expectations of those who practice it. Not only of the actual soldiers but also 
of the collectivities (organizational, social, and political) in which they are embedded. 
Ignatieff insists “we are more interested in ourselves than we are in the places, like
97Bosnia, that we take up as causes.” Robert Cooper has stated that a country’s foreign
• • * T Q  * ,  #policy needs to “get under the domestic skin” in order to be successful. In fact, this is 
only partially correct: foreign policies are born o f  the domestic flesh that makes up a 
country. If we believe that the same applies to military roles and missions, then this 
perspective can help clarify the ironic tension inherent in the notion of warfighters also 
being peacebuilders.
Seen in this light, military activity is a process, “a set o f  relationships [rather] than 
an individual event ” Even within the most hierarchical aspect of these relationships— 
the relationship between the government and the army—efficiency relies to a large 
degree on cooperation, bound up in “a complex interplay of societal, political and
*3 A i
military interests, values, and expectations.” If military action results from a process of 
relations, and if that process is a dynamic and multi-faceted one, war cannot help but be 
affected. Clausewitz states that policy does not just initiate military action, but also “will
27 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. (Toronto: Vintage,
2003): 42.
28 Robert Cooper, The Breaking o f  Nations. (London: Atlantic Books, 2003): 83.
29 C.E. Welch, “Civilian Control o f  the Military: Myth and Reality,” in C.E. Welch, ed. Civilian Control o f  
the Military: Theory and Cases from  Developing Countries. (Albany, NY: State University o f  N ew  York 
Press, 1976): 1. Emphasis in original.
30 Douglas L. Bland, “Your Obedient Servant: The Military’s Role in Civil Control o f  the Armed Forces,” 
Paper Presented at EUROMIL Conference in Prague, December 2000: 1. Copy held by author.
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T 1determine its character”. A contemporary example of this can be seen in the course of
military operations in Bosnia. Despite desperate cries from journalists, analysts, 
commanders and diplomats on the ground, Western countries were loathe to do much, as 
Sarajevo was tom apart, and then enclave after enclave of Bosnian Muslims were 
attacked and, infamously in Srbrenica, slaughtered. The people of Europe and North 
America may have been transfixed by the nightly news, but their passions were not 
sufficiently aroused to call for an immediate, robust response. Instead, their cry was that
in
‘something must be done’. Following from this sentiment, but lacking any clear vision 
of what that something might look like, “the head-shaking and hand-wringing of 
politicians [was] eventually translated into military action.” Bom of dithering, the 
military action that eventually took place bore the hallmarks of trepidation, caution, and 
failure to act. The people, the government, and the army all play a part in creating the 
type of ‘war’ that occurs, be it savage and brutal, or effete and ineffectual.
Aim of the Thesis
Civil-military cooperation embodies a vital contradiction. It is, by definition, 
something odd. This oddness is worthy of sustained study on several grounds, both 
practical (in terms of military and political ‘lessons learned,’ for example) and 
theoretical, but there are other worthy reasons as well. First, civil-military cooperation is 
a defining feature—perhaps even the defining feature—that marks the transition from 
peacekeeping to peace support operations and beyond. Second, civil-military cooperation
31 Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Peret, eds. and trans. (London: David 
Campbell Publishers, 1993): Book 8, Chapter 6, 732.
32 See Graham N. Green, “N o Fire in a Vacuum: Distraction, Disinterest, Distortion, and Disunity in 
Formulating Western Policy towards the Former Yugoslavia,” in Maya Shatzmiller, ed. Islam and Bosnia: 
Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States. (Montreal and Kingston: M cGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2002): 161-175.
33 Lord, 16.
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is set to continue, perhaps even to intensify. As Max Boot, the American neo­
conservative thinker, writes in his history of ‘small wars,’ the 21st Century will be full of 
“wars in which...soldiers act as ‘social workers.’”34 Daniel Pipes, agrees, although 
appears to be more jejune in his appraisal: “Almost unnoticed, war as social work has 
become the expectation.”35 Whether or not one agrees with the principles behind or 
practice of civil-military cooperation, it is likely to be with us for some time, as it has
•5/
been for centuries, albeit in different forms and under different names. As Hugo Slim 
reminds us “militaries and humanitarians have represented two sides of the same coin—
7^humankind’s inability to manage conflict peacefully” ; therefore, they find themselves 
thrust together, forced to work side by side.
At the same time, little has been written about civil-military cooperation from a 
theoretical perspective. As the review of literature (in Chapter 2) will illustrate, civil- 
military cooperation is often subsumed under the rubric of peacekeeping or peace support 
operations, where it receives little sustained attention. There are exceptions to this rule 
(most notably by Michael Pugh and Larry Weiss) but these works have not tended to look 
at the internal dynamics of civil-military cooperation; that is, they have not focused on 
the ‘domestic arrangements’ that underpin and drive civil-military cooperation. In this 
thesis, I seek to interrogate those arrangements, and using a theoretical framework from
34 Max Boot, Small Wars, (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 338. Here Boot is referring to the perjorative 
term invoked by Michael Mandelbaum in his critique o f  Clintonian foreign policy in Michael Mandelbaum,
“Foreign Policy as Social Work,” Foreign Affairs, 75.1 (January/February 1996): 16-32. 
j5 Daniel Pipes, “Don’t treat war as social work,” The National Post Online. 6 May 2003. 
http://www.np.com; accessed 6 May 2003.
36 Even the initial pessimism surrounding “humanitarian intervention” evident at the beginning o f  the Bush 
administration has begun to subside. N o matter what they are labeled— stability operations is the latest 
moniker— it is likely that such interference and convergence is set to continue. See Sung-han Kim, “The 
End o f  Humanitarian Intervention?” Orbis. (Fall) 2003: 721-736.
37 Hugo Slim, “The stretcher and the drum: civil-military relations in peace support operations,” in J. 
Ginifer, ed. Beyond the Emergency. (London: Frank Cass, 1997): 124.
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classical ‘war studies’, explain how it is that civil-military cooperation has come to be the 
way that it is.
Furthermore, the existing theoretical work tends to examine civil-military 
cooperation in terms of its affect on NGOs and aid agencies, while most of the writing 
concentrating on the military settles for a ‘lessons learned’ (and therefore non-theoretical) 
format. I wish to bring some balance to the literature by concentrating on civil-military 
cooperation from the point of view of the military. This focus is warranted for several 
reasons. While I will demonstrate that the practice of civil-military cooperation is the 
product of a Trinitarian relationship within a given society, it is largely carried out by 
only one of those actors—the military. There are some indications that this may be 
beginning to change (with the advent of larger civilian components within Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams, for instance), but during the time period under examination in this 
study (that is, 1999-2007), civil-military cooperation is a military practice. My 
qualifying phrase “with a given society” above is also of importance. There are several 
perspectives from which one might examine civil-military cooperation, including that of 
the ‘beneficiary’ populations or implementing partners. These avenues of inquiry are 
legitimate and fascinating in their own right, and while there is much work to be done in 
these areas, they do not form the basis of this study. Other observers have done so (as 
discussed in Chapter 1) and I have done so elsewhere. Even in complex, multi-actor 
phenomena there can be value in an in-depth look at one actor’s motivations and
38 For an early example o f this, see Christopher Ankersen, “Coordination, Cooperation, or Something 
Else?” in Douglas L. Bland, et al. eds. Challenge and Change for the Military: N ew  M issions, Old 
Problems. Montreal and Kingston: M cGill-Queen’s University Press: 2004.
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behaviours. Furthermore, while civil-military cooperation may connote a 
partenership, in many cases, especially early on in its application as a practice, it was 
almost completely the reserve of the military.40
I may be looking at one actor, but I aim to do so in a theoretically robust fashion. 
Alex Bellamy asserts that the ‘next stage’ in peace operations theory must be normative, 
subjective, and reflexive.41 While I agree with the latter two premises, I do not recognise 
the dichotomy between instrumental and normative theory. The notion that policy 
relevance somehow hobbles theory is absurd; good policy can and should be informed by 
good theory. What must be done is to connect civil-military cooperation literature to 
wider theoretical knowledge without withdrawing completely from the policy world. 
After all, the problems that instrumental literature tries to address are serious challenges. 
Rather than relying on conventional wisdom, or ignoring problems altogether, it might be 
possible to create ideas, rich in theory and constructive in terms of practice. Rather than 
having to choose between the work of ‘doers’ and ‘thinkers’, I prefer Bellamy, Williams, 
and Griffin’s contention that there is a “continuing gap between the formal theories and
39 For example, Mark Duffield looks at contemporary development practice, from the perspective o f  
(mostly British) government aid agencies. For him, the recipients o f  the fruit these NGOs are not the 
primary focus and, therefore, receive little consideration. See Mark Duffield, Development, Security and  
Unending War: Governing the World o f  Peoples. Cambridge: Polity, 2007.
40 In the Canadian case, for instance, in Bosnia during the period under review, the only Canadian aid 
agency representative in the country was attached to the Embassy in Sarejevo, far from the area o f  
operations in the northeast where civil-military cooperation was taking place. Likewise in K osovo in 1999: 
there was a Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) representative, located in Pristina, who 
departed once the Canadian military established an effective presence in the province. Similarly, in other 
missions, CIDA deployed very few staff to be involved with civil-military cooperation, preferring to see the 
military as an ‘implementing partner’ . It is not really until the deployment o f  the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan that civilian participation, at the government aid agency level, 
is formalized, and even then, it is dwarfed in size by the number o f  military personnel involved. While 
soldiers may w ell com e in battalions, government aid workers do seem to come as single spies.
41 Alex J. Bellamy, “The ‘N ext Stage’ in Peace Operations Theory?” International Peacekeeping. 11.1 
(Spring) 2004: 17-38.
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the practical experiences of peacekeeping.”42 It is that gap that this thesis is attempting to
bridge, albeit with specific regard to civil-military cooperation. I wish to avoid falling
into the trap Pugh decribes, that of taking my subject matter as given:
the received view of peacekeeping in global governance is not neutral but serves 
the purpose of an existing order within which problem solving adjustments can 
occur. The concentration.. .on ‘the doable’ and on ‘working with what we’ve got’ 
may yield important practical lessons, but the prevailing wisdom, and much of the 
dissent on the issue, does not interrogate the order itself and, by accepting it as 
“reality”, reinforces its underlying values and structures.43
However, I believe that it is still important to understand how and why ‘the prevailing
wisdom’ has accepted anything as ‘reality’, and just how its ‘underlying values and
structures’ are implicated. Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin hint at the importance of this
by asking two questions with regard to their study of peacekeeping. Not only are they
interested in determining “the chief characteristics of the contemporary political
environment in which peacekeepers operate” they also wish to understand
“how.. .peacekeepers [have] come to understand their role within it.”44 In order to do so,
it is vital that the actors involved in civil-military cooperation are examined.
While Landon’s picture (Figure 1.1 above) may be worth a thousand words, it
does not problematise the prism of ‘national perspectives’. To mix metaphors, Landon’s
prism is a ‘black box’. A key aim of this thesis, then, is to explore one of those national
perspectives and the corresponding rays of military practice. I want to look at this in a
way similar to what Minear and Weiss describe as the politics of humanitarianism:
politics is the arena in which priorities are established, social contracts formed, 
participation and accountability nurtured. As the term “arena” suggests, politics is 
an ongoing struggle, within nations and between them. It commands
42 Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin. Understanding Peacekeeping. (Cambridge: Polity,
2004): 4.
43 Pugh, “Peacekeeping and Critical Theory,” 1-2. M y emphasis.
44 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, p .l.
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constituencies by virtue of the vision that it promotes. Whether an issue is a 
domestic one such as abortion or an international one such as ethnic cleansing, 
political courses of action reflect understandings of shared values and 
responsibilities. The question is not, therefore, whether humanitarian and 
political action intersect but rather how the interplay is understood and 
managed.45
While I will not look at the politics behind interventions, but rather at how they are 
conducted once they are underway, this political orientation remains central.46
Accordingly, the overarching question becomes, “Why is civil-military 
cooperation practiced the way that it is?” This can be broken down to two related 
questions:
1. How is civil-military cooperation conceived of within a state and did it come 
to be understood this way?
2. How does the actual practice of civil-military cooperation change the way that 
it is understood?
The thesis is an examination of the actors, rules, expectations, and identities involved in 
the development and conduct of civil-military cooperation.
It is worthwhile to note that this thesis is not an examination of the effectiveness 
of civil-military cooperation as a practice. It does not evaluate how well civil-military 
cooperation actually delivers aid or improves the lives of the population or even if it 
meets the objectives set out for it by the military commanders who carry it out. While
45 Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarian Politics,” (Washington: Foreign Policy Association, 
1995); Thomas G. Weiss, “The Politics o f  Humanitarian Ideas,” Security Dialogue. 31.1 2000: 11-23. O f 
course there are many other politics at work here besides the domestic politics o f  intervening states, 
including the political relationships between peacekeepers and the host nation, amongst regional actors, and 
throughout the so-called international community. See Neil MacFarlane, “Politics and Humanitarian 
Action,” Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute For International Studies And The United Nations University 
Occasional Paper #41 (Providence, RI: Brown University, 2000).
46 An even more fundamental definition o f  politics can be said to be at work here, taken from the title o f  
Harold Lasswell’s classic, Politics: Who gets what, when, and how. (New York: Peter Smith Publishers, 
1990).
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this line of analysis is fascinating and important, it is not my aim at this stage.47 The 
reasoning for such delimitation is that prior to any form of measurement, it is important 
to come to grips with the way in which a practice has been conceived and understood. 
Based on such an understanding, a clearer picture of what can be expected and what can 
be measured would be possible, and indeed stand a better chance of capturing the 
relevant qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of evaluation.
In answering these questions I will use data that reflect civil-military cooperation 
journey through peacekeeping to stability operations, discussed above. The first case I 
will draw from will be the NATO mission to Kosovo, in 1999, known as the Kosovo 
Force (KFOR). Following immediately on the heels of the Allied air campaign against 
Yugoslav forces in the region, KFOR’s early months were spent dealing with the return 
of refugees and other displaced people, as well as the chaos surrounding the flight of Serb 
officials who were largely responsible for providing official civil administration. Civil- 
military cooperation undertaken during the ground campaign that followed was initially 
very ‘event driven’ reacting to perceived emergencies, in the form of assessing the extent 
of the humanitarian situation and the provision of basic shelter before the arrival of 
winter. The second case looks at Bosnia in 2002, again concentrating on the NATO 
mission (known as the Stabilization Force or SFOR). By 2002 SFOR was a ‘mature 
mission’; that is to say, it was not considered to be working in an emergency situation 
and was executing an elaborate, predetermined campaign plan. Civil-military 
cooperation still dealt with issues of humanitarian assistance, but for the most part its
47 Evaluations o f  this type are now starting to appear, albeit in different formats and focusing at the 
‘strategic level’. For one such study, which looks at the wider post-conflict reconstruction effort in Iraq, 
from an American perspective, see Stuart W. Bowen, Jr, H ard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 
Experience. (Washington, DC: Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, 2009).
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focus was on more advanced forms of aid to the local communities, including community 
reconstruction and rudimentary economic development. The final case is that of 
Afghanistan, both under the aegis of the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) in 2002 and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from 
2003 onwards to 2007. Military activities in Afghanistan run the gamut from those 
conducted on peacekeeping operations to combat tactics conducted as part of stability 
operations. While I will use data from these cases, I will not be examining each case 
individually, but will be drawing on them throughout the empirical sections of the thesis, 
according to a theoretical framework (developed in Chapter 3).
So that the dynamics behind civil-military cooperation can be understood as 
richly as possible, the thesis concentrates on one country: Canada. Such a focus allows 
for the relevant domestic actors to be investigated comprehensively and their 
relationships fully charted. I have chosen Canada for three main reasons. First, it is a 
frequent participant in peacekeeping, PSOs, and stability operations. It has been involved 
in all the cases listed above, and many more besides, ranging from traditional UN 
missions in Cyprus, to more ambitious ventures in Cambodia and East Timor. Second, 
the current literature is dominated by analyses of American, and to a lesser extent British, 
civil-military cooperation practices. Canada provides a useful counterbalance to these 
studies and my findings may be more applicable to other ‘middle’ powers involved in 
civil-military cooperation (such as, say, the Netherlands, and the various Scandinavian 
and Nordic countries). Third, owing to my own background and experience , I have 
been able to secure access to documents and people within Canada that would be
481 am a Canadian citizen, and spent 12 years in the Canadian Forces as an infantry officer, from 1988 until 
2000. While I took part in overseas peacekeeping and peace support missions (in Croatia 1992-1993 and 
Kosovo 1999) I was not involved in the performance o f  CIMIC tasks.
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extremely difficult to replicate in other countries. It is important to stress that this study 
is not comparative: it looks at a single country’s experience and does not relate it to that 
of others. While this ‘single country’ focus may limit the universal generalisability of 
my study, I believe this is more than made up for by the depth of the findings.49
There is a correlation between the country in focus and the case selection. Quite 
independent of their wider geopolitical significance, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan 
played important roles within Canadian political, social, and military spheres as well, 
particularly as it relates to civil-military cooperation. From a political perspective, 
Kosovo was seen—and portrayed to the public—as a ‘human security mission’: the 
military was there to rescue the Kosovar minority from Serbian oppression. For the 
military, Kosovo was envisioned primarily as a ‘peace enforcement mission’ and the 
contingent was designed with the possibility of combat (to push out the remaining 
Yugoslav forces, in accordance with the mission’s mandate). Civil-military cooperation 
was assigned to a company as a ‘be prepared’—that is, a secondary—task. However, 
from early on it became evident that civil-military cooperation (running the gamut from 
humanitarian relief to civil administration) was to become the main thrust of the 
battalion’s effort. For Canada, “Kosovo was very much a ‘come-as-you-are’ affair [and 
its]military forces were forced to conduct peacebuilding with their warfighting hats on.”50
Bosnia, of course, was a mission that predated Kosovo. However, the period 
under study in this thesis, as mentioned above, is of NATO forces in a “mature mission”.
49 M. Williams calls this making “moderatum generalizations”. M. Williams, “Interpretivism and 
Generalisation” Sociology 34.2 (2000): 215. I will comment on this more fully in the methodological 
appendix found at the end o f  this study.
50 Christopher Ankersen, “Praxis versus policy: Peacebuilding and the Canadian Forces,” in Thomas 
Keating and W.Andy Knight, eds. Building Sustainable Peace. (Edmonton/Tokyo: University o f  Alberta 
Press/United Nations University Press, 2004): 76.
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« thIndeed, for Canada, the unit I visited represented the 15 ‘rotation’ into the theatre.
Quite differently from Kosovo, the Canadian battalion in Bosnia in 2003 was organized 
with civil-military cooperation staff in its headquarters and a forty soldier strong civil- 
military cooperation platoon, drawn from Reservists, deployed throughout the area of 
operations. This was, in fact, the first battalion to be so organized. Previously, within 
Bosnia (both under NATO and United Nations auspices) and even in Croatia (in 1992- 
1993), civil-military cooperation was not conducted by specially designated troops, but 
rather as a either a ‘secondary task’ (assigned to a rarely used sub-sub-unit such as an 
anti-tank platoon) or just a task that ‘everyone’ was expected to carry out.
Afghanistan represents a step change in importance from Canada’s Balkan 
involvement, but can be seen as a ‘step backwards’ in some respects, at least initially, as 
far as civil-military cooperation is concerned. Largely viewed in terms of Canadian- 
American relations following September 11th, 2001, the various missions to Afghanistan 
(from 2002 to 2007) carried out civil-military cooperation in a variety of ways: in 2002, 
the battalion deployed with only a single, untrained civil-military cooperation officer. 
Over the course of the six-month mission, conducted under American command, the 
realization of the need for civil-military cooperation led to an innovative approach.51 
After that initial deployment, Canada deployed a variety of civil-military cooperation 
structures, from ‘cells’ within battalions to Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Outline of the Thesis
This introduction has situated civil-military cooperation by illustrating the 
characteristics of peace support operations and how civil-military cooperation fits into
51 See Christopher Ankersen, “Peacekeeping Intelligence and Civil Society: Is CIMIC the missing link?” in 
David Carment and Martin Rudner, eds. Peacekeeping Intelligence: Extended Boundaries and N ew  
Players. London: Francis and Taylor, 2006.
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that framework. It has introduced the key terms and concepts that will be relevant 
throughout the study, and identified the thrust of the thesis (namely, the politics of civil- 
military cooperation).
Chapter Two is a review of the literature surrounding civil-military cooperation, 
including scholarship not only on peacekeeping and peace-support operations, but on 
civil-military relations and military doctrine. One of the most important findings coming 
out of this chapter is that no model current exists that incorporates the key actors, their 
shared context, and the relationship between them.
Chapter Three traces the construction of such a model, based on Clausewitz’s 
‘secondary trinity’: people, government, and the armed forces. To this construct is added 
Peter Katzenstein’s regard for the culture of national security and Gwyn Harries-Jenkins’ 
appreciation for legitimacy and Benjamin Gregg’s understanding of indeterminacy. The 
resulting comprehensive model allows for the politics of civil-military cooperation to 
better understood.
The next three chapters (Chapters Four, Five, and Six) form the empirical heart of 
the thesis. In accordance with the theoretical model developed in Chapter Three, they 
look at the contribution of the people, the government, and the armed forces 
(respectively), in the context of shaping civil-military cooperation as a practice. Each 
chapter begins with a brief description of the constituent elements of the actor in 
question, and proceeds to map out the ways in which each actor contributes to the 
practice of civil-military cooperation.
Chapter Seven is concerned with the synthesis of the findings from the preceding 
analysis. In so doing, it paints the full picture of how the elements of Clausewitz’s trinity
26
interact to shape military practice. Chapter Eight concludes by evaluating the impact of 
this interaction—the true politics of civil-military cooperation—both in policy and 
theoretical terms, for Canada and other states.
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\Chapter 1: 
Missing Pieces: The State of the Literature
It is possible to write in a variety of styles, some of which rely on a manipulation 
of grammar for their effect. Take three examples. First, if a writer leaves out the active 
subject of a sentence, that sentence is said to be written in the ‘passive voice’ (or, as it is 
increasingly known, the ‘bureaucratic voice’). Things happen, but it is not clear how.
The focus is on completed action and ultimate effect rather than on any actor. This style 
has the effect of creating an atmosphere devoid of responsibility; when a child explains 
‘the window got broken,’ it begs the question ‘who broke it?’ Ernest Hemmingway 
provides a second example of a literary style; he was famous for his simplified writing, 
noted for its lack of adjectives and adverbs. The result is terse and abrupt prose, one 
where the characters’ context (the extent of their relationship, for example) is often 
implicit or assumed. The focus is on the character (Nick Adams, say) rather than his 
history. This gives the reader the strange feeling of eavesdropping on a conversation and 
not being quite ‘up to speed’ with what is being said. The novel Le Train de Nulle Part 
provides the third example: is written entirely without verbs—description par excellence. 
The common critical complaint is predictable: not enough action. Its pseudonymous 
author, Michel Thaler, is not unaware of this effect, claiming, “I am like a car driver who 
has smashed the windscreen so he cannot see into the future, smashed the rear-view 
mirror so he cannot see the past, and is travelling in the present.” Each of these styles 
can be mobilised by artistically eliminating some degree of grammatical pleonasm or 
other (Thaler regards verbs as weeds, and Hemmingway notoriously declared war on
52 Cited in Kim Willsher, “‘Fictitious’ author publishes the first book without verbs,” The D aily Telegraph, 
9 May 2004. [http://www.news.telegraph.co.uk; accessed 26 July 2004].
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adjectives) in order to create a desired poetic effect. However, none of them would be 
suited to a holistic explanation of complex social phenomena. Yet, it is if the body of 
literature surrounding and concerning civil-military cooperation were afflicted with each 
of these styles to some degree. Much of the field concentrates on structural explanations 
for actions, ignoring the variety of actors involved. Other parts of the literature focus on 
the actors, but give no attention to the context surrounding them. Moreover, there are 
many authors who describe civil-military cooperation as if it were a set of static 
relationships, with no indication of those relationships changing or evolving.
The challenge, then, is to create a theoretical framework that can encompass all 
the necessary components required of a holistic analysis of the complex set of practices 
that is civil-military cooperation, one that accommodates actors, their dynamic 
relationships and their context. This chapter will explore the existing literature 
surrounding civil-military cooperation, highlighting both its strengths and its weaknesses, 
concluding with a set of criteria upon which a successful theoretical framework can be 
based, with a view to using this framework to understand the main research question of 
this study, “Why is civil-military cooperation practiced the way that it is?”
Instrumental and Normative Perspectives
The salience of civil-military cooperation may have increased over the course of 
the last decade and a half, but the amount written about it has not followed the same 
trend. What little literature there is “has been determined by problem solving 
imperatives, concerning the diplomatic politics and techniques of peacekeeping, lessons- 
leamed from operations and prescriptive analysis for improving performance in these
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areas.”53 Accordingly, a common refrain within the literature is to claim that 
peacekeeping has been approached atheoretically.54 Such an observation, however, is not 
to deny that instrumental literature is important and well intentioned; at the very least it 
illustrates the attention that scholars and practitioners have paid the topic. And it is 
practitioners (or those who write with practitioners in mind) that have produced a good 
portion of the literature. They range from military planners,55 doctrine writers,56 and
5 7  5 0
civil-military cooperation operatives to NGO-oriented researchers . These writings 
concentrate on the relationship between military forces and civilian organizations 
involved in civil-military cooperation activities, or investigate the procedural, 
organisational and logistical obstacles or mistakes that have arisen in the course of civil- 
military cooperation experiences, in search of the ever elusive ‘lessons’ that may be 
identified and hopefully learned so that future occasions may occur more smoothly. As 
Chris Seiple notes, for instance, his work “is written.. .from the point of view of those 
who operate at ground level, where, no matter the official positions of governments 
organizations, a working policy must be developed which ‘works.’”59
Some scholars criticise this approach because they believe it to be “self- 
referential”; that is “it takes peacekeeping activities as its starting point and asks how
53 Michael Pugh, “Peacekeeping and Critical Theory,” Draft Paper for BIS A Conference, 16-18 December 
2002: p. 1. [Mimeo held by author]
54 For example, see Thomas Weiss, “ More Questions than Answers,” D isasters. 21.2 1997: 95-117.
55See J.W. Rollins, “Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in crisis response operations: the implications for 
NATO,” International Peacekeeping. 8.1 (Spring) 2001: 122-129.
56 See Nick Spence, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies: More than a Field Application,” 
International Peacekeeping. 9.1 (Spring) 2002): 165-171.
57 See Douglas Delaney, “CIMIC operations during Operation ‘Kinetic’,” Canadian M ilitary Journal. 
Winter 2000-2001:29-34.
58 See Jane Barry and Anna Jefferys, “A bridge too far: aid agencies and the military in humanitarian 
response,” Humanitarian Practice Network Paper # 37. (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002).
59 Chris Seiple, The U.S. M ilitary/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions. (Carlisle, PA: United 
States Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996): 3.
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they can be done better” rather than questioning whether they should be done at all.60
This is not surprising, given the aim of the writing or the background of the writers.
From a practitioner’s point of view, improving practice is a perfectly legitimate outcome
of analysis. However, by focusing on effectiveness and efficiency, this body of work
tends to ignore fundamental issues. As Alex Bellamy notes:
instrumental approaches are predicated on significant normative assumptions that 
are left unexplored. They are: international peace and security is a moral good in 
itself; violent conflict represents a ‘breakdown’ of normal social relations; the 
great majority of people prefer peace to war and need only be represented with 
‘paths’ to peace; there is a direct link between international peace and good 
governance at the domestic level; and ‘good’ governance equates to Western-style 
statehood, democratization, neo-liberal economics and the existence of an active 
civil society.61
Agreeing with Bellamy’s assessment of the implicit assumptions, Beth Fetherston 
goes so far as to claim that all peacekeeping theory is bound up within the
fO“unproblematized discourse of modernity.” That is to say, it is concerned with the
notion of solving problems in the name of effecting progress. There certainly is evidence 
of the normative agenda being either neglected or pushed aside in much of the civil- 
military cooperation literature. Peter Erickson is typical of this seemingly pragmatic 
attitude; his article stems from the ‘fact’ that a joint civilian and military approach is 
required in order to achieve success in contemporary peace support operations, and 
therefore, progress should be made in making the system work more efficiently.63
60 A lex J. Bellamy, “The ‘Next Stage’ in Peace Operations Theory?” International Peacekeeping. 11.1 
(Spring) 2004: 17-38.
61 Bellamy, 19.
62 A.B. Fetherston, “Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsiderations o f  
Theoretical Frameworks,” in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds. Peacekeeping and Conflict 
Resolution (London: Frank Cass, 2000): 190.
63 P. Eriksson, “Civil-military coordination in peace support operations— an impossible necessity,” 
Journal o f  Humanitarian Assistance. September 2000. [http://www.jha.ac/articles/a061.htm; accessed 1 
October 2002]
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However, much instrumental writing does establish its normative perspective (if
not its agenda). Nick Spence is quite clear in the opening section of his article on civil-
military cooperation; he believes that old approaches are no longer workable, and that
new techniques are necessary:
the scale and nature of the challenges in contemporary operations are such that no 
single component has the wherewithal to address completely the root causes, 
thereby enabling longer-term socio-political transition to a stable and self- 
sustaining environment and resolution of the crisis. Complex crises are 
fundamentally political. The deployment of a security force to address an 
unresolved conflict and the employment of humanitarian organisations to relieve 
suffering are, by themselves merely anaesthetizing a dynamic situation and 
preventing it from reaching its culminating point; at best they provide an enforced 
‘negative peace’. Unless the symptoms, causes and underlying dynamics of the 
situation are addressed then its resolution will never progress beyond prolonged 
containment.64
Spence may not label it as such, but he is laying out an unmistakable liberal 
understanding of conflict. It goes well beyond a simple ‘peace as the absence of direct 
system-level violence’ orientation, and advocates intrusive means of conflict resolution. 
Therefore, to characterise all instrumental literature as mere tinkering would be 
inaccurate. Many authors in this school would be quite happy to have peacekeeping (and 
its constitutive practices such as civil-military cooperation) radically changed, rather than 
merely modified or improved. An example of authors who believe in large scale change, 
but not in the same direction as Spence, can be seen in the work of Jane Barry and Anna 
Jefferys who, for instance, believe that there must be a limit to the close contact between 
military forces and civilian development agencies and although they do not explicitly lay 
out a normative manifesto, make it perfectly clear what their idea of an ideal situation 
looks like.65 Andrew Terrell, on the other hand, proceeds from an equally lucid
64 Spence, 165-166.
65 Barry and Jefferys, 1-3.
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normative point of origin; he believes that civil-military cooperation should be less 
collaborative and more directive—with the military fully in control—changing it from 
cooperation to coordination.66 Bellamy may be correct in stating that such writing does 
not explicitly lay out its normative standpoint, but it cannot be denied that authors that 
advocate ‘improvements’ to civil-military cooperation often do so from distinct 
normative positions. It is not necessarily the case that these writers have not considered 
such arguments, just that they do not state them unambiguously. However, in terms of 
the literary images at the beginning of this chapter, the instrumentalists are the most 
Hemmingway-like in their writing, tending to ‘leave out’ much of the context in their 
stories.
Roland Paris, another critic of the instrumentalist camp, believes that the implicit 
liberal agenda underpinning much of what has been written in the instrumental vein is 
only part of the problem. Because “the literature.. .is too limited in the scope of its 
inquiry and devotes too much attention to ‘policy relevance,’ or the goal of offering 
advice and recommendations to decisionmakers” it has become “cut off from the rest of 
political science.”67 His assessments are accurate and applicable to civil-military 
cooperation literature. Much of the work in the field does tend to be incremental and 
devoid of any theoretical influence, often informed instead by ‘common sense’ and 
personal experience. The problem may not be a focus on existing ‘problems’ or the lack
66 A. Terrell. “Controlling The Angels: An Examination o f  the Need to Actively Control Non- 
Governmental Organisations Operating Within the Boundaries o f  a United Nations Sanctioned Peace 
Support Operation,” Defence Research Paper. (Watchfield: Joint Services Command and Staff College, 
2000).
67 Roland Paris, “Broadening the Study o f  Peace Operations,” International Studies Review. 2.3 (Fall) 
2000: 27.
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of an explicit normative agenda, but that the extant (and implicit) normative agenda 
“silences other possibilities.”68 
Systemic and Domestic Accounts
Because of the dominance of ‘common sense’ approaches, it is not surprising that 
the most visible emerging trend in the theoretical literature is to ascribe to a ‘critical 
theory’ perspective, which has tended to explain civil-military in terms of the larger 
phenomena of globalisation or global governance. As alluded to above, Paris sees 
contemporary peacebuilding as a modem day mission civalitrice, whereby Western states 
take it upon themselves to bring failed states back into line—with the tenets of liberalism 
defining both the ends and the means of the process.69 Mark Duffield connects civil- 
military cooperation to the convergence of security and development, as a result of an 
increasingly globalised economy, where the West cannot ‘afford’ some conflicts. As a 
result, “strategic complexes” are formed, made up of a variety of actors, which are in 
essence nothing more than instruments of the Western states.70 Rather than accept the 
implicit liberal agenda (as described by Spence and Bellamy above) these authors 
question and problematise the assumptions that underpin practices like civil-military 
cooperation, putting them into the context of larger transnational or global processes.
Neorealists, such as Barry R. Posen, argue that the nature of the international 
system determines military doctrine. Posen argues that military doctrine is “a state’s 
theory about how to it can best ‘cause’ security for itself’ and is created “given an 
anarchical international environment [within which] the number of possible threats is
68 Fetherston, 190.
69 Roland Paris, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilatrice’,” Review  o f  International 
Studies. 28.4 (2002): 637-56.
70 Mark Duffield, G lobal Governance and the New Wars. (London: Zed Books, 2002): 53-60.
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great...Because [national] resources are scarce, the most appropriate military means
• ♦ • • 71should be selected to achieve the political ends in view. Military doctrine, then is a 
matter of evaluating external threats, determining political ends, and allocating resources, 
or means, in the best way possible in order to meet those ends, in light of the given
77threats. In the course of this development, “priorities must be set”. States will act in 
accordance with this formula, or at least they should: the winners will be the ones who 
manage to do it most effectively, and the losers will be the ones who made the most 
mistakes along the way. To Posen and other neorealists, there is no need to problematise 
how those threats are perceived, how the ends are determined, or how those priorities are 
to be set. The answer to these how questions are not provided for in neorealist theory, 
but are critical factors in explaining differences in military practices across national and 
cultural boundaries, as well as consistencies in military practices over time, even as the 
international environment changes.
The realist contention, based on Thucydides’s Melian Dialogue, is that “The 
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to
71
accept” , often advanced as an explanation for what military practices states adopt, is 
equally unhelpful. In particular, it does not explain what ‘weak’ actors do.74 The range 
of options left open to them, even if constrained by their material ‘power’, cannot be 
determined solely by reference to their environment. Such a perspective can explain why
71 Barry R. Posen, The Sources o f  M ilitary Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World 
Wars. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984): 13.
72 Posen, 13.
7j Cited in Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History. 
4th ed. (New York: Longman, 2003): 23.
74 Consider this statement by Paul Kennedy: “N o doubt it is theoretically possible for a small nation to 
develop a grand strategy, but the latter term is generally understood to imply the endeavours o f  a power 
with extensive (i.e. not just local) interest and obligations, to reconcile its means and its ends.” Paul 
Kennedy, G rand Strategies in War and Peace (New  Haven: Yale University Press, 1991): 6 , fn 18.
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Austria, for example, accepted neutrality in 1955, but it does not explain why they chose 
to send troops to take part in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 
(UNDOF). States, strong or weak, can chose—even is only within constraints—to do a 
lot, or a little. Why they chose to do so lies within themselves. The relevant components 
of a state must be examined if any sense is to be made of the resultant military practice, 
especially when looking at specific military practices, such as civil-military cooperation, 
which is not aimed at guaranteeing state survival. Realist and Neorealist theory,
“is.. .intentionally bereft of any detailed analysis of the domestic characteristics of states, 
such as culture, ideology, and political institutions. These characteristics are only 
considered in terms of how they enhance or diminish the power of the state in the 
international arena (but state behaviour in general will be unaffected in the long term).”
It is possible to see a softening of this position. Following the September 11,
2001 attacks on the United States, Posen warned, “if the United States is to sustain both 
public and international support for the war on terrorism, it will need to resolve long- 
delayed questions about its future foreign and security policy through an extended
7 Adiscussion involving policymakers, policy analysts, and the American people.” Whereas 
Posen originally spoke of the need for a military doctrine to be appropriate, he referred to 
its suitability to “cause” security in light of the threats posed by and in the international 
environment. In his later work, he appears to be saying that military doctrine must be 
appropriate domestically as well. The international system is, therefore, not the sole 
determinate of national policies, even for powerful states.
75 John Glenn and Darryl Howlett, “Neorealism” in John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and Stuart Poore, eds., 
Neorealism versus Strategic Culture (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004): 28.
76 Barry R. Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics,” International 
Security. 26.3 (Winter) 2001/2002: 55.
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It would seem that something akin to a “normative shift” has occurred. Cora Bell 
claims that in such a shift we are witnessing “the social process of changing domestic or 
international rules about what is deemed acceptable or unacceptable behaviour” and that 
since the end of the Cold War this “has been a factor in decisions ranging right up to 
military action, and even the form such action has taken.”77 She believes that this shift 
has been away from “realist/nationalist norms to alternatives that may be in part called
78“cosmopolitan.” Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin pick up on this tendency towards 
cosmopolitanism, but caution that it is not quite a full-blown shift as yet. Indeed, they 
claim that peacekeeping is caught in a conceptual tussle “between those who see [its] role 
in global politics in Westphalian terms and those who see it in more ambitious, post-
70  • • ,Westphalian terms.” They explain that post-Westphalian peacekeeping is predicated on
the understanding that “threats to international peace and security are not limited to acts
of aggression between states but may also result from violent conflict and illiberal
80governance within them.” Therefore, for those like Jurgen Habermas, contemporary
81 • •peace support operations are a form of “cosmopolitan law enforcement” which aims to 
‘get at’ matters internal to states and ‘correct’ them, for the benefit of all concerned.
Although Habermas considers this kind of approach to be a positive step, others 
who share his police imagery are less accepting. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri also
77 Cora Bell, “Normative Shift,” The National Interest. 70 (Winter) 2002 [on line edition]: 1.
78 Bell, 2. See also Michele Griffin, “Where Angels Fear to Tread: Trends in International Intervention,” 
Security Dialogue. 31.4 2000: 424-426.
79 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 1.
80 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2.
81 Jurgen Habermas. “Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border between Law and Morality,” in 
William Joseph Buckley, ed. Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Wiliam E. Eerdmans, 2000):313, cited in Bellamy, p. 25. It is interesting to note that domestic policing has 
undergone a similar ‘normative shift’ over the past thirty years. Issues which were once considered private 
matters and therefore not police business (such as domestic violence) are now clearly ‘fair game’ for police 
officers in many parts o f  the world. As such, policing has moved from a reactive ‘arrest criminals’ stance 
to an active ‘prevent crime’ stance. See, for example, Alysia W. Tate, “Chicago Alternative Policing 
Strategy,” The Chicago Reporter. Jan 2004. [online edition].
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use a policing metaphor in their work, but characterise what is happening not so much as 
a desirable normative shift but as a continuation—perhaps an acceleration—of
O'}
hegemonic practices already embedded in international relations. Michael Pugh, for 
one, is sceptical of the extent to which a cosmopolitan project can be achieved through 
practices such as civil-military cooperation. Indeed, he regards what he perceives to be 
the institutionalisation of civil-military cooperation as having “given military
O'!
organizations a new authority and voice.” Civil-military cooperation, then, is 
characteristically hegemonic, rather than emancipatory, and is conducted as a “substitute” 
for more intense military action (in the form of actually protecting civilian populations); 
as a means of “filling a gap” left because of the chronic underinvestment in other aid 
delivery organisations; and/or because militaries recognise that they must “create a role”
OA
for themselves in the absence of any traditional, conventional threat.
The problem common to all structural approaches (whether they are realist or 
cosmopolitan or in between) is that they do not explain how the structural processes come 
to be established. Jim Whitman’s comments on the wider global governance literature
• • OCare appropriate here: there is a “conspicuous absence of considerations of agency.” In
essence, purely structural accounts are all process and no actor. Recalling the 
grammatical models described above, these writers are essentially writing in the passive 
voice. While the structural level of analysis cannot be completely discounted, it cannot
82 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Empire. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000): 37-39.
83 Michael Pugh, “Civil-Military Relations in the Kosovo Crisis: An Emerging Hegemony?” Security 
Dialogue , 31.2 2000: 231.
84 Pugh, Civil-Military Relations, 231-238.
85 Jim Whitman, “ Global Governance as the Friendly Face o f  Unaccountable Power,” Security Dialogue. 
33.1 2002: p. 46.
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become understood as necessarily deterministic.86 Structures and processes are 
constructed by actors, who are in turn influenced and constituted by their very creations. 
To explain a complex phenomenon such as the rise of civil-military cooperation through 
a structural explanation alone is insufficient. It is necessary to take structural factors (e.g. 
systemic trends, transnational/global phenomenon, etc.) into account but these factors 
must connect in some way to actors (whether these actors are people, NGOs, or states) 
and therefore, into what is regarded as the domestic environment. If civil-military 
cooperation is a bid towards hegemony, we are left to ask how that has become the case, 
and if it is the case, from whence did the notion of hegemonic desire arise? We must 
interrogate not only the ‘what’ but also the ‘who’, the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of civil-
on
military cooperation. To do otherwise is to eschew issues of responsibility.
If we turn to examine domestic factors in order to understand the source and 
nature of military practice, we find several explanatory possibilities. John Gooch, a 
historian of military doctrine, believes that it is a “cocktail” whose “ingredients, which 
combine together differently in each and every case, include: the nature of weapons 
technology; the influence of formative experiences; organisational and institutional
00
interests; ideology; national culture; [and] the political/strategic situation.” While this 
may be a comprehensive description, the manner in which the cocktail is distilled and 
mixed is left unexplored.
86 See, for example, Anthony Giddens. The Constitution o f  Society: Outline o f  the Theory o f  Structuration. 
(Berkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 1984); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f  International 
Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1999).
87 Whitman does not use the word responsibility, but rather he identifies the problem o f  much o f  the global 
governance literature as one o f  avoiding issues o f  accountability. Whitman, Global Governance, 50-54.
88 John Gooch, “Introduction: Military Doctrine and Military History,” in John Gooch, ed. “The Origins o f  
Contemporary Doctrine,” Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper 30 (Camberly: SCSI,
1997): 6 .
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There have been attempts to explain civil-military cooperation by looking at 
specific actors. Robert DiPrizio in his study of American humanitarian interventions in 
the 1990s, puts forward what he calls “a theory of ‘presidential discretion’. That is, a 
sitting president has much leeway in responding to humanitarian crises and is not tethered
• OQby the media, public opinion, Congress, or the Pentagon as many people think.” I agree 
that individuals have a significant impact on the process of formulating and executing 
military practice. The very human elements of creativity, enthusiasm, confusion and 
fallibility are at play in social life. This perspective—one of individual prerogative— 
supported by the findings of several cases, might be compelling on its own, save for the 
rejoinder added by DiPrizio himself: “In the end, the context matters very much.”90 What 
that context is and how it affects the decision-maker, are left unexamined in DiPrizio’s 
work. I agree that the context matters very much, and that is why it is critical to evaluate 
it, systematically.
There are other problems with DiPrizio’s work with regards to its applicability to 
this study. The particular aspects of the US political system, with its strong executive 
role, stark two party political spectrum, and its pervasive ‘checks and balances’, not to 
mention its unequalled hegemonic status (at least in terms of military power) make it in 
many ways a sui generis case that is non-generalisable, and DiPrizio wisely makes no 
attempts to do so. Furthermore, perhaps partly because of American relative political and 
military strength, DiPrizio dismisses any consideration of the international system in his 
analysis. Finally, DiPrizio concentrates on the decisions to intervene in humanitarian
89 Robert C. DiPrizio, Arm ed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from  Northern Iraq to Kosovo. (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002): xii.
90 DiPrizio, xii.
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crises, rather than on the conduct of military forces once committed, and therefore sheds 
little light into how any actors other than the executive elite think or act.
Theo Farrell suggests an approach that takes both the international and the 
domestic level into account with his concept of “transnational institutionalism”. While 
not focussing on civil-military cooperation or peace support operations, he introduces the 
idea that national (military) actors are influenced by developments in transnational ideas 
and trends, but that in order to understand the effect of these ideas, it is necessary to 
analyse the domestic actor and its environment.91 What matters is not only the systemic 
level, but the institutional arrangements and cultures at play within the state or 
organisation in question. Put another way, global trends are what actors make of them, 
and what they make of them is related to a complex set of relationships that surround the 
actors (both in terms of domestic space and history). Farrell’s contribution is suggestive 
of a constructivist (or at least sociological) approach to the study of civil-military 
cooperation, and we will return to that later in this chapter. For the moment, Farrell’s 
argument reminds us that actors matter and that they need to be investigated in order to 
make sense of global trends.
Looking more closely at civil-military cooperation as a practice involving agents, 
rather than solely as a constituent part of a larger global process, we can see that there are 
several ways in which to proceed, each of them valid, with each one facilitating a 
different understanding of the issue. Pugh suggests that “civil-military relations in peace 
support operations can be represented in several dimensions: relations between external 
military forces and internal civilian authorities or society; between internal regular or
91 Theo Farrell, “Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional 
Army,” European Journal o f  International Relations. 7.1 2001: 63-102.
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irregular forces and external civilian agencies; and between the external military and
civilian components of interventions” where internal refers to that which belongs to the
host/target/victim/beneficiary of international intervention, and external refers to
everything else. Following this schema, most scholars focus on last category—external
military forces and external civilian components—mostly in the shape of Western armed
forces and international NGOs or IOs.93 Exceptions to this pattern are rare; Fitz-Gerald’s
work on the relationship between multinational peace support forces and host societies
(in Pugh’s typology, external forces and internal societies) stands out.94
While not commenting on civil-military cooperation directly, some observers do
focus on the importance of the domestic context in shaping military policy. Douglas
Bland and Sean Maloney contend that
Security and defence policies, like charity, begin at home. Sets of decisions 
reflected in these policies originate in what citizens, political leaders, and military 
officers think about such things as national interests, national security, wars, 
allies, armed forces and society, and civil-military relations. More often than 
‘rational managers’ would have us believe, people’s thoughts on security and 
defence are shaped by what they think has gone before, by popular explanations 
of national experiences and by national myths.95
92 Michael Pugh, “Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations,” in Kurt R. Spillman,
Thomas Bemauer, Jiirg M. Gabriel, Andreas Wenger, eds. Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned  
and Future Perspectives. (Bern: Peter Lang, 2001): 1
http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/documents/studies/volume_9/pugh.htm; accessed 27 Feb 2003]
93 For instance, see Seiple (note 7), Eriksson (note 1 1), Barry and Jeffreys (note 13), Terrell (note 14), as 
well as many authors discussed in the introductory chapter o f  this volume, such as D.L. Byman, “Uncertain 
Partners: NGOs and the Military,” Survival. 43(2) 2001: 97-114; J.H. Eisenhour and E. Marks, “Herding 
cats: overcoming obstacles in civil-military operations,” Joint Force Quarterly. Summer 1999: 86-90; and 
Larry Gardenker and Thomas Weiss, eds. Soldiers, Peacekeepers and D isasters. London: Macmillan, 
1991.
94 Ann Fitz-Gerald, “Examining the Local Impact o f  ‘Multinational Responses’ in Multinational Peace 
Support Operations: Implications for Training and Doctrine”. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cranfield 
University, 2001.
95 Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, Campaigns fo r  International Security: C anada’s Defence 
Policy at the Turn o f  the Century. (Montreal and Kingston: M cGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004): 61.
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I contend that this paragraph accurately and concisely explains how defence policy, and
military practice, come to pass. Bland and Maloney further point out that, contrary to the
notion that a single ‘rational actor’ makes policies, that
policy is found more often that it is made.. .defence policy reflects a consensus 
arrived at through some process of informal bargaining around ideas among 
prominent authorities inside and outside the defence establishment. The policy 
process, therefore, is best seen as a mechanism, both formal and informal, through 
which ideas are expressed by society, politicians, opinion-makers, military 
leaders, government officials, allies, and even opponents and then weighed 
against other ideas and assessed in the light of the ‘facts of national life’.96
Again, the notion that ‘context matters’ is clearly articulated, as indicated by the need for 
any policy to be assessed against a set of ‘facts of national life’.
As much as I am sympathetic to the thrust of their work, I believe Bland and 
Maloney stumble in two key areas with regard to the context surrounding defence policy 
formulation (a key source in the development of military practice). First, while they 
acknowledge its importance, they do not examine the manner in which these ideas, 
thoughts, and myths influence decision-makers. In the penultimate line of one chapter 
they state “people of authority acting on ideas and perceptions they support are the 
critical component of this process, but they are ultimately inseparably intertwined with
07the structures that turn their ideas and perceptions into concrete results.” They do not 
go further and interrogate this ‘intertwining’.
Second, they seem to lament the fact that ‘ideas matter’, decrying the presence of 
myths as some how ‘clouding’ judgements. Ideas may be a starting point, but are 
watered down along the way to becoming policy. This they call the ‘pragmatic
96 Bland and Maloney, 58.
97 Bland and Maloney, 58.
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• ORapproach’, as opposed to a more ideational, but less realistic ‘normative approach’. 
Furthermore, as indicated in the passage above, they concentrate on the role of 
‘prominent authorities’ that make decisions based on perceptions and only after 
negotiations. They tend to assign other actors (such as the media and the public) the role 
o f ‘dangerously misguided’ fools, confused by national myths, adding nothing more than 
fuzzy externalities to the decision making process. There is a reality out there, but 
decision-makers are prevented from acting on it. Consensus, therefore, is nothing more 
than ‘whatever the market will bear.’ Essentially, they wish that defence policy making 
(in Canada, at least) were more rational, itself an inherently normative argument."
What is missing, then, is the possibility of examining the relationship between 
those military forces carrying out civil-military cooperation practices and their parent 
governments and societies; in other words, a missing ‘external-external’ variation in 
Pugh’s schema. In order to do so, we can turn to the academic field of Civil-Military 
Relations, which deals with this dimension as its focus.
Civil-Military Cooperation as Civil-Military Relations
Civil Military Relations is an appropriate body of theory to use in examining 
civil-military cooperation, because as, James Burk states, its “empirical domain...is large. 
It includes direct and indirect dealings that ordinary people and institutions have with the
98 Bland and Maloney, 54.
99 See Bland and Maloney, esp. 61-97. Separately, Bland and Maloney, in their other writing, spend a great 
deal o f  time trying to expose the nature o f  these national myths and educate the Canadian public to come to 
their senses. See Sean M. Maloney, “Are We Really Just: Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the 
Reality o f  Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War,” Institute for Research on Public Policy 
Working Paper No. 2003-02. (Montreal: IRPP, 2003); Douglas L. Bland, “War in the Balkans...Canadian 
Style,” Policy Options (October) 1999: 18-21; and Douglas L. Bland, ed. Canada Without Arm ed Forces?  
(Montreal-Kingston: M cGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004). They are not alone in their mission. The 
eminent Canadian military historian Jack Granatstein has recently published best-selling works with 
evocative titles, chastising Canadians for their na'fvte. See J.L. Granatstein, Who K illed  the Canadian 
Military’? (Toronto: Harper Books, 2004) and J.l. Granatstein, Whose War Is It? (Toronto: Harper Collins, 
2007). The former contains a chapter entitled “Fatal Distraction: Lester Pearson and the Unwarranted 
Primacy o f  Peacekeeping”, while the latter one called “The Harmful Idealization o f  Peacekeeping”.
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military, legislative haggling over funding, regulation, and use of the military, and 
complex bargaining between civilian and military elites to define and implement national 
security policy.”100 Civil Military Relations is the study of armed forces and society and 
provides a theoretical guide for investigating Pugh’s missing ‘external-external’ category. 
That being said, however, Civil Military Relations as a field is not without its problems, 
which must be appreciated and compensated for if it is to be adequate for the purposes of 
explaining civil-military cooperation. Not unlike peacekeeping literature, it tends to be 
undertheorised101; to be more correct, it is dominated by a few theories which are rarely 
questioned. Most importantly for our purposes Civil Military Cooperation can be said to 
suffer from three major flaws. First, it makes too much of the difference between 
military and civilian activity. In 1767, the Scottish Enlightenment scholar Adam 
Ferguson wrote in his Essay on Civil Society that modem states rely upon the separation 
of the political sphere from the military sphere.102 Indeed, Ferguson’s neologism ‘civil 
society’ was meant to distinguish it from a ‘martial’ one. In achieving this separation, 
societies benefited from the particular specialisation achieved in each sphere. Freed from 
having to be a leader on and off the battlefield, the head of the state was able to 
concentrate of affairs of state, which included, but were not at all limited too, matters of 
defence. Equally free from martial concerns was the merchant; through the establishment 
of what would come to be called a professional military class, those not called to the
100 James Burk, “Theories o f  Civil-Military Relations,” Arm ed Forces and Society. 29.1 (Fall) 2002: 7.
101 Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified Theory o f  Civil-Military Relations,” Arm ed Forces and Society (Fall) 
1999: 7.
102 Adam Ferguson. An Essay on Civil Society. 1767.
[http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3113/ferguson/civil.html; accessed 1 Feb 2003]. See also 
John Gooch, Armies in Europe. (London: Routledge and Regan Paul, 1980). This separation, it is argued, 
is a particularly Western development. Furthermore, even within European militaries, it tended to occur 
within armies (as opposed to navies) fighting in “paradigmatic conflict” in Europe (as opposed to European 
forces fighting in India or other “peripheral geographies”. See Jeremy Black, War: Past, Present, and  
Future. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000): 61.
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colours are able to focus on making money and generating economic growth. The most 
crystalline manifestation of this thinking would come from Frederick the Great: he 
“wanted to fight [his] wars without the peasant behind his plow [sic] and the townsman in 
his shop even being aware of them.”103 Militaries are separate, and should be separate, 
from ‘normal’ social and political discourse.104
Much Civil Military Relations literature takes this division as given, and is 
occupied with the implications of it. Bland, for instance, claims that there are “four 
problems of Civil-Military Relations”: the “praetorian problem” (fear of military take­
over); problems of good order and discipline (making sure that the military does as it 
told); problems which require protecting the military from political interference; and 
problems in relating expert military advise to generalist political decisionmakers.105 
Bland exaggerates to a certain extent: there are many studies that challenge the strict 
divide between the military and the rest of society, but even in doing so, they proceed 
from the premise that militaries are ‘not quite like’ the rest of us. If the relationship were 
to be drawn as a Venn diagram, there would be two circles, one for the military and one 
for the rest of society. Scholars might disagree as to the amount of overlap between the 
circles, but the two circles would remain separate to some degree. Drawing on this idea 
of separation, Civil Military Relations authors, like Samuel Huntington and Samuel 
Finer106, see the military as being ‘functionally differentiated’ from other elements of 
society and the state. The military’s job, in the colloquialism of the U.S. Army, is to fight
l03Philip Bobbitt The Shield o f  Achilles: War, Peace, and The Course o f  History. (London: Allen Lane, 
2002): 140.
104 See, for example, Martin Edmonds. Arm ed Forces and Society. (Leceister: Leicester University Press, 
1988): esp. 131.
105 Bland, A Unified Theory, 12-13.
105 Samuel P. Huntington. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics o f  C ivil-M ilitary Relations. 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1957); Samuel E. Finer. The Man on Horseback: The Role o f  the M ilitary in Politics. 
(London: Pinter, 1962).
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and win the nation’s wars. As such, Civil Military Relations focuses on dramatic events,
such as wars, coups, and epic struggles between politicians and generals.
While there are authors who examine Civil Military Relations in peacetime
contexts, they tend to do so with an air of disdain, as if peace support operations are a
distraction, a diversion from the true nature of military business. Sam Sarkesian and
Robert Connor, for instance, seem troubled by contemporary events:
The US military faces challenging and troubling issues. The strategic landscape 
remains unsettled, American society is changing, military contingencies have 
become embroiled in what many call non-traditional missions, while the military 
is struggling to respond to a variety of internal travails.. .All of this is taking place 
as budgetary restraints and social expectations seem to dominate the political 
landscape. Thus, the.. .military faces a dilemma: how to respond to the 
uncertainties of the new domestic and strategic landscapes, nurture the proper 
relationship with society, and yet retain its raison d ’etre.107
As mentioned above, while an explicit normative agenda may not be present, it is clear
where the authors stand on this issue. Militaries should not be constrained by “social
expectations”; if they are, it will detract from their ability to carry out their ‘core
competencies’. Although they concede that some form of “proper relationship” needs to
be developed with the rest of society, the reader is not left with the impression that this
will be an easy task. As if to leave no doubt where they stand, Sarkesian and Connor
added this biblical verse to the frontpiece of their book:
For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to battle? I 
Corinthians 14,8
The notion of separation is of critical importance to the study of civil-military 
cooperation, because, as a practice, civil-military cooperation breaks down the barrier 
between military and other activities. Civil-military cooperation challenges some
107 Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr. The US M ilitary Profession into the Twenty-First Century: 
War. Peace, and Politics. (London: Frank Cass, 1999): 3. Emphasis added.
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authors’ understandings and beliefs of what militaries can and should do, in that it fits 
into what Sarkesian and Connor have categorised as “non-traditional activity” and, as 
such, is suspicious. The idea of tradition is noteworthy because it connotes a degree of 
historical coherence and a cultural appreciation of what is appropriate or acceptable 
practice. I will return to this topic later in the chapter.
The second fault in Civil Military Relations deals with the relationship between 
the divorced entities. Not only are the military and social spheres separated, the 
relationship between them is most often portrayed as conflictual. Most evident in the 
work surrounding coups and coup prevention, Civil Military Relations literature sees an 
inherent tension between military officer and political master. Bland’s “praetorian 
problem” has been sufficiently addressed in the West by, so that according to Hackett 
“from the late 18th Century onwards.. .the soldier and the statesman were.. .no longer
I ORinterchangeable [and] the subordination of the military to the civil was.. .complete.” 
Coups have become exceptions in the West, and yet the literature is haunted by their 
possibility.109 The imagery of Finer’s Man on Horseback is of a powerful figure waiting 
in the wings to take over control of the country: “ .. .there is a common assumption, an 
unreflecting belief, that it is somehow ‘natural’ for the armed forces to obey the civil 
power.. .But no reason is adduced for showing that civilian control of the armed forces is, 
in fact, natural.”110
108 John Winthrop Hackett. “The Military in the Service o f  the State” in M. M. Wakin, ed. War, Morality, 
and the M ilitary Profession. (Boulder: W estview, 1996): 106.
109 Coups are an obsession in much o f  Civil Military Relations literature and the emphasis on them is 
unwarranted not only with reference to the West, but to Eastern Europe, Russia, and the republics o f  former 
Soviet Union. See David J. Betz, Civil-M ilitary Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe. (London: 
Routledge, 2004): 6 .
110 Finer, 5.
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Hence, Huntington’s theory centres on the idea of “objective control” whereby the 
military is kept out of political circles and under the watchful eye of civilian bureaucracy, 
legislature, and executive. Each actor has a particular sphere of competence, where each 
is expert, with the civilian sphere dominant in terms of policy direction. Peter Feaver 
continues in the Huntingtonian tradition in his recent work. The relationship between the 
general and the politician is one where once an order is given, the military may decide to 
“work” (follow the order) or “shirk” (ignore or modify the order). Moreover, what 
determines the military decision is the extent to which they will be “monitored” by the 
politicians and, if caught, “punished.”111 There is no room for trust, as the military as it is 
inherently untrustworthy. Their functional imperative (that is, to prepare for and conduct 
military operations) will always be in conflict with their socio-political imperative (that 
is, to fit in with society’s norms and values). As Burk puts it, in a Huntingtonian world 
“freed from state restraints, the military would pursue the objects of its own passions and
119pose an internal threat to sovereign power.” In this setting, the civilian authority must 
be vigilant and precise in its dealings with the military: it must say clearly and forcefully 
command the army to ‘jump’ when it wants it to jump, otherwise the army may decide to 
disregard the order, either by refusing to jump, or jumping whenever the it feels that the 
need arises.
Morris Janowitz is often regarded as Huntington’s foil. Within Civil Military 
Relations, Huntington represents a political science perspective, while Janowitz is dean 
of the sociological school. Rather than objective control, he believes that the military 
must be inculcated with a strong sense of professional responsibility so that they will
111 Peter Feaver. Arm ed Servants. (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
112 Burk, 10.
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eschew political domination. However, he does so partly because he fears that civilian 
oversight will never be sufficient to prevent a coup. What is required, therefore, is a 
body of citizen-soldiers, to whom the idea of a coup would be inherently unthinkable. 
Military service would be founded on civic virtue, and that ideal of virtue would include 
the keys to civilian supremacy. The military’s own (i.e. internalised) ethos would prevent 
it from taking over the country.113 Despite its somewhat gentler portrayal of the armed 
forces, Janowitzian theory is a dialectic which relies upon the difference between 
‘soldier’ and ‘citizen.’
The difference between Huntington’s approach and that of Janowitz can be 
summarized succinctly. In Huntington’s understanding, the military should stick to its 
core business, and remain detached from either social engineering or political 
interference. They, in short, should be motivated by their functional imperative.
Janowitz, on the other hand, believes that militaries should be tied to the mores of their 
parent societies. Indeed, disconnected militaries, cut off from the rest of the state are to 
be regarded as dangerous. Janowitz’s militaries, then, are driven by their societal 
imperative. Starkly put, these two ideal positions represent two poles between which real 
militaries must strike a balance.
Bland attempts to overcome the divide between military and civilian in his 
“unified theory of civil-military relations” where he claims that rather than a conflictual 
relationship marked by a struggle for dominance of one side over the other, in 
contemporary settings, ‘good’ civil-military relations rely on shared responsibility.114 His 
public administration approach demonstrates a theoretical maturity, which allows that
113 Morris Janowitz. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. (Glencoe, IL: The Free 
Press, 1960).
114 Bland, “A Unified Theory”, 15-19.
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evolution is possible; a recognition that relationships are not fixed, that they can change 
over time. To believe otherwise, to retain a model driven by a single, fixed relational 
possibility is to become stuck on Thaler’s train to the present, allowing for no past and no 
future.
The third problem with existing Civil Military Relations literature is that, by 
strictly separating the military from the civilian, and by maintaining a the view that the 
armed forces need to be kept at bay lest they interfere with ‘normal’ politics, the literature 
disembeds the military from the rest of society. This means that the military is treated in 
isolation from existing social and political trends. In effect, militaries regarded in this 
fashion become caricatures, entities which are grotesque in that they are outside any 
particular cultural milieu. Without social or cultural grounding, militaries appear in a 
state of stasis and theories based on these assumptions simply do not accommodate 
contemporary military activity. Tom Sower examined Feaver’s ‘work or shirk’ model in 
the context of peace support operations in Kosovo, and found that it was unable to 
account for military behaviour there.115 The range of choices facing a military 
commander in a multinational operational setting was much larger and the actual military 
performance was far more nuanced than Feaver’s forecast binary choice would suggest. 
Sowers found that there were distinct differences between American commanders and 
their British counterparts; it appears that factors such as national strategic culture do have 
an impact on how soldiers interpret the orders they receive. Theories that ignore the 
contribution of culture because they remove militaries from their cultural environment
115 Tom Sower, “The Soldier and the International State: Post-conflict operations and variance in principal- 
agent relations,” Unpublished MSc Thesis, Department o f  Government, London School o f  Economics and 
Political Science, August 2003.
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are insufficient to aid in our understanding of complex practices such as civil-military 
cooperation.
A related tendency is to view American civil-military relations as somehow 
universally applicable. For example, Sarkesian and Connor assert that in order for the 
American people to understand the utility of the use of force in contemporary 
international relations, the American military is “the critical actor” that should be 
involved in providing that explanation “by virtue of its unique purpose.”116 If we assume 
that this is the case in the United States (and that is questionable), can we also assume 
that the military plays such an important role in other societies, such as, say, France, or 
South Africa, or Canada? While Civil Military Relations has examined countries other 
than the US, it often does so with Huntingtonian theoretical expectations that are dubious
1 17at best. In leaving context out of the treatment of civil-military relations, much of the 
literature appears suspiciously in Hemmingway’s shadow.
In contrast to this singular treatment of civil-military relations, Katzenstein
1 | o
presents a wide selection of alternative, culturally sensitive examinations. Proceeding 
from the perspective that “issues dealing with norms, identities, and culture are becoming 
more salient”119 in issues of international security, Katzenstein et al demonstrate that the 
military is not a-cultural, and that its relationship with its civilian masters, as well as its
116 Sarkesian and Connor, 3.
117 The two areas that have explored the most within CMR have been Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
The focus in both regions has been on military reform, with a liberal democratic objective in mind. It is 
surprising how often that model is predicated on Huntingtonian principles, despite large variations in 
national experience. See, for example, Larry Diamond and M.F. Plattner, eds. Civil-M ilitary Relations and  
Democracy. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996) for a selection o f  non-US case studies.
118 Peter Katzenstein, ed. The Culture o f  National Security: Norms and Identity in W orld Politics. (New  
York: Columbia University Press, 1996). While Katzenstein et al might not categorise themselves as 
working within the field o f  Civil Military Relations, their subject matter and approach makes their 
inclusion in this field justified.
119 Katzenstein, 1.
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parent society, varies across time and space. In fact, he concludes that all national 
security policy (including, ostensibly, practices such as civil-military cooperation) is 
socially determined by two factors: the particular cultural-institutional context of a state, 
as well as the collective identity of the actors (be they states, elite, or military 
organisations). Therefore, military activity is social activity, where actors are affected by 
their context, but also shape that context through their actions, which stem (in part) from 
the way they see themselves ‘fitting in’. Therefore, in contrast to writers like Feaver who 
believe they ‘know’ what the military’s interests are (to increase its ability to fight and 
win wars) and Posen, who attributes military practice to the ‘natural’ state of international 
anarchy, Katzenstein claims that “one cannot deduce the interests of the military from 
either the functional needs of the military or from the international balance of power.”
Rather he reminds us that “we should not take for granted what needs to be explained: the
120sources and content of national security interests that... governments pursue.”
It is important to differentiate between cultural treatments that recognise national 
differences and theories that explain all behaviour by reference to nationality. While it is 
constructive to appreciate that the particular social and political structure of a country 
may have an impact on military activity, it is not helpful to resort to some form of 
national essentialism. Stephen Rosen highlights an example of where John Gooch 
attributed the poor performance of the Italian army in WWI to “the nature of Italian 
political culture and the structure of Italian society”. Rosen comments that “it remains 
possible that poorly trained, suspicious Italian soldiers and incompetent Italian officers 
were the result of poorly drafted conscription laws and lack of money for training” rather
120 Katzenstein, 10-11.
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than anything inherently Italian. This is wise counsel, although we might press further 
to ask why it is that the troops were poorly trained, the officers incompetent, the laws 
poor, and the money scarce; after all, it could be that this was due to the peculiar nature 
of Italian society at the time. The point is, though, that it is the context and the identity of 
the actors, rather than their nationality per se that determines military behaviour.
Such a culturally sensitive perspective allows the question of why militaries 
conduct civil-military cooperation operations to be explored. However, in order to do so 
fully, it must be clear who the actors are that operate within a given cultural context. 
While the accounts in Katzenstein’s volume vary, they tend to focus on elites. National 
security policy is the product of negotiated identities and expectations between civilian 
decisionmakers and military commanders. Kier, for instance, looks at the decision by 
French military officers to adopt a defensive doctrine in the wake of the French cabinet’s 
policy to include large numbers of conscripts and reservists in the overall order of battle 
(rather than funding more regular, professional troops). In her analysis there is no
1 99examination of the wider French society and their expectations.
Contemporary societies are involved in civil-military relations. Their influence 
varies, again according to particular historical and institutional settings, but it needs to be 
accommodated in any theoretical framework. Of particular interest in this regard is the 
work by Charles Moskos and others, who have investigated the impact of “post-modern” 
societies on civil-military relations.123 They believe that there
121 Stephen Peter Rosen. Societies and M ilitary Power: India and its Armies. (Cornell, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996).
122 Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II,” in Peter Katzenstein, ed. 
The Culture o f  National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. (N ew  York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996): 186-215.
123 Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal. The Postmodern Military: Arm ed Forces 
after the C old  War. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000).
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is [a] cultural shift in public attitudes and opinion. Old verities are questioned 
rather than accepted. There are fewer overarching authorities to whom people are 
willing to defer. There is a shrinking consensus about what values constitute the 
public good, and little confidence that we know how, by use of reason, to 
determine what the public good might be. The eighteenth century’s faith in 
reason, the nineteenth century’s faith in the nation-state, and our own century’s 
[the twentieth] confidence in science and technology have all lost their hold on 
our imagination.. .Inasmuch as the nation-state is the sine qua non of the Modem 
military, such developments fundamentally change civil-military relations.124
They are not alone in their assessments. Phillip Bobbitt claims that the new epoch of 
military activity will be shaped by the post-modem “market state” and its mandate to
• • i 9 cfacilitate its citizens’ prosperity. Robert Cooper observes that Europe and other 
affluent societies have become postmodern and in the process have given up on warfare
19£in favour of welfare. Christopher Coker believes that Western societies’ “new civil
1 9 7values” explain the recent move towards “humane warfare.” Whether or not societies 
have become as postmodern as some observers would have us believe, the fact is that 
societies cannot be left out of any explanation of a military activity such as civil-military 
cooperation.
Conclusion
It is clear from the literature that the way in which we conceive of the military’s 
place within societies is changing, perhaps spilling over the conceptual banks set for it in 
earlier times. As these expectations change, they have a direct impact on the types of 
roles that the military can be expected to perform. In turn, as the military conducts new 
operations, these expectations may be modified. Particularly key in this regard are the 
notions of the functional and societal imperatives. The tension between them is played
124 Moskos, Williams, and Segal, 4-5.
125 Bobbitt, 213-242.
126 Robert Cooper. The Breaking o f  Nations. (London: Atlantic Books, 2004): 49.
127 Christopher Coker. Humane Warfare. (London: Routledge, 2001): 96.
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out—almost in staccato fashion—when armies conduct civil-military cooperation. These 
concepts play a critical role in the development of the argument that follows.
The aim of a literature review is not merely to provide a critique of the existing 
scholarship, but hopefully to find some giants’ shoulders upon which to build a 
foundation for further research. In this sense, it is important to see not only gaps in the 
current writing, but to note and incorporate its ‘good’ points. Moreover, the intent of this 
chapter is to establish, from a review of the literature, a set of criteria for a theoretical 
framework that will assist our understanding of civil-military cooperation practices. It is 
now evident, then, that such a framework must have space for actors, their contexts, and 
the dynamic relations that exist between them. It must enable an examination of the 
domestic level, but at the same time accommodate the fact that this level of analysis is 
influenced, and in turn influences, the international or global (i.e. the systemic) level. A 
theoretical model that does not allow for change (for instance, in the relations between 
actors, or in the way that certain concepts are understood) is equally unhelpful. Finally, 
any framework must be informed from the perspective that ‘ideas matter’, in terms of 
norms and identities, and equally in terms of particular cultural contexts. Before moving 
on the look at a model that will satisfy these requirements, let us turn to examine the 
evolution of civil-military cooperation and the context within which it occurs.
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Chapter 2:
The Evolution of Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace and War
Civil-military cooperation has come to be considered a pre-requisite for the 
success of international interventions, but such a judgment has not been without 
controversy. The evolution of ideas can be difficult to trace; terms and notions that 
were once clear can become muddled over time. The process of what Terence Ball calls 
“conceptual change” is present in the fields within which civil-military cooperation is a
1 7Q
part. This becomes clear when we follow the evolution of peacekeeping into peace
support operations and stability operations. First, we can locate civil-military 
cooperation within the wider field of peacekeeping.131 Peacekeeping, a product of the 
Cold War, was based on consent of the parties and a strict code of ‘non-interference’ in 
domestic affairs. It evokes images of U.N. authorized soldiers in blue helmets interposed
128 See John Mackinley, “The role o f  military forces in a humanitarian crisis,” in Larry Gardenker and 
Thomas G. Weiss, eds. Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters. (London: Macmillan, 1991): 28-29; Daniel 
L. Byman, “Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military,” Survival. 43(2) 2001: 100; Michael C. Williams, 
Civil M ilitary Relations and Peacekeeping. IISS Adelphi Paper 321 (London: Oxford University Press,
1998): 13; Stuart Gordon, “Understanding the priorities for civil-military cooperation (CIMIC),” The 
Journal o f  Humanitarian Assistance, [http://www.jha.ac/articles/a068.htm; accessed 8 May 2002]; Nicola  
Dahrendorf, ed. A Review o f  Peace Operations: A Case fo r  Change. (London: The Conflict, Security, and 
Development Group, King’s College, 2003); Bernard Kouchner, “A First Hand Perspective from K osovo,” 
in Kurt R. Spillmann, Thomas Bemauer, Jiirg M. Gabriel, Andreas Wenger, eds. Peace Support 
Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives. Bern: Peter Lang, 2001: 137-146; and Klaus 
Reinhardt, “Lessons Learned as Commander KFOR in K osovo,” in Kurt R. Spillmann, Thomas Bemauer, 
Jiirg M. Gabriel, Andreas Wenger, eds. Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future 
Perspectives. Bern: Peter Lang, 2001: 147-155.
129 Terence Ball, Transforming Political Discourse. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
130 For an alternate account o f  the evolution o f  peacekeeping, see John Mackinlay, “Defeating Complex 
Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan,” Whitehall Paper 64. (London: Royal United Services Institute, 
2005): 1-18. Mackinlay marks the evolution in terms o f  ‘traditional peacekeeping’, ‘containment’, and 
‘intervention forces’. I find these terms misleading, as all such missions are interventions and have been 
implicated in the wider context o f  conflict containment.
ljl O f course, prior to the age o f  peacekeeping, which began in earnest after the Second World War, 
militaries had interacted with civilians. Those seeking to avoid becoming embroiled in battle, and those 
unlucky enough to be unable to do so, were ‘dealt w ith’ as a problem to managed by elements from the 
military police, the medical, as well as civil affairs or civil administration officers. Services included 
“evacuation assistance, hygiene, shelter, burials, and utilities.” For example, Canadian Civil Affairs troops, 
under the command o f  a brigadier and as a part o f  the Allied Military Government, landed in Normandy 
one month after D-Day, with the explicit aim to “keep civilians out o f  the way o f  the fighting troops”, 
especially in and around Caen. Serge Bernier, “Civil Affairs in the Canadian Army in the Second World 
War.” Presentation made at Canada House, London. 6 June 2004.
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between two warring factions who have agreed to a peace treaty or cease fire, and have
consented to the deployment of a neutral and impartial international force. This force is
not only neutral and impartial, it is relatively inert: “traditional peacekeepers do not
propose or enforce particular political solutions. Rather, they try to build confidence
between the belligerents in an attempt to facilitate political dialogue.”132 Civil-military
cooperation was limited, as militaries tended to ‘stay in their lanes’, or perhaps more
1aptly, stay in their watchtowers.
Over the course of the 1990s, the West ‘discovered’ the reality of intrastate 
conflicts, characterized by the confluence of communal violence; humanitarian suffering 
(be it in the form of population displacement, famine or abject poverty); and 
opportunistic, criminal economic exploitation.134 As if this were not enough, intrastate 
conflicts tended to occur in places noted for the absence of indigenous state-based 
structures and institutions, labeled as failed, failing, fragile, collapsed or disrupted
ITSstates. Consent was not always possible to obtain. Building on Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali’s seminal An Agenda for Peace, ideas such as ‘peace enforcement’ and even
132 Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin. Understanding Peacekeeping. (Cambridge: Polity, 
2004): 5.
133 Roland Paris notes only two occasions prior to 1989 where ‘non-interference’ was not the norm in a 
peacekeeping mission: in the Congo in 1960 and in western N ew  Guinea in 1962-1963. Roland Paris, At 
W ar’s End: Building Peace After C ivil Conflict. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 14-15. 
The extant to which the ideal types o f  peacekeeping have ever been practiced is not uncontroversial, 
however. Even early missions, like the original United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed to 
Egypt in the midst o f  the Suez Crisis o f  1956, did conduct what might be called ‘humanitarian relief and 
civil administration activities’ but did so outside its direct mandate, for a very short period o f  time, and in 
consultation with (and with permission from) local Egyptian authorities. See Marc Weller, “The Relativity 
o f  Humanitarian Neutrality and Impartiality,” Journal o f  Humanitarian Assistance February 1999 
[http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.Uk/a/a528/htm posted 10 February 1999, accessed 13 July 1999].
134 See Mary Kaldor New and O ld Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2006); Mark Duffield G lobal Governance and the New Wars. (London: Zed Books, 2001); Amin 
Saikal, “The dimensions o f  state disruption,” in From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and M ilitary  
Responsibilities in D isrupted States. William Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur, eds. (Tokyo: 
UNU Press, 2003): 17-30.
135 Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999): 4.
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‘peacemaking’ were introduced into the vocabulary of international diplomacy and the
1lines between the political, the military, and the humanitarian began to blur. Built on 
such a foundation, the British military doctrine of “Wider Peacekeeping” was conceived 
as wedding of operational reality and theoretical legitimacy. It wrestled with the ideas of 
consent and coercion, trying to design pragmatic, but intellectually and morally 
defendable, definitions of peace enforcement and peacemaking; it sought to come to grips 
with the increasingly blurry ‘Mogadishu Line’ which was acting as an unhelpful and self-
i
limiting barrier in ‘real world’ operations in the Balkans. This line was further 
smudged by the conclusions of the Brahimi Report, which castigated the notion of
1 -JO
impartiality as pretence for inaction. Peacekeeping forces should not be impartial, but 
rather committed to the principles of the UN charter, unafraid to call a spade a spade, and 
more importantly, take robust action when necessary. Non-interference (especially in 
light of the disastrous events of Srebrenica) was seen to be a cop out. Accordingly, peace 
support operations were designed to meet a predetermined political vision or ‘endstate’. 
Furthermore, Brahimi asserted that, due to the need for more than just passive military
136 United Nations. Report o f  the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit 
Meeting o f  the Security Council on 31 January. “An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking and peace-keeping.” 1992A/47/277 - S /24111.17 June 1992.
137 United Kingdom. The Army F ield Manual, Volume 5, Operations Other the War, P art 2 [also known as 
Wider Peacekeeping]. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995). For a discussion o f  the 
development and impact o f  the concept o f ‘Wider Peacekeeping’, see Richard Connaughton, “British 
Peacekeeping Doctrine: A Critique,” in D.S. Gordon and F.H. Toase, eds. Aspects o f  Peacekeeping. 
(London: Frank Cass, 2001): 199-212 and Dominick Donald. “The Doctrine Gap: The Enduring Problem 
o f Contemporary Peace Support Operations Thinking,” in Colin Mclnnes and Nicholas J. Wheeler, eds. 
Dimensions o f  Western M ilitary Intervention. (London: Frank Cass, 2002): 115-120.
138 United Nations. Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. “Report o f  the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations,” A/55/305; S/2000/809. 21 August 2001. See also Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh 
Thakur, “From An Agenda for Peace to the Brahimi Report: Towards a new era o f  UN peace operations?” 
in Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, eds. United Nations peacekeeping operations: A d  hoc missions, 
Permanent Engagement. (Tokyo: UN U Press, 2001): 238-255.
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supervision, “peacekeepers and peace-builders are inseparable partners in complex 
operations.”139
In contrast to traditional peacekeeping, peace support operations (PSOs) saw the
deployment, often on ‘humanitarian interventions,’ of well-armed troops with robust
rules of engagement that allowed them to ‘interfere’ with the conflict parties, often
forcefully.140 Peace support operations saw the intervening military not as merely
monitoring or observing, but enforcing some agreement, even without the explicit
consent of the conflicting parties. Within peace support operations, then
Military activities.. .are designed to conclude conflict by conciliation among the 
competing parties or ethnic groups, rather than a short-term and superficial 
termination of the conflict by force. A stable settlement, not military victory, is 
the ultimate measure of success. Military activities will generally focus on 
alleviating the symptoms of the crisis while creating the conditions in which other 
diplomatic and humanitarian agencies can more ably redress the underlying 
causes of the conflict.141
While Philip Wilkinson focuses on the immediate objectives of military forces in peace
support operations, others go further, linking this military activity to the wider context of
international politics, claiming that peace support operations
are designed to help establish liberal-democratic peace in its post-Westphalian 
sense. That is, they aim to establish liberal-democratic societies within states as 
the most effective means of maintaining international peace and security. They 
combine robust military forces capable of limited peace enforcement tasks should 
a ceasefire break down, with a strong civilian component that includes civil 
administration, humanitarian elements and civilian policing. Peace support 
operations attempt to enforce a political agreement, the substance of which has 
been dictated by the interveners and supports the establishment of liberal 
democracy.142
139 United Nations, 3.
140 For a comprehensive history o f  this trend, beginning before the Second World War, see Tim Laurence, 
“Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping: An Uneasy Alliance?,” Whitehall Paper 48, (London: Royal 
United Services Institute, 1999).
141 Philip Wilkinson, “Sharpening the Weapons o f  Peace: Peace Support Operations and Complex 
Emergencies,” in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds. Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution. 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000): 68
142 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 6.
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Solutions to “complex emergencies” within troubled states or regions would have 
to come from outside143. The new interventions—into situations of complex, 
multidimensional problems—would require complex, multifaceted solutions. Indeed, it 
can be said that peace support operations are meant as a corrective to the uni-dimensional 
approach of traditional peacekeeping. Rather than dealing with conflicts only at the 
systemic level, and with separate, often conflicting instruments (such as diplomacy, 
military action, and development), peace support operations have been “characterized by 
[their] complex, multilevel, multidimensional nature...[and] signify the attempt to create 
an operational, normative, just, democratic fabric...in and between civil societies.”144 
Civil-military cooperation, according to this line of thinking, is a key element that is 
designed to move away from a pure ‘interpositional force’ approach. It allows military 
commanders another set of tools that can influence the situation on the ground. If force is 
a stick—then civil-military cooperation, in the form of reconstruction projects or 
humanitarian relief—is a carrot.
The history of civil-military cooperation is not solely tied up with the evolution of 
peacekeeping. The American military, partly as a result of its historical experience, and 
perhaps partly out of ideological preference, has shied away from the notion of 
peacekeeping.145 However, this does not mean that they have not had a history of 
conducting civil-military cooperation. Perhaps the seminal encapsulation of the
143 Michael Ignatieff, “State-failure and Nation-building,” in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds. 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003): 299-321.
144 Oliver P. Richmond, Maintaining Order, Making Peace. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002): 11- 
12.
145 Charles Krauthammer, “Peacekeeping is for Chumps," Saturday Night, Novem ber (1995):74.
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American experience with these types of military operations can be found in the United
States Marine Corps Small Wars Manual. Written in 1940, it defined ‘small wars’ as
Operations undertaken...wherein military force is combined with diplomatic 
pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is 
unstable, inadequate or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such 
interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.146
In these small wars “measures will be taken to .. .break the resistance to law and order by
a combination of effort of physical and moral means.”147
The moniker of small wars eventually faded away, but the concept remained. By
the time of the Vietnam War the U.S. Army labeled these kinds of actions stability
operations, which it defined as
Internal defense and internal development operations and assistance provided by 
the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which 
responsible government can function effectively and without which progress 
cannot be achieved.148
The American military participated in numerous UN peacekeeping (e.g. Somalia 
and Haiti) and NATO peace support operations (e.g. Bosnia and Kosovo) over the course 
of the 1990s and the U.S. Army briefly introduced a thin doctrinal volume on such 
operations, but this referred to ‘traditional peacekeeping’ and did not allow for intrusive 
actions, such as civil-military cooperation.149 Perhaps not surprisingly the conceptual 
encapsulation of what conflict had become by the middle of the 1990s did not take 
doctrinal form. Rather the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, General 
Krulak, expressed it as a metaphor. In 1999 he described a world where the armed forces
146 United States. United States Marine Corps Small Wars Manual. (Washington, DC: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1940): 1. Emphasis added.
147 United States, Small Wars Manual, 7.
148 United States, United States Army Field M anual 31-23 Stability Operations. (Washington, DC: United 
States Government Publishing Office, 1967): I. Emphasis added.
149 United States, United States Army Field M anual 100-23 Peace Operations. (Washington, DC: United 
States Government Publishing Office, 1994).
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would find themselves fighting a Three Block War, a situation where they would be 
“confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and 
within the space of three contiguous city blocks”, forced to conduct “humanitarian 
assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional warfighting” virtually at the same time.150 This 
imagery captured the imagination of military commanders throughout the West for two 
key reasons. First, for many soldiers outside of the US, it reflected their reality. British, 
French, even Canadian troops found themselves in situations similar to that described by 
Krulak, in places like Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Second, Krulak’s vision was not 
one of despair, but one of opportunity. Because soldiers found themselves within a Three 
Block War, they could escape the notion that they were tied to older, now-defimct 
images, whether they were ‘NATO’s Central Front’ or the equally outdated ‘Cyprus’s 
Green Line’.
Despite Krulak’s allegorical tale, the transition from a Democrat to a Republican
administration in the United States in 2001 was marked, as a part of Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld’s campaign of transformation, by a strong opposition to the idea of
peacekeeping, which was associated with ‘nation-building’151. This can be seen in the
decision to close the United States Army War College’s Peacekeeping Institute by the 
1 ^summer of 2003. However, the necessity of stability operations was reinforced
150 Charles C. Krulak, “"The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines M agazine, 
January 1999.
151 During the presidential candidate debate with Al Gore, George W. Bush declared, “ ...w e  can’t be all 
things to all people in the world. I am worried about over-committing our military around the world. I want 
to be judicious in its use. I don’t think nation-building missions are worthwhile.” Presidential Debate at 
Wake Forest University Oct 11, 2000.
(http://www.issues2000.org/2004/George_W  Bush_Foreign_Policy.htm; accessed 5 March 2007). O f
course, the U.S. has a long history o f  nation-building. See James F. Dobbins, “America’s Role in Nation- 
building: From Germany to Iraq,” Survival. 45.4 (Winter 2003-4): 87-110.
152 Douglas Holt, “Peacekeeping Institute to Close,” Chicago Tribune. 15 April 2003. 
(http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Peacekeeping Institute; accessed 6 March 2007).
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following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The doomed Peacekeeping Institute
1 c i
was reborn, now as the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. In doctrinal 
terms, the U.S. Army was prepared to conduct ‘Stability Operations and Support 
Operations’ (SASO), which made provision for active involvement in the internal 
workings of the countries targeted.154 Stability Operations became the popular term of art 
used by government officials and civilian observers. It provided a way out of discussing 
peacekeeping, and the equally problematic term ‘nation-building’155, but was to a large 
degree congruent with peace support doctrine, as conceived of by NATO and other Allied 
militaries.
Events continued to shape American thinking. The realities of military operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted the Joint Staff to abandon the term Stability Operations
in favour of the more descriptive ‘security, transition, and reconstruction operations’:
Formerly, operations similar to these were.referred to as stability operations. 
Stability can be a misleading word.. .Stability understood as “status quo 
antebellum” will not often be our strategic goal. Rather, the United States (and its 
coalition partners) will seek a new, better status quo—a status quo in which 
civilians are better off than they were before conflict erupted. In fact, transition to 
a new and better status quo will often involve instability.156
153 United States, Department o f  the Army, “Army to retain and expand Peacekeeping Institute,” Press 
Release. 28 October 2003 (http://press.arrivenet.eom/govemment/article.php/l I3279.html; accessed 7 
March 2007).
154 United States, United States Army F ield Manual 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations. 
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2003). The doctrinal manual was re-issued 
in October 2004.
155 Even though, by this time, the U.S. Administration had softened somewhat on the term, as evinced by 
statements by officials such as then-National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice. Jay Nordlinger, “ ’Power 
and Values’ A conversation with Condoleezza Rice,” National Review. September 18, 2002. 
(http://www.nationalreview.com/flashback/flashback-nordlinger091802.asp; accessed 7 March 2007)
156 United States, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations. Joint Operating Concept. Version 
1.06 (Washington, DC: Office o f  the Joint Staff, Department o f  Defence, 2004): 2. Emphasis in the 
original. This was published in June 2004 and superseded the existing thinking o f  November 2003 
contained in United States, Stability Operations. Joint Operating Concept. (Washington, DC: Office o f  the 
Joint Staff, Department o f  Defence, 2003).
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Security, transition, and reconstruction operations would see “the joint force commander, 
as part of a multinational and integrated multiagency operation... providing] initial 
humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and 
other reconstruction assistance.” Furthermore, the document stressed that these kinds of 
operations “are essential for the ultimate achievement of strategic aims. [They] are a core
I 57mission of the military services and civilian agencies.”
The U.S. Army lagged behind the Joint Staff in their move to distance itself from 
the idea of ‘stability’. However, drawing on the older concept of counterinsurgency, 
something that had traditionally been the domain of special operations forces, they began
1 5ftto see the need to revitalize their thinking. David Kilcullen claims that counter 
insurgency “is armed social work, an attempt to redress basic social and political 
problems while being shot at. Max Boot, in his historical account The Savage Wars o f 
Peace, agrees, stating that American military operations in the Twenty-first Century will 
be characterized in part as “wars in which U.S. soldiers act as ‘social workers’”.159 This 
makes [operations such as civil-military cooperation] a central Cl [counter insurgency] 
activity, not an afterthought.”160 This has been formally enshrined in the latest American
157 United States, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations, iii-v. Observers had been calling for 
such an integrated approach for some time. See, for instance, Adam Siegel, “M ission Creep...or Mission 
Understood?” Joint Force Quarterly. Summer 2000: 112-115.
158 For a good overview o f  the U.S. counterinsurgency thinking up to 2004, see International Institute o f  
Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2003/4: An Evaluation and Forecast o f  W orld Affairs. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004): 38-48. For a eclectic collection o f  counterinsurgency articles, launched to 
coincide with the publication o f  the new doctrine, see the United States Army Combined Arms Center, 
Counterinsurgency Reader: Special Edition o f  M ilitary Review. (October 2006). Robert R. Tomes 
provides a connection to earlier thinking and practice in counterinsurgency, which has proven to be popular 
with American military, in Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Parameters. 
(Spring 2004): 16-28.
159 Max Boot, The Savage Wars o f  Peace: Small Wars and the Rise o f  American Power. (New York: Basic 
Books, 2002): 338.
160 David Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles: Fundamentals o f  Company-level Counter-insurrgency,” 
M ilitary Journal (May/June) 2006: 107. Killcullen is a retired regular Australian Army officer, now acting 
as a special advisor on counter-insurgency within the U.S. Department o f  Defence.
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Army and Marine Corps doctrine. Written largely by Lieutenant General David Petreaus,
Counterinsurgency states that
A counterinsurgency campaign is... a mix of offensive, defensive and stability 
operations.. .It requires soldiers and marines to employ a mix of familiar combat 
tasks and skills more associated with non-military agencies. [These include] civil 
security; civil control; [the provision of] essential services; governance; [and] 
economic and infrastructure development.161
In the contemporary jargon, successful military operations require a mix of both kinetic 
(hard combat activities) and non-kinetic (softer activities, such as civil-military 
cooperation and information operations). Counterinsurgency, then, as the latest 
manifestation of Western military performance, is an extension of an earlier trajectory.
If American generals Krulak and Petreas mark the edges of a decade long 
evolution of how civil-military cooperation has come to be understood, the one general 
who has been able to most thoughtfully encapsulate the entire conceptual journey is 
perhaps the British general Rupert Smith. Focusing on how armed force is employed 
and how armed forces are deployed, Smith believes that the West now fights “wars 
amongst the people”. In Smith’s conceptualization, we have moved from Matthew 
Arnold’s darkling plain to somewhere far subtler, and therefore more difficult. Smith 
holds “a view of the world as one of confrontations and conflicts rather than war, and 
therefore one in which military force has a role to play; but that role is not a detached 
one, nor one which will achieve the strategic objective itself.” In this world, Smith 
believes that “the job of the military alongside all agencies conducting the operation is to
161 United States, United States Army F ield Manual 2-24 Counter insurgency. (Washington, DC: United 
States Government Printing Office, 2006): 1-19 (NB: this refers to a single page (chapter 1, page 19) not a 
series o f  pages as is usually the case in bibliographic notation). This manual is simultaneously published 
as United States Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency.
66
1 ff)defeat the opponent and win the will o f the majority o f  the people for the future.” 
Informed by his experience as a commander in the Balkans, Smith asserts that armies are 
not enough: commanders must understand that they fight amongst—but more 
importantly, for—people: the societies within the failed or fragile states in which they 
operate. This necessitates understanding and harnessing the capabilities of the media, 
politicians, and aid organizations at home, internationally, and in the theatre of 
operations.163 As John MacKinlay puts it, “Commanders at most levels recognize that 
the population in the operational space is their vital ground and that winning them over to 
their side requires more than the provision of military security, such as providing water, 
power, schools, hospitals and a livelihood.”164
The idea of fighting amongst the people is an important re-calculation, and an 
even more important re-casting, of the context of contemporary military operations. At 
the same time, it is an inescapable, almost obvious conclusion. The ‘enemies’ (if you 
could call them that, for often they posed little threat to the foreign interveners) in these 
new battles were not martial peers (as had been assumed to be the case throughout the 
Cold War), nor even second-rate pretenders (as had been the case in the first war of the 
West against Iraq in 1991). It was more accurate to see them the way war correspondent 
Anthony Loyd did, as a “spangle cracked gang movement”.165 Rather than squaring off 
against a like-minded and similarly prepared formation on a battlefield, Western
162 Rupert Smith, The Utility o f  Force: The Art o f  War in the Modern World. (London: Penguin, 2006): 
394. Emphasis added.
163 Smith, 58.
164 John Mackinlay, “Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan,” Whitehall Paper 64. 
(London: Royal United Services Institute, 2005): 48.
165 Anthony Loyd, Another Bloody Love Letter. (London: Headline Review, 2007): 4.
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militaries were called in after brutal violence had been meted out against civil
populations. This scene became the equivalent of the set-piece battle of earlier wars:
The cluster of houses smoldered dismally in the midday sun...Tanks and mortars 
had pulverized them a day earlier, before the infantry moved in and torched what 
remained. The centre of the village was little more than rubble, any surviving 
houses gutted by flame.. .bodies tossed and chopped like salad by shellfire, 
riddled with bullets; burned, splintered, cracked; bone-bleached, green-rotten, 
peach-fresh; single, group, multiple; soldier, civilian; man, woman, child.166
In the face of such destruction, sickeningly repeated hundredfold throughout the Balkans,
Africa, and western Asia, observers came to see that the conceptual centre of
I fk 7conventional mechanized warfare could not hold. Although lagging, the mind had no 
choice but to change, given what the eye perceived. The soldiers and others caught up in 
these ‘new wars’ must have thought that, surely, some revelation was at hand.168 
Humanitarian Responsibility
Indeed, the evolution of the military concept of civil-military cooperation traced 
here did not occur in a vacuum, but rather against the backdrop of two related journeys: 
the evolutions of humanitarianism and normative international relations. The tale of 
humanitarianism over the course of the final decade of the Twentieth and the first decade 
of the Twenty-first centuries is a paradoxical one. At first blush, the 1990s were the 
period within which humanitarianism flourished. Indeed, the term ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ and ‘international community’ were not only coined at this time, but 
became part of the vocabulary of mainstream international politics: “As crisis after crisis
166 Loyd, 14-15.
167 Loyd and Smith were not the only, nor the first, to come to this realization. Amongst many accounts, 
particularly prescient and poignant examples can be found in Misha Glenny, The Fall o f  Yugoslavia: The 
Third Balkan War. (London: Penguin, 1992); Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The R oad to Sarajevo  
(Vancouver: Douglas and MacIntyre, 1993); Christopher Bellamy, Knights in White Armour: The New Art 
o f  War and Peace. (London: Pimlico, 1997); William Shawcross, D eliver Us from  Evil: Peacekeepers, 
Warlords and a W orld o f  Endless Conflict. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); and Romeo Dallaire, 
Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure o f  Humanity in Rwanda. (Toronto: Random House, 2003).
168 With apologies to William Butler Yeats.
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and episode of mass murder wracked the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia, 
the triumphalist rhetoric about a new humanitarian order became more and more the 
norm in Western official circles, the United Nations, the World Bank, and the relief 
organizations.”169 Tony Blair chose his words carefully in his Chicago speech of April 
24, 1999, where he set out the ‘doctrine of the international community’. Genuine 
concern for the welfare of the people was at the heart of NATO’s military campaign to 
stop the Serbs in Kosovo: “Anyone who has seen the tear stained faces of the hundreds of 
thousands of refugees streaming across the border, heard their heart-rending tales of 
cruelty or contemplated the unknown fates of those left behind, knows that Bismarck was
1 70wrong.” Humanitarianism was founded on values, not the Realpolitik of an earlier age.
However, humanitarianism, despite its centrality, came to be seen as a fig leaf, if 
not for military domination, then certainly for a Western penchant for order and stability. 
Even when wrapped in the banner of humanitarianism, “the test of a successful 
intervention is [not] whether it defeats an enemy or stops a human rights abuse, but 
whether it sets in train the nation-building process that will prevent the area from 
becoming a security threat once again.”171 Clearly rise of humanitarianism, as conceived 
of in the capitals of the West, contributed to the crisis that the humanitarian community 
found itself in.
169 David Rieff, A B edfor the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis. (London: Vintage, 2002): 88.
170 Tony Blair, “Doctrine o f  the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago,” 24 April 1999. 
[http://www.numberlO.gov.uk/output/Pagel297.asp; accessed 30 June 2002].
171 Michael Ignatieff, “State-failure and Nation-building,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, 
and Political Dilemmas, J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003: 306.
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• 177And yet, as controversial as the notion of humanitarian intervention was , it did 
not wither on the vine, discarded as some cynical cover story. Instead, it evolved, to 
become the formal doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. The emphasis shifted from 
a ‘right to intervene’ to a ‘duty of care’. As stated by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, there exist three elements to the overarching idea of 
the responsibility to protect:
a. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root.. .and direct causes 
of... conflict.
b. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations o f  compelling human need.
c. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide.. .full assistance with recovery,
1 '7 1
reconstruction, and reconciliation.
The idea of a state based reaction to human catastrophe was made stronger under this 
doctrine, which was formally—and unanimously—adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly as part of its 2005 World Summit. The moral imperative behind 
humanitarian intervention gained a degree of legal standing, at least and as far as 
declaratory, non-binding UN resolutions went. Some states were perhaps drawn to the 
idea of a responsibility to protect, not due to its humanitarian aspects, but rather to its 
ability to address state failure. Following September 11, 2001 both the United States and 
the European Union in the security strategies emphasized failed states as threats to 
security.174 In this context, military involvement becomes critical, perhaps even central,
i72J.L. Holzgrefe characterizes the axes around which the controversies over humanitarian interventions as 
ethical ones, encompassing a variety o f  schools o f  thought, such as utilitarianism, natural law, social 
contractarianism, and communitarianism, and legal positivism. See his J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian 
Intervention Debate,” in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003: 15-52. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri characterize the controversy more in terms o f  
“biopolitics” and the continual process o f  domination in world politics. See Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri, Empire. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000): 34-41.
173 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect. (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2001): xi. Emphasis added.
174 United States o f  America, The National Security Strategy o f  the United States o f  America. Washington, 
DC. September 2002 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf; accessed 11 December 2002];
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to the idea of humanitarianism. Humanitarian disasters cause security problems, and 
therefore become security problems themselves. Relief, aid, and development are 
important, but only as far as they help to achieve some strategic objective. Indeed, some 
observers have gone so far as to claim that places like sub-Saharan Africa may be in the
I 75‘fortunate’ position of having a combination of “ungovemed spaces” and humanitarian 
disasters, making them ideal targets for both economic development and military
| n/:
assistance. “The problem is that the military and some governmental departments.. .see 
the humanitarian actors as ‘force multipliers’ and part of the overall strategy. But the 
humanitarian practitioners see themselves... as part of a completely different programme. 
This is more than an absence of glue, these are completely different views of what is 
happening in the same operational space, and...humanitarians have an unremitting
I 7 7resistance to being co-opted into a [security] strategy.” Civil-military cooperation 
must be seen against this backdrop.
Hallmarks of the Evolution: Interference, Convergence, and Institutionalisation
Whether based in a peace support, small wars, or ‘strategic humanitarian’ 
tradition, the instances of military intervention since the beginning of the 1990s have 
aspects that set them apart from the traditional peacekeeping. First, they are instances of
European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. Brussels. 12 December 
2003. [http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf; accessed 14 February 2004].
175 Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk, et al. Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing 
Terrorism Risks. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007).
176 Jonathan Stevenson, “Africa’s Growing Strategic Resonance,” Survival 45.4 (Winter) 2003-2004: 153- 
172.
177 John Mackinlay, “Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan,” Whitehall Paper 64. 
(London: Royal United Services Institute, 2005): 49.
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direct political and military interference in the internal affairs of a country, with or
1 78without explicit consent.
Second, these interventions were responses to what have become known as
‘complex political emergencies’ and consequently they led to the convergence of
political, military, and humanitarian assets and capabilities.179 In other words, the
concept of intervention changed in line with the changing concept of conflict. It is
certainly debatable whether or not conflict has changed or merely our interpretation of it;
it could be said that all emergencies are complex and always have been. What is
important here is that the ‘problems’ of the 1990s began to be interpreted differently than
they had been before. They were no longer ‘proxy wars’ between the superpower camps,
nor were they to be ‘depoliticised’ and presented as ‘famines’ or ‘disasters’. Politics
1 80could (re)enter the mainstream discourse.
1 O 1
Wilkinson has labeled this convergergence the “New Response Paradigm,” and
within it is not only politics that is embraced. Mark Duffield believes that over the 
course of the 1990s, the Western involvement in “The New Wars” led to the “merging of 
development and security,” whereby there has been an “incorporation of war into
t O '}
development discourse.” This has led to a distortion or “radicalization” of
178 J. Barry and A. Jefferys, “A bridge too far: aid agencies and the military in humanitarian response.,” 
Humanitarian Practice Network Paper # 3 7 . (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002).
179 John H. Eisenhour, and Edward Marks, “Herding cats: overcoming obstacles in civil-military 
operations,” Joint Force Quarterly. Summer 1999: 86.
180 See Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, “From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies”, Third 
World Quarterly 20.1 (February 1999); William Maley, “Twelve Theses on the Impact o f  Humanitarian 
Intervention,” Security Dialogue. 33.3 (September 2002).
181 Philip Wilkinson, “Sharpening the Weapons o f  Peace: Peace Support Operations and Complex 
Emergencies,” in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds. Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution. 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000): 65.
182 Duffield, 2. Collier provides a concrete example o f  this ‘inclusion’. In his high-profile work for the 
World Bank, he has stated that “war is development in reverse” and that “development can be an effective 
instrument for conflict prevention.” See Paul Collier, et al. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and  
Development Policy. (Oxford: Oxford UP for the World Bank Group, 2003): ix.
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development, whereby humanitarian resources are to be used strategically, in order to
punish or entice, rather than be distributed based entirely on need. “Societies must be
changed so that past problems do not arise” and development ‘properly’ used is the tool
that can bring about that change. However, it is not merely this increased instrumental
approach to development that is striking:
There is a noticeable convergence between notions of development and security. 
Through a circular form of reinforcement and mutuality, achieving one is now 
regarded as essential for securing the other. Development is ultimately impossible 
without stability and, at the same time, security is not sustainable without 
development. [This convergence] embodies the increasing interaction between 
military and security actors on the one hand, and civilian and non-governmental 
organizations on the other.
While Duffield’s work concentrates on this convergence mainly from the 
perspective of development studies, his observations are just as germane to the study of 
the military. NGOs are convinced they need security, and armies are convinced they 
need development. That each party does not agree on how they might proceed or what 
the precise nature of the convergence might be is a matter for discussion and negotiation
1 fidin the light of the compelling and overarching conceptual accord.
Flowing from these notions of interference and convergence is the third aspect of 
military intervention since the end of Cold War: its apparent institutionalization. The 
reasons for this appear diverse. Thomas Weiss suggests that they are a combination of 
“the end of East-West tensions, the erosion of sovereignty, the evolution of 
[international] norms, genuine altruism, domestic politics, media coverage, and the desire
183 Duffield, 16.
184 There are those, o f  course, who oppose the idea o f  convergence altogether. See Astri Suhrke, 
“Peacekeepers and Nation-builders: Dilemmas o f  the UN in East Timor,” International Peacekeeping. 8.4 
(Winter) 2001: 1-20.
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to contain refugee flows” . Building on the idea of domestic politics , Ann Fitz-Gerald 
and F. Walthall contend that the trend follows “in the wake of recent calls for ‘joined up 
government’”. David Chandler takes a different tack, believing that they are indicative 
of “the people-centred approach”, popular in development circles, being applied in the
1 87arena of international politics. Indeed, rhetoric from a number of Western
governments highlights the need for a ‘human security strategy’ based on humanitarian
1 88values as a substitute for the traditional ‘state security’ paradigm. There are ideas,
though, that situate the rise in ‘military humanitarianism’ as part of a larger scheme.
Labelled by Slim as “geopolitical conspiracy theories” they see “humanitarian missions
1 80as rehearsals for short notice invasions” .
Regardless of the reasons behind it, some have concluded that civil-military 
cooperation has become institutionalized within the system of global governance or 
international conflict management. Not only does institutionalization refer to a 
formalization of civil-military cooperation, it suggests that that military is driving the 
process, constructing for itself a “hegemonic position.” 190 Ranging from some 
militaries’ attempts to impose a system o f ‘command and control’ over aid agencies in
185 Thomas G. Weiss, M ilitary-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises. (Oxford: 
Rowman, and Littlefield, 1999.)
186 Anne M. Fitz-Gerald and F. Walthall, “An integrated approach to complex emergencies: the Kosovo  
experience,” The Journal o f  Humanitarian Assistance. 2001 [http://www.jha.ac/articles/a071.htm; accessed 
3 February 2003]
187 David Chandler, “The People-Centred Approach to Peace Operations: The N ew  UN Agenda,” 
International Peacekeeping  8.1 (2001): 1-19.
188 For example, see Lloyd Axworthy, “Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership,” 
International Journal 52.2 (1999): 183-196; and Paul Heinbecker, “Human Security: The Hard Edge,” 
Canadian M ilitary Journal 1.1 (2000): 11-16.
189 Hugo Slim, “The stretcher and the drum: civil-military relations in peace support operations,” in J. 
Ginifer, ed. Beyond the Emergency. (London: Frank Cass, 1997): 124. See also Noam Chomsky, The 
M ilitary Humanism: Lessons from  Kosovo. (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1999).
190 Michael Pugh, “Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations,” in Kurt R. Spillman, 
Thomas Bemauer, Jiirg M. Gabriel, Andreas Wenger, eds. Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned  
and Future Perspectives. (Bern: Peter Lang, 2001): 8-9.
[http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/documents/Studies/volume_9/pugh.htm; accessed 27 Feb 2003].
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Somalia191, to the fact that some militaries have now ‘taken over’ humanitarian tasks, 
such developments signify a deliberate military invasion of the so-called ‘humanitarian
1 Q9space.’ Pugh believes that such an invasion serves to lessen the potential good that can 
be achieved by the true cosmopolitan actors in conflict situations—local actors and 
representatives from ‘global civil society’ in the form of international organizations and 
NGOs.193
Martin Shaw sees this shift towards institutionalisation as one of what he calls
“The Rules of Risk-Transfer War” (which is how he characterizes “the new Western way
of war”): ‘Humanitarianism’ and ‘humanitarian’ organizations must be annexed to
compensate for violence against civilians.”194 In his conceptualization, civil-military
cooperation serves two purposes:
On the one hand, it reassures Western publics by promoting ‘humanitarian’ action 
simultaneously with the launch of war.. .On the other hand, ‘humanitarianism’ is a 
way of mitigating, or appearing to mitigate, the consequences of war. It has had 
real consequences:.. .genuine care for some of the injured and sick, and support 
for some healthcare and other systems.. .But their other, perhaps more important 
significance has been to reassure Western publics about the minimal, civilian- 
friendly character of the violence their armies have carried out.195
Others see the idea of institutionalization going beyond mere mitigation (whether
it be mitigation of domestic angst or foreign suffering). The very idea of what now
constitutes military victory is such that some sort of civil-military cooperation is
unavoidable. William Martel’s criteria for victory illustrate this clearly:
1. Defeat enemy military forces and its economic infrastructure;
2. Control the enemy state;
191 K.M Kennedy, “The relationship between the military and humanitarian organisations in Operation 
Restore Hope,” in W. Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds. Learning from  Somalia: The Lessons o f  Arm ed  
Humanitarian Intervention. (Boulder, CO: W estview Press, 1997): 99-117.
192 Barry and Jeffreys, 1.
193 Michael Pugh, Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations, 9-11.
194 Martin Shaw, The New Western Way o f  War. (Cambridge: Polity, 2005): 91.
195 Shaw, 92.
75
3. Political and governmental reform;
4. Rebuild the economy and infrastructure;
5. Realign the enemy state’s foreign policy; and
6. Build a new strategic relationship with the defeated state.196
According to this schema, civil-military cooperation is obviously implicated in rebuilding 
the economy and infrastructure of the ‘defeated state’ (number four in Martel’s list). 
However, as demonstrated by the broadening of the spectrum of military involvement in 
‘stability and support operations’, one can make the case that security sector reform and 
strategic advisory activities have a role in to play (number three and five). Finally, it can 
be said that in cases where post-conflict states are left dependent on military and 
development assistance, a new ‘strategic relationship’ has been built. Civil-military 
cooperation, as a practice, then can be seen as a means of achieving victory, not merely 
(or, perhaps, not at all) about helping the victims of violence. If this is the case, civil- 
military cooperation cannot be humanitarian because it is not conducted for humanitarian 
reasons alone.197
There are those, however, who believe that such institutionalization is an 
indication of the great potential of contemporary military operations. Civil-military 
cooperation and other such tasks198 demonstrate that armed forces are capable of much
196 William C. Martel, Vicotry in War: Foundations o f  Modern M ilitary Policy. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007): 136-145.
197 Humanitarian principles dictate that assistance is given on the basis o f  need alone, and cannot granted or 
withheld in accordance with any other objective. See United Nations. Office o f  Coordination o f  
Humanitarian Assistance. (OCHA). “Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies,” Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) Reference Paper, 28 June 2004, esp. para 18. 6. 
[http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/ocha-civmil-28jun.pdf; accessed 3 July 2004]
28 June 2004 and International Federation o f  the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Code o f  Conduct 
for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster 
Relief. 1994. [http://www.iffc.org/publicat/conduct; accessed 25 Apr 2002]. See also Oxfam, “Iraq: 
Humanitarian-Military Relations,” Briefing Paper No. 41. February 2003; and Barry and Jefferys.
198 Such as disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR).
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more than merely “killing people and breaking things”199. While still state-directed and 
state-executed, civil-military cooperation aims to better the plight of the victims of 
conflict, whether they are refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs), or those survivors 
who remain in place. Dealing with the displaced, providing medical treatment, and 
feeding the hungry are examples of what might be termed ‘emergency relief and 
militaries are no strangers to these kinds of activities, either in wartime, post-conflict, or 
post-disaster scenarios.200 However, in recent interventions militaries have gone much 
further, conducting not only relief, but development tasks, including reconstruction (of 
infrastructure and accommodation), civil administration, police and prison services, even
901local capacity-building and economic development. Furthermore, there are many 
examples linking military activities on peace support operations to conflict resolution and
90 9peacebuilding. Therefore, as Whitman notes, there is little point in asking merely 
whether the military can be humanitarian; on that point, there can be little doubt.
199 Anthony Zinni, Address to the US Naval Institute, February 2004.
[http://www.usni.org/seminars/forum/03/forum03zinni.htm; accessed 17 March 2004]. See also Frederick 
W. Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” Policy Review Online. 120 (August) 2003: 6 
[http://www.policyreview.org/aug03/kagan.html; accessed 27 Aug 2003]
200 See Larry Gardenker and Thomas G. W eiss, eds. Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters. (London: 
Macmillan, 1991).
201 See Christopher Ankersen, “Praxis versus policy: Peacebuilding and the Canadian Forces,” in Thomas 
Keating and W.Andy Knight, eds. Building Sustainable Peace. Edmonton/Tokyo: University o f  Alberta 
Press/United Nations University Press, 2004: 71-92.
202 See Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds. Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution  (London: 
Frank Cass, 2000); David M. Last. Theory, D octrine and Practice o f  Conflict De-Escalation in 
Peacekeeping Operations (Clementsport. NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997); Roland Paris, 
“International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’,” Review o f  International Studies 28:4 
(October) 2002: 637-56; Roland Paris, At W ar’s End  (Cambridge: CUP, 2004); Damian Lilly, “The 
Peacebuilding Dimension o f  Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies,” A Briefing Paper 
(London: International Alert, 2002) [http://www.international-alert.org/pdfpubdev/briefing3.pdf; accessed  
12 Sep 2003].
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Soldiers (and armed forces as a whole) can and do ‘do good’ in peace support 
operations.203
The whole issue of institutionalization hinges on the question at the heart of this 
study, which is to ask why militaries are involved in such activities in the first place.204 
On the one hand, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin assert that it is the desired ends and not 
the means that are important in evaluating modes of peacekeeping. On the other hand, 
Pugh contends that, prima facie, military involvement in peace support operations 
(because they are tied to a hegemonic purpose) restricts genuine progress. In his view the 
ends taint the means.
It is possible to see the antithetical position with regards to civil-military 
cooperation: even if the ultimate aim is ‘world domination’ if some lives are improved 
along the way, then that must be seen as a good thing. Michael Ignatieff, for instance, 
acknowledges that nation-building practices (such as civil-military cooperation) are a part 
of a wider project of empire, but cautions us not to throw the baby away with the 
bathwater:
Imperialism doesn’t stop being necessary just because it becomes politically 
incorrect. Nations sometimes fail, and when they do only outside help— imperial 
power—can get them back on their feet. Nation-building is the kind of imperialism 
you get in a human rights era, a time when great powers believe simultaeneously in 
the right of small nations to govern themselves and in their own right to rule the 
world 205
203 Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, “The Canadian Role in Human Security,” in Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. 
Frost, eds. The G lobal Century: Globalization and National Security. (Washington, DC: National Defence 
University Press, 2001): 1077-1078.
204 Jim Whitman, ‘Those who have the power to hurt but would do none’: The Military and the 
Humanitarian,” in D.S. Gordon and F.H. Toase, eds. Aspects o f  Peacekeeping  (London: Frank Cass, 2001): 
101 - 102 .
205 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. (Toronto:
Vintage, 2003): 106.
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Put less controversially, perhaps, he claims that “humanitarian action is not unmasked if 
it is shown to be the instrument of imperial power. Motives are not discredited just
90 ( \because they are shown to be mixed.” Civil-military cooperation, while not carried out 
for purely humanitarian reasons, can have a humanitarian effect. The means can be 
justified by reference to the ends to which they contribute.
Conclusion
Civil-military cooperation has existed, in some form or another, within military
thought for some time. Increasingly, though, the international political backdrop has
highlighted the importance of marrying warfighting with peacebuilding. It is virtually
impossible to conceive of a contemporary (or future) military intervention without some
kind of humanitarian or reconstruction aspect to it, whether it takes shape as the
justification behind the intervention in the first place, or as an integral part of the
campaign plan. As Gordon points out,
The political objectives underpinning interventions have become more ambitious, 
resulting in a greater degree of complexity in the institutional responses of 
states.. .The convergence of the human security and traditional, narrowly defined 
state security agendas, the gradual importation of ‘political economy’ approaches 
to conflict analysis, state and international organisations’ pursuit of multi­
dimensional missions and policy ‘coherence’ between the various aspects of these 
interventions have each been significant factors in [the] evolution” of civil- 
military cooperation.207
Ulrich Beck describes this as an indication that we have entered a period of “post­
national war”, whereby cosmopolitan concerns for human rights lead to, among other
90Rthings, a “new kind of post-national politics of military humanism is emerging”.
206 Ignatieff, 23.
207 Stuart Gordon, “Exploring the Civil-Military Interface and Its Impact on European Strategic and 
Operational Personalities: ‘Civilianisation; and Limiting Military Roles in Stabilisation Operations?” 
European Security. 15.3 (2006): 340.
208 Ulrich Beck, “War is Peace: On Post-National War,” Security Dialogue. 36.1 (2005): 9.
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Indeed, countries now fight “peace-war”, motivated by both a self-regarding desire for 
security and an impulse to resolve issues of human rights, seen as the root of international 
insecurity.209 Seen in this light, “no state possesses a legitimate monopoly on the use of 
force, because the legitimacy and legality of the use of force is placed under the
910 •reservation that human rights are recognized as the highest good.” In this way, a 
state’s national performance must be judged against a set of international criteria. This 
would explain, for instance, Tony Blair’s Chicago speech ahead of the war in Kosovo.
We fight not for national interests, but for universal values. According to Beck, the fact
that states fight on account of their “cosmopolitan responsibility” means that such wars
♦ • 211 “can.. .no longer be understood through the Clauswitzian conceptualization”.
Such a change in the way in which state action is judged is, according to Robert 
Cooper, nothing short of “extraordinary”. In what he calls The Postmodern (what Beck 
refers to as the Second Modem) Period, Cooper claims that “The legitimate monopoly on 
force, which is the essence of statehood, is thus subject to international— but self- 
imposed—constraints.”212 Cooper’s subordinate clause makes all the difference here.
My contention is that, even //it is the case that states fight for supranational or 
postnational ends, the means they employ strive to be in accordance with their own 
internally defined legitimacy. This legitimacy is contingent, culturally constructed, 
dynamic and, therefore, indeterminate. Most importantly, it is the product of the set of 
relations that exist between the people and their passions; the government and their
209 Beck, 18.
210 Beck, 14.
2 1 1 Beck, 8.
212 Robert Cooper, “The Postmodern State and the World Order,” (London: Demos, 1996): 17-18.
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policies; and the military and their skills. The objective of the next chapter is to explore 
those relations further.
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Chapter 3:
A Clausewitzian Framework for Analysis
Political guidance can be really helpful i f  you get it.
General Sir Mike Jackson
What the whole community comes to believe in grasps the individual as in a vice.
William James
As we confront civil-military cooperation as a practice, in order to understand 
why it takes the particular shape it does, we require some kind of framework to guide our 
thinking. Building on what we have learned in our examination of the existing literature, 
any such framework needs to be comprehensive; dynamic; sympathetic to the notion that 
immaterial factors (such as ideas and norms) matter; and it must allow for a degree of 
agency, rather than attempting to proscribe action through its very structure. The purpose 
of this chapter is to develop just such a framework, so that the empirical explorations that 
follow it can be better understood. The model introduced here seeks to explain the 
elements that underpin military activity, but more importantly to highlight the 
significance of the dynamic inter-relations between those elements. It introduces the idea 
that legitimacy is the key to those relationships, and explains how actors seek to establish 
legitimacy, in order to gain a certain freedom of action. Legitimacy, however, is not 
some ‘ever fixed star’; rather, it is contingent on several factors, including the particular 
cultural context within which it can be found. A final element in the model will focus on 
the indeterminate nature of even a culturally informed system. In the end, individuals— 
whether citizens, politicians, or soldiers—cannot escape the need to interpret the variety 
of signals that surround a particular choice. Ultimately, one’s cultural milieu may form a 
background, but each individual has to act according to his or her own understanding of 
what that means.
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We have already seen that civil-military cooperation is deeply embedded in both 
the ‘peace support’ and ‘small wars’ traditions of military activity. It is perhaps not 
surprising, then, that the most appropriate place to find our framework lies within the 
works of a philosopher of war: Carl von Clausewitz. Properly understood, his 
‘Trinitarian’ approach to war provides the best scheme for increasing our comprehension 
of why civil-military cooperation is carried out, and why it is carried out in the peculiar 
ways that it is. Clausewitz’s model, which is most often regarded as strictly a tool for 
understanding conventional war, encapsulates and allows for all the necessary actors, 
relationships, contexts, and ambiguities necessary in order to understand contemporary 
‘operations other than war’, such as civil-military cooperation. Far from being a relic of
j.L
the European 19 Century, dominated by the spectre of Napoleon, the idea of the 
‘Remarkable Trinity’ remains relevant and powerful today.
Military Activity as Political Activity
Clausewitz’s signal contribution to understanding the nature of military activity 
begins with his recognition that war is “ .. .a true political instrument, a continuation of 
political intercourse, carried on with other means.” There is no more hackneyed 
phrase in the field of Strategic Studies than this, but it is of vital and subtle significance. 
Most importantly, it establishes that military activity is not something that is carried out 
in theoretical or physical isolation from the other affairs of state. Clausewitz stresses this 
point in several places within On War, but also elsewhere. In his private correspondence 
with a contemporary Prussian officer on the General-Staff, Major Roder, he emphasises
213 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Michael Howard and Peter Peret, eds. and trans. (London: David 
Campbell Publishers, 1993): Book 1, Chapter 1, §24, Page 99. [Due to the various editions o f  this work in 
print, I have included, in addition to the page number, the Book, Chapter, and Section identifiers for easier 
reference.]
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that “War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by other 
means. Consequently, the main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in 
nature.. .According to this point of view, there can be no question of a purely military 
evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.” 214 The 
two separate but inter-related premises that underpin Clausewitz’s perspective should not 
be underestimated. The first is that military activity is intrinsically political. The second 
is that military activity “is not wholly autonomous” and is, in fact, subordinate to higher
} 1 c
order considerations.
Nearly two centuries after the publication of Clausewitz’s great work, most 
military officers and students of military affairs purport to understand this concept. 
Indeed, it is in some form or other learned by rote and recited in staff colleges around the
<ii/
world. However, as Clausewitz complained in 1827, while this “point of view is 
almost self-evident” it is obvious that “it has not yet been fully accepted, as shown by the 
fact that people still like to separate the purely military elements of a major strategic plan
917from its political aspects, and treat the latter as if they were somehow extraneous.”
While much of contemporary professional doctrine (of both militaries and civilian aid 
agencies, for example) and academic study holds the civil and military spheres as 
separate, Clausewitz reminds us that this is folly.
This is particularly relevant in military endeavours that fall short of what might be 
described as wars of national survival. Clausewitz argues that “the less intense the
214 Peter Peret and Daniel Moran, eds. and trans. Carl von Clausewitz: Two Letters on Strategy. (Ft. 
Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984): 21.
215 Peret and Moran, 24.
216 In his introductory essay, Michael Howard cites Wilhelm Riistow who describes Clausewitz as “well- 
known but little read.” This may well still be the case. Michael Howard, “The Influence o f  Clausewitz,” in 
Clausewitz, 29.
217 Peret and Moran, 21.
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motives.. .the conflict will seem increasingly political in nature.”218 In the stability 
operations that mark the contemporary period, the objectives of the Western intervening 
states are such that their life or death does not hang in the balance. These peace support 
operations or small wars are often maligned for the level of political ‘interference’ 
inherent in them. Decisions on things such as targeting, rules of engagement, timing, 
tempo, and sequencing are not left to generals, but rather kept close to the chests of the 
political leaders involved.219 As frustrating as that may seem to some military officers 
(and their ardent supporters qua commentators), Clausewitz chastens them not to carp 
about “harmful political influence on the management of war.. .Their quarrel should be 
with the policy itself, not with its influence.” Clausewitz goes on to admit that even 
where policy can be found wanting, this is not enough to outweigh the need to recognise 
its primacy: “Policy, of course, is nothing in itself: it is simply the trustee for all these 
interests... That it can err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in 
power, is neither here nor there. In no sense can the art of war ever be regarded as the
aa  i
preceptor of policy...” No matter what else it might be (horrifying, exhilarating, 
destructive, life-changing) military activity, then, is a means to some end. Clausewitz 
makes this plain when he points out that “The political object is the goal, war is the 
means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their
218 Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, § 25, Page 99. Emphasis in orginal.
219 See, for a trenchant example, W esley K. Clark, Waging M odern War. (Oxford: Public Affairs Press, 
2001), esp. 245-269.
220 Clausewitz, Book 8, Chapter 6, Page 734. Interestingly, Eliot Cohen feels that in the case o f  American 
civil-military relations, the military has gone beyond complaining and, to a certain extent, usurped civilian 
control over military activity. See Eliot Cohen, “Kosovo and the N ew  American Way o f  War,” in Andrew 
J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen, eds. War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a G lobal Age. (New  York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001: 38-62.
221 Clausewitz, Book 8, Chapter 6, Page 733.
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purpose.”222 For now, we shall leave aside any further exploration between the means 
and the ends of military activity. Suffice it to say that Clausewitz’s recognition is of 
critical importance for the understanding (not to mention the successful conduct) of 
contemporary military operations.
The Paradoxical Trinity
As remarkable as Clausewitz’s ‘war as the extension of politics’ maxim is, he did 
not stop there. While war is a political activity, it cannot be understood fully by simply 
focussing on a country’s ruler and its army. Clausewitz understood that the crucial aspect 
of war was that it was the product of three factors. In his own words, war is, “a 
paradoxical trinity—comprised of primordial violence, hatred, enmity.. .;of the play of 
chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of [an] 
element of subordination.”223 Each factor of the trinity adds its own unique character to 
war and each piece is required. Portrayed graphically, each factor would take the form of 
a vertex, with war occupying the area circumscribed within the resultant triangle.
To Clausewitz, these factors were not disembodied forces. Rather, each factor
9 9 4was borne by a particular segment of the State :
The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people ', 
the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of 
probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and 
the army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone.225
Besides assigning a function to particular groups, it is instructive to note how Clausewitz
alters slightly the phrasing. Whereas he first spoke of enmity, he now opens up the
222 Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §24, Page 99.
223 Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §28, Page 101.
224 Several authors refer to these elements as Clausewitz’s ‘secondary Trinity’. See, for instance, Gert de 
Nooy, “Introduction,” in Gert de Nooy, The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future o f  Western M ilitary 
Strategy. (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997): 2-5.
225 Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §28, Page 101. Emphasis added.
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possibility of a more inclusive range of emotions by saying that the people bring passion 
to war. This is not a small semantic point, but an important development in Clausewitz’s 
conceptualisation. The people’s passions sometimes run to ‘primordial violence’ but 
could include other emotions. The particular passion espoused by the people at a given 
time will contribute to the character of the resulting military activity. If the people are 
fearful of their opponents, or if they regard them with disdain, the nature of the ensuing 
battles will be different.
Note, too, that the army’s creativity and talent, rather than the notion of chance 
are stressed in this passage. In effect, what Clausewitz is saying is that chance, in and of 
itself, does not determine a war’s course. Rather, it is what a commander is able to do 
within the framework of uncertainty that is important. Since chance affects both sides of 
a war in an evenly ‘random’ way, it is crucial to observe what a commander does (in 
terms of training, materiel preparation, and planning) and the decisions he takes. Of 
course, there are variables beyond a general’s control (such as weather or illness), but war 
is a contest between human beings, not a game decided by fate or the gods, a roll of the 
dice, or some other piece of pure chance.
That the political aims belong solely to the government, as discussed above, is a 
clear point, although it has not always been followed in practice, even in liberal 
democracies. Similarly, it is not extraordinary to consider the character of the army and 
its leadership as making a contribution to the process of warmaking. The two most 
significant aspects of a Trinitarian model of military activity are the role attributed to the 
people and the relationships between the three factors and those that exist between their 
bearers.
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Writing after the French Revolution would force Clausewitz to bring society
‘back in’ to the business of war, assigning them key—indispensable—roles. Politics
might be the engine of war, but an engine needs fuel. “It would be an obvious fallacy,”
Clausewitz states, “to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a
rational act on the part of their governments.. .emotions cannot fail to be involved.. .they
will.. .affect it to some degree.” Emotion is the fuel and the people, as Clausewitz refers
to them, provide just that. The people do more than accelerate the violence of war,
though, they can also serve to circumscribe it. Since ancient times, “it is society which
determines when a soldier kills, whom he kills and even how he kills.” The particular
timbre of the passion brought to bear by the people at any given time cannot be taken as
given. In a contemporary sense, democratic societies may exercise this influence, as
“they will determine through their votes how [the country] will be defended, how many
dollars will be spent on defence, and what risks will be taken and what vulnerabilities
will be accepted.” This theme is picked up by Robert Carlyle, who claims that
Democratic values impact upon the character of the armed forces, in particular 
limiting what types of behaviour are acceptable. Moreover, during the 
preparation for war, social and political organization is the primary determinant of 
the types of military organization that will be acceptable to the parent society.228
So powerful can the people be that it is possible for Victor Davis Hanson to ask, with
reference to the pivotal Tet Offensive of 1968,
Can anything good come of a volatile Western citizenry that dictates when, 
where, and how its soldiers are to fight, even as it permits its writers, artists, and
226 Christopher Coker, The Warrior Ethos: M ilitary Culture and the War on Terror. (London: Routledge, 
2007): 61.
227 Douglas L. Bland, “Parliament’s Duty to Defend Canada,” Canadian M ilitary Journal 1.4 (Winter 
2000-2001): 35.
228 Robert Carlyle, “Clausewitz’s Contemporary Relevance,” Strategic and Com bat Studies Institute 
Occasional Paper 16. (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1995): 27.
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journalists freely and sometimes wildly to criticize the conduct of their own 
troops?229
Even though he believes such scrutiny can have detrimental effects on the conduct of 
military operations in the short term, Hanson admits “this strange propensity 
for.. .civilian audit and popular criticism of military operations—itself part of the larger 
Western tradition of personal freedom, consensual government, and individualism—can
990ensure accountability and provide for a wide exchange of views.” Indeed, he includes 
“Dissent and Self-Critique” in his list of reasons contributing to the superiority of the 
Western way of war.
As Clausewitz notes, the “social conditions of the states themselves.. .give rise to 
war; the same forces circumscribe and moderate it. They themselves are not part of war;
9 9 1they already exist before the fighting starts.” In the current age of globalization, it is
not just the populations of a single nation-state who matter. Global civil society has
assumed many of same characteristics of the people in Clausewitz’s original Trinity:
thanks to technology [such as satellite television and the Internet], the public 
practice of monitoring the exercise of power across borders has begun to take 
root. The informed citizen is debating how, when and where to use force, and he
9^9
is doing so in the context not so much of war, but of global policing.
Even if the people are not taking up arms or marching in the streets, the peoples’ 
contribution cannot be trivialized; they form the backdrop before which war is carried out 
and can even shape the way in which war is exercised and understood. Clausewitz’s 
Trinity recognizes this and is the stronger for it.
229 Victor Davis Hanson, Why The West Has Won: Culture and Carnage from  Salamis to Vietnam. 
(London: Faber and Faber, 2001): 437.
230 Hanson, 438.
231 Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §3, Page 84.
232 Christopher Coker, “Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the 
Management o f  Risk,” Adelphi Paper 345. (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute 
o f  Strategic Studies, 2002): 30.
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In addition to the role assigned to the people, another essential aspect of
Clausewitz’s Trinitarian understanding of war is that the Prussian went beyond
identifying the key forces and actors behind war; he also saw the importance of the
relationship between them:
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their 
subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory which 
ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them 
would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be 
totally useless.
To Clausewitz, war is not conducted in isolation, like an experiment in a laboratory,
under controlled conditions. Policy is not simply ‘decided’, orders to commanders not
dryly ‘cut’, armies not merely ‘dispatched’ to win or lose on the battlefield, like in some
board game. The conditions of real war are not controlled, but rather messy. As
mentioned above, policies can be ill-conceived, or tainted by personal vanity. The
emotions of the people can be of such a frenzy as to compel politicians to act, perhaps
unwisely. The talent of a commander might not be up to the task at hand. Equally, the
politician and the commander might not get on well. History is replete with examples of
just such occurrences and each of these relational realities makes a significant mark on
the resulting military operation.
While at first reading, Clausewitz’s Trinitarian model can appear mechanical, it is
important to bear in the variability mentioned above. As Christopher Bassford points out,
each force of the Trinity
affects.. .human actors to some quite variable extent. The army’s officers and 
men and the political leaders are also, to varying degrees in different societies, 
members of “the people”. In democratic societies at least, the people are expected 
to play a role in rational decision making, whereas political leaders are as often
23j Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §28, Page 101.
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driven by personal needs by rational calculation of their societies’ practical 
requirements. Events on the army’s battlefields have a tremendous influence both 
on the the people and on the political leadership, while popular and political 
factors, in turn, affect the army’s performance. 34
Here Bassford points to three axes of variability. The first axis records the fact that each 
actor may not espouse its given Trinitarian force in an ideal fashion. The people, for 
instance, may not be the consummate ‘cheerleaders’ one might hope: “it is quite possible 
to fight and even win wars about which one’s people don’t give a damn.” The second 
axis’s variability highlights the fact that there are no clear dividing lines between each 
actor. As Bassford indicates, soldiers and politicians are people too, subject to emotions 
and passions. Similarly, the people, in some circumstances, can have an important role to 
play in the development of policy. The third axis of variability touches upon the 
interplay between the forces and their actors. The impact of one can affect all the others, 
the end result being a different kind of war than might be the case if each actor had been 
allowed to act in isolation. As Christopher Coker puts it “state, society, and army all 
[have].. .mutual claims on each other.”236
These claims form what Gianfranco Poggi describes as “a process of mutual 
accommodation”. Indeed, far from seeking the weakening of, or absolute autonomy 
from, its co-actors, each actor depends on the others doing their jobs, fulfilling their roles. 
Poggi, speaking of the relationship between Church and State as holders, respectively of 
normative and political power, describes this dependance. The Church relies on the State
2j4 Christopher Bassford, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters. XXV (Autumn 1995): 4. 
[Note: the edition used is from Bassford’s website. Therefore the pagination differs from the original.] 
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/trinity/TRININTR.htm; accessed 11 December 2002.
235 Bassford, 4.
236 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare. (London: Routledge, 2001): 95.
2j7 Gianfranco Poggi,. Forms o f  Power. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001): 81.
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to establish and enforce laws in the area of, for instance, charitable giving and private
property, or the transformation of certain sins into crimes (such as divorce or abortion).
In modem, Western societies the Church is shorn of an independent ability to do these
things, but at the same time is utterly dependant on their existence. It needs the State to
function, and therefore, may actively support it, encouraging its followers, through the
exercise of its considerable normative power, to obey the authority of the government.
The relationship is symbiotic, because the State benefits from the normative power of
Church, leveraging, for instance, the authority of God in its oaths and ceremonies, or its
blessing for military activities “making it easier for.. .authorities to send young men to be
killed in war and for judicial authorities to settle a pending dispute.” In some cases,
this symbiosis goes beyond mere convenience into what must be deemed collusion:
The most significant benefit the church could normally offer the state in its 
negotiation has been its ability to legitmate the political system and thus (to use 
Weber’s expression) to ‘domesticate’ its subjects, making them more amenable to 
political control and discipline—indeed to oppression. In the liturgy of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, for instance, the inculcation of obedience and indeed 
devotion to the tsar was the central message, incessantly broadcast to the 
faithful.239
Lest this example seem too extreme or arcane, it is worth recalling God’s role in the 
British national anthem as the ‘One’ saving the monarch, not to mention sending her 
victorious, and the reciprocal duty of the sovereign as the ‘Defender of the Faith’. 
Similarly, the relationship between American President George W. Bush and the so- 
called ‘religious Right’ can be seen to be mutually beneficial to both parties.240
238 Poggi, 82.
239 Poggi 83.
240 For an extended discussion on the role o f  religion in international politics, see Fabio Petito and Pavlos 
Hatzopoulos, eds. Special Edition, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies. 29.3 (2000).
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While not speaking of Church and State, Clausewitz himself appreciates this 
mutuality. As mentioned above, he describes the tendencies of the Trinity to be “variable 
in their relationship to one another” and aimed to develop a theory “that maintains a 
balance between [them], like an object suspended between three magnets.”241 It is worth 
considering this metaphor carefully. An object, to be truly suspended between magnets 
as described by Clausewitz, would be significantly influenced by each pole in its turn.
The strength of each magnet would be an important component of the position and 
stability of the object. But, beyond the properties of any one magnet, the suspended 
object would be dependent on the combined effect of all the magnets. As Bassford 
explains, “the actual path of the suspended object is never determined by one force alone, 
but by the interaction between them, which is forever and unavoidably shifting.”242 
Indeed, the three magnets and the object cease to become separate pieces, but rather form 
a system in equilibrium. Variations in the strength or position of any of the magnets 
would change the location of the suspended object and fluctuations would decrease its 
stability, causing the object to be attracted directly to a pole or to wobble and crash. 
Mutual Claims as Legitimacy
Clearly, the social world in which people, governments, and militaries occupy, 
and within which military activity is carried out, is not as simple as a hypothetical physics 
thought experiment might suggest. However, it is possible to find an analogue for the 
idea of equilibrium in the concept of legitimacy. What does legitimacy mean? In basic 
terms it can be said that actors have legitimacy “when they are supported by the society’s
241 Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §3, Page 101.
242 Bassford, 4.
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shared values and beliefs, underwritten by moral consensus.”243 The basis for this 
legitimacy can be found in tradition, reason, or law244 and amounts to “the capacity of a 
social or political system to develop and maintain a general belief that the existing social 
order and its main solutions are generally appropriate.”245
Put bluntly, possessing legitimacy can mean the difference between being found 
to be accepted or unacceptable. In societies where the military is vested with a monopoly 
of collective violence in the interest of the state, a certain inequality arises. Soldiers, in 
the execution of their duties, may use deadly force to kill other human beings, something 
that other citizens (non-soldiers) may not do. In order to justify this inequality, which 
lies at the heart of modem liberal society,246 the military’s use of force must fall into 
some schema that renders it acceptable, even desirable. The enablement of such a 
schema relies on the military’s existence, and their holding of a monopoly of violence, 
being deemed and seen to be legitimate 247 From this we can see that legitimate military 
activity is that which accords with the prevailing political discourse; for our purposes, 
this discourse claims that the political is the superordinate realm. Illegitimate military 
activity, on the other hand, is that activity which is out of sync with this political 
organising principle: “Leaders who are considered to be acting in ways that citizens
948threaten their world order risk forfeiting the legitimacy to rule.”
243 Poggi, 50. For a critical discussion o f  the idea o f  legitimacy, with special reference to epistemological 
shortcomings caught up in traditional conceptualisations, see Micheal S. Drake, Problem atics o f  M ilitary 
Power: Government, Discipline and the Subject o f  Violence. London: Frank Cass, 2001): 3-6.
244 Gwyn Harries Jenkins and Jacques Van Doom, eds. The M ilitary and the Problem o f  Legitimacy. 
(London: Sage, 1976): 5.
245 Jacques Van Doom , “The Military and the Loss o f  Legitimacy,” in Gwyn Harries Jenkins and Jacques 
Van Doom, eds. The M ilitary and the Problem o f  Legitimacy. (London: Sage, 1976): 19.
246 Bobbitt 5-12.
247 Van Doom 22.
248 Alexandra Kent, “Reconfiguring Security: Buddhism and Moral Legitimacy in Cambodia,” Security 
Dialogue. 37.3 (September) 2006: 346.
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Following from a Weberian conceptualisation of legitimacy, Van Doom believes
that the key to a legitimate role for the military lies in institutionalization249, the process
of bureaucratisation and de-personalisation that can be traced to the beginning of the
Modem Period. We can see this process clearly articulated by Clausewitz and his
Remarkable Trinity. By entering into a process of formalisation, the military becomes
embedded into the existing order, rather than a body completely separated from it. This
is of vital importance, not only for the government, who no longer need to be weary of
the military lurking in the shadows, but also for the military itself. Legitimacy
understood in this way means that the military does not need to worry about whether or
not it will be accommodated or accepted by society. Each time a new general is
appointed at the head of the armed forces, or a new parliament is elected, there is no need
to question whether or not the military has a role to play in the organs of the state;
institutionalised legitimacy means, for the military at least, that “they can generally rely
upon their being accepted.” As Gianfranco Poggi explains,
Legitimacy means that [an actor] can assume, in their routine operations, that 
subjects or citizens will comply with.. .orders.. .on the basis not only of 
unreflecting habit or fear of punishment, but also of a willing disposition to obey,
' i c  j
motivated by a sense of obligation and of moral self-respect.
The main issue in civil-military relations, then, becomes the establishment and 
maintenance of this legitimacy.
However, located with this notion of virtuous restraint, is a paradox, for “the more 
unlikely major military conflicts become, the more difficult it is for the soldier, as well as
Van Doom 23.
250 Van Doom  22.
251 Poggi, 82.
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his culture, to retain belief in his efforts and existence.” The difficulty for the military 
becomes, therefore, how to maintain some kind of relevance, while at the same time 
obeying its political master, who may not provide a role for the military to fill. This 
difficulty is compounded when the society that surrounds both the politician and the 
general is added to the picture. In a democratic society the military is not only 
subordinate to the government, but both together are subject to the approval of the 
citizenry at large. The parent society may confer legitimacy to the military, but it does so 
largely on its own terms. Unlike in what Harries-Jenkins describes as a ‘militocratic’ 
regime (where the military serves as the ‘guardian of the state’, taking its role directly 
from the constitution or founding principles of the state), in democracies “the legitimacy 
of the military is evaluated against a subjectively determined concept of ‘what ought to 
be’ rather than ‘what is’. This normative concept changes over time, but also changes at 
a faster rate in the parent society than in the armed forces.” This phenomenon means 
that the military is often seen to maintain “a seemingly outmoded interpretation of the 
common good.”254
In addition to this unavoidable reality, there are two other reasons why armed 
forces must concern themselves with issues of legitimacy. The first is because in the 
West, especially since the decline of conscription, the military is increasing seen as non- 
representative of the wider society. The public regard the military as a ‘closed
society’, self-selecting, secretive, and in some cases, drawn from a particular segment of,
252 Van Doom  34.
253 Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, “Legitimacy and the Problem o f Order,” in Gwyn Harries Jenkins and Jacques 
Van Doom, eds. The M ilitary and the Problem o f  Legitimacy. (London: Sage, 1976): 56.
254 Harries-Jenkins 56.
255 Harries-Jenkins 53.
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rather than the whole, society.256 Due to this, the military can be seen as an alien 
organisation requiring special attention and oversight. Although in some cases positive 
steps are taken to ‘correct’ the perceived imbalances within the armed forces, by the 
introduction o f ‘equalisation’ programs such as affirmative action or employment equity, 
most often it is the fact that the government (which is seen to be representative, at least in 
liberal democracies at any rate), is in charge which resolves this issue. Often, then, the 
military must rely on its bond with the government for its own legitimacy. Harries- 
Jenkins calls this “derived or reflected legitimacy”, whereby it is political oversight 
which brings about the legitimacy, rather than anything inherent within the military 
itself.257
Secondly, and perhaps more practically, since the military absorbs a great deal of 
a country’s treasure, there is a need to ensure that this money is spent in a manner that 
delivers the most ‘bang for the buck’. Issues of effectiveness (how well does the military 
meet the government’s objectives?) and efficiency (how well do they utilise their 
resources in this pursuit?) demand that the military be accountable for their budgetary 
allotments. The importance of this fact gives rise to the popular macro-economic 
imagery of ‘guns or butter’. It is felt that given these stark choices, the military cannot be 
left to make decisions on their own. Harries-Jenkins goes so far as to state the “military
256 Over time this segmentation has taken based on class, race, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual 
orientation. In some cases, the ‘unrepresentativeness’ o f  the armed forces has concentrated on the officer 
corps’ dependence on aristocratic elites (e.g. the purchasing o f  commissions) while in other contexts it has 
been reflected in a concern (correct or otherwise) that the ‘ranks’ were over-filled with poor, uneducated, 
racial minorities (e.g. during U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War). For a comprehensive examination o f  
how this segmentation plays out in the American case, see Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds. 
Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-M ilitary Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2001).
257 Harries-Jenkins 1976, p. 21.
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purpose embraces two...motives: that of...legitimacy and...effectiveness.” Without
the former, achieving the latter is impossible.
Without political legitimacy, the armed forces within a democratic system would 
be fish without water, unable to concentrate on their assigned tasks. Precious time and 
resources would have to be siphoned off in order to justify each and every action 
undertaken. While not completely freed from this type of activity now, the military has a 
certain amount of legitimate capital that it can draw on; this capital is the product of 
institutionalisation, whereby a contract of sorts has been put in place. In exchange for 
formalized relations with the government and the people, and based on the notion of 
professional restraint or the instrumentalized use of violence, the armed forces are 
granted a degree of autonomy.
The military, as a single actor, is not alone in the need to maintain legitimacy. 
Governments, too, rely on the establishment of relationships with the people and with the 
military. In democracies, this legitimacy is established not only through the rule of law 
and whatever particular constitutional arrangements that may exist, but also through 
various forms of influence exercised by the people, whether it be in voting, or in the 
inevitable opinion polling that fills nearly every day between elections.
If legitimacy is a form of capital the military must make periodic investments in 
order to sustain and maintain it. It is not the case that militaries ‘achieve’ legitimacy 
once and for all. Legitimation “is more a set o f relationships than an individual event 
The first of these relationships is that between the military and the government. The most 
obvious way in which the process of civil control of the military is carried out is by legal
258 Harries-Jenkins, 237.
259 C.E. Welch, “Civil Control o f  the Military: Myth and Reality,” in C.E. Welch, ed. C ivil Control o f  the 
Military: Theory and Cases from  Developing Countries (Albany: State University o f  N ew  York, 1976): 1.
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means. Constitutions and statutes shape (i.e. enable and restrain) the military and make
the limits of legitimate military activity clear.260 It can be said that they represent the
“articulation” “ .. .of the generalised values of the superordinate system” since they stem
1
from the very highest levels of that system. The intended audience for these legal 
methods is three fold: they speak to the military, but equally to the government and the
'yf/y
people. These laws (which differ across national contexts) deal with almost every 
aspect of political oversight, from the appointment of a commander in chief, to the role of 
the armed forces, to the establishment of political offices designed to provide political 
direction to the armed forces, to the kinds of financial and disclosure regulations that 
apply to the armed forces, to the way in which a military might apply discipline to its 
own soldiers. They are the most formal instruments of control and since they derive by 
definition from the political-cum-legislative apparatus of the state, they embody in their 
very existence the critical element of civil control.
A less formal but more important relationship is the one that exists between the 
military and the society. In one sense this relationship is mediated by the government, 
where that government is seen to be representative of the people. However, in a 
significant regard, the people themselves have a role to play. After all, it is their values, 
will, and moral consensus that are seen as the fount of legitimacy within a liberal 
democratic political order. Seen in this light, the idea of popular sovereignty means that 
the military is doubly under civil control. As Harald Laski notes “the will of the state is
260 Bobbitt, 6-7. While it might be interesting to explore which comes first the value or its legal 
expression, I w ill not go into that here. For the purposes o f  this paper, it is acknowledged that abstract 
notions o f ‘good’ are held prior to any laws being written; however, when dealing with a mature political 
order, it is impossible to return to an ‘original position’ where a society might exist in a pre-legal situation.
261 Van Doom  21.
262 Reinforcing the notion that the government is an intended recipient o f  law, Bobbitt claims that prior to 
the written constitution o f  the United States, sovereign states were not subject to the laws o f  their own 
country. Bobbitt, 262.
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subject to the scrutiny of all who come within the ambit of its decisions.” And, as has 
been mentioned above, military activity is in many respects no different than other state 
functions, particularly in this regard. The people get a say as to how the military operates 
within a given political system, if for no other reason than because it is their tax money 
that pays for it.264 This input can take many forms ranging from the relatively benign 
(and therefore common), such as public access to defence information, media 
questioning, lobbying and participation in policy reviews and formulation processes, to 
the significant (and therefore rare), such as the recall of defence minister or the defeat of 
a government in an election. These means, of course, are part of the greater 
institutionalisation mentioned above, and the end of which is the transference of popular 
legitimacy to the armed forces.
It should be remembered that popular support is often fickle and, as Harries- 
Jenkins mentions above, highly subjective and dynamic. Changes in the landscape 
caused by demographic shifts, recent military escapades which vary in popularity, and the 
role and mission of the military may have a significant impact on public opinion of, 
support for, and consequently the legitimacy of, the armed forces. While it may be 
possible to gauge what the public will support and what it will not, this cannot be taken 
for granted.
Writing of welfare states, Harries-Jenkins claims that government “decisions are 
often irrational in the sense that they are derived from an ill-defined and normative
263 Harald Laski, cited in Harries-Jenkins 43.
264 Gerard Theriault, “Democratic Civil-Military Relations: A Canadian V iew ,” in J. Hanson and S. 
McNish, eds. The M ilitary in M odern Democratic Society. (Toronto: Canadian Institute o f  Strategic 
Studies, 1996): 11.
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ethical posture which represents an absolute standard of values” ; these absolutes can 
easily become out of step with the more fluid societal norms. Again, it is instructive here 
to recall that Clausewitz warned against viewing the Trinitarian balance as a static 
concept, castigating those who sought to ‘fix arbitrary relationships’ between the 
elements of the Trinity. Furthermore, for Clausewitz “war was not only a continuation of
Ofiftpolitics: it was also an activity that took place within a social context.” Since 
particular societies differ in the way in which they are organised and in which the values 
they find meaningful, “the sources of legitimacy... are an expression of a [particular] 
social climate.”267
But what are ‘the sources of legitimacy’? Philip Bobbitt believes that 
“legitimacy.. .derives from history”, which in his eyes is more that merely a dispassionate 
record of what has happened, but rather “an understanding of past practices that 
characterizes a particular society.” Bobbitt’s emphasis that is not the ‘material’ nature 
of history (what happened when) that is the key to legitimacy is important: it is how that 
history is understood, or interpreted, that matters most. Actually, that interpreted history, 
shaped by language and the subjective perspectives of those who record it, publish it, and 
pass it on, ceases to be history and is transformed into something much greater. It takes 
on far more potency, as far as the establishment of legitimacy is concerned, in the form of 
myth. As Christopher Coker describes it, “myth is a story that enables us to imagine 
our social surroundings and to carry out the collective practices that make up our social
265 Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, “Armed Forces and the Welfare State,” in Morris Janowitz, ed. Civil-M ilitaiy  
Relations: Regional Perspectives. (London: Sage, 1981): 232.
266 Philip Windsor, Strategic Thinking: An Introduction and Farewell. Mats Berdal and Spyros 
Economides, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Press, 2002): 34.
267 Van Doom  21.
268 Bobbitt, 7.
269 Van Doom 21.
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9 7 0life.” A myth is “an allegory of the real and not its passive reflection which allows a 
soldier to assess, understand and judge the value of his own profession... Myth is the
971transcendent encounter which tells us how to live our life.” In order to be legitimate, 
in fact, a soldier (or any other actor) must act within the framework of expectation 
contained within the mythical history of the society to which he belongs. The other 
actors, too—in our case the government and the people—have expectations, derived from 
myths, to which they hold the soldier to account. Moreover, there are expectations to 
which the people and the government are compared, equally shaped by myth. To be ‘in 
sync’ with those mythical expectations is to be legitimate.
The myths to which we ascribe are really the “self-portrayal of a society that
9 7 9enables it to know its identity.” What we choose to include and recall in our myths, 
what we choose to highlight of our collective narrative of the past, serves to bolster what 
we value today. Myths provide us with the vocabulary to describe our present actions 
and future intentions and, in turn, that
language and methaphor.. .[has] immense impact on our assessment of the ethics 
of our conduct. We fashion cloaks from words and images and place them on 
events. These cloaks deeply affect our perception of those events, our moral
971
intuitions about them, and what we see as ethical responses to them.
Bill Sweeney underlines the power of these mythical references when he says that they 
“acquire a facticity which we perceive as the objective constraint on our thinking and
270 Christopher Coker, The Warrior Ethos: M ilitary Culture and the War on Terror. (London: Routledge, 
2007): 36.
271 Coker, 35.
272 Bobbitt, 5-6.
273 Margaret Somerville, “War to the Rescue?”, The National Post. 24 April 2003: C3.
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7 7  Abehaviour.” In fact, it can be said that the social world in which we act is constructed 
from them.
The notion that actions are tied to ideas is most keenly associated with Max 
Weber. He defines action as “human behaviour when and to the extent the agent or
77 c
agents see it as subjectively meaningful.” Perhaps more important to the model which 
lies at the heart of this chapter is Weber’s observation that action is only truly social
• 7 7  fkaction when “behaviour is related in its meaning to the behaviour of other people.”
The foundation on which this link between ideas and action is based is made up of norms. 
Theo Farrell defines them, in the tradition of Max Weber, thus:
Norms shape action by providing actors with ways of defining problems and 
responding to them appropriately; these are regulatory norms. Constitutive norms 
also shape action by enabling actors to construct identities which give meaning to 
their actions the actions of others. In other words, in addition to asking 
themselves, “What kind of situation is this?” and “What am I supposed to do?” 
actors may also ask, “What am I supposed to do as (say) a French Army officer?
Norms, then, can be seen as link between Coker’s myths and Sweeney’s 
constraints. Indeed, norms are what myths are made of, and myths serve merely as 
vehicles for transmitting norms, which in turn form the basis of legitimacy. Something is 
legitimate if it is in accordance with the normative framework suggested by myths.
Indeterminacy
However, perhaps Sweeney’s idea that myths form constraints goes too far. After 
all, as our myths are reinterpreted over time, any constraint formed by them would have a
274 Bill Sweeney, Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology o f  International Relations. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999): 202. Emphasis added.
275 W.G. Runciman, ed. Weber: Selections in Translation. Eric Matthews, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978): 7.
276 Runciman 7.
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certain elasticity to it. However, I believe he is right in the sense that there are 
boundaries formed through our interpretations of myths, which while not absolute, do 
influence what we consider as legitimate. In a sense, they are like the piste markers on a 
ski slope: skiing outside may be possible, but most of us tend to stay on the well-groomed 
runs, leaving the fresh powder for the more adventurous. In this sense, we might view
7 7 7such “persistent patterns of behaviour” as a description of social action. Put slightly
differently, Peter Katzenstein claims that the environment within which actors operate is 
marked by “collectively shared expectations”, which he believes are a product of social
77Rfactors, such as norms and identities.
How does this relate to Clausewitz’s work? It is the Prussian himself that reminds 
us that any particular military activity is a product of the specific circumstances that give 
birth to it. Writing again to Major Roder, Clausewitz states that, “every major war plan 
grows out of so many individual circumstances, which determine its features, that it is 
impossible to derive a hypothetical case with such specificity that it could be taken as
7 70real. We are not referring simply to trivialities, but to the most important issues.” 
Clausewitz was referring to such things as the nature of the political regime at war and 
the manner in which its leaders came to power. It is interesting that these ‘most 
important issues’ are based on values and ideas (norms), and not merely on physical or 
material factors, such as the number of men or canon available. Ideas shaped such things 
as how a society is organised and whether or not it chooses how it is governed, and these 
things matter in shaping how a military campaign might be prosecuted.
277 Douglas L. Bland, “War in the Balkans: Canadian Style,” Policy Options. October 1999: 18.
278 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in Peter J. 
Katzenstein, ed. The Culture o f  National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1995): 10.
279 Peret and Moran, 22.
104
Furthermore, Clausewitz also stressed that a sense of historical contingency is 
vitally important if we are to understand how any certain military action came to occur:
The exceptional circumstances in which Bonaparte and France found themselves 
since the Wars of the Revolution, allowed him to achieve major victories on 
almost every occasion, and people began to assume that the plans and actions 
created by those circumstances were universal norms. But such a view wouldsnsummarily reject all of the earlier history of war, which is absurd.
Ideas are important in war, according to Clausewitz, and those ideas change over time.
To believe that they remain fixed is delusional.
Clausewitz did not stop with history. The future counts too, and he regarded it as 
a something that could not be predicted. Again making reference to Napoleon’s 
battlefield success, Clausewitz was sure to register both the possibility and importance of 
variability, in this example, within the relationship between the people and the 
government and the effect that would have on future war:
War, untrammelled by any conventional restraints, had broken loose in all its 
fury. This was due to the peoples’ new share in these great affairs of state; and 
their participation, in turn, resulted partly from the impact that the Revolution has 
on the internal conditions of every state... Will this always be the case in the 
future? From now on will every war in Europe be waged with the full resources 
of the state, and therefore have to be fought only over major issues that affect the 
people? Or shall we see again a gradual separation taking place between 
government and people? Such questions are difficult to answer, and we are the
no 1
last to dare to do so ...
This idea of contingency is explained here with reference to the power of ideas: 
the rise in the importance of the people following on from the French Revolution, and the 
mythical notion of liberte, egalite, et fraternite. These terms were mythical and
Peret and Moran, 24.
281 Clausewitz, Book Eight, Chapter 3, 717.
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normative in the sense discussed above: they provided the resources necessary for agents 
to construct meaning, and from there, to take social action. As these ideas change over 
time, Clausewitz tells us, the resultant action, too, may change.
However, it is not simply the case that norms change; their power or influence 
over social action is not absolute. Myths—and the norms within them—do not dictate 
action, they must first interpreted by individuals, who use them to construct what Ann
• 9 89Swidler calls “strategies of action.” As Alexander Wendt explains, it is not the mere 
presence of ideas that leads to action, but rather each actor must choose which ideas to 
act upon, and how. Confronted by the several, often competing norms, different actors 
may choose to act differently, giving different priorities to the relevance or importance of 
any set of ideas.284 This is especially so in contemporary societies, which are freed from 
the stifling constraints of more traditional times. As Charles Moskos and James Burk 
point out, today’s societies in the West are marked by “radical uncertainty” which means 
that “we cannot easily judge the relative importance of collective activities.”285 Vaclav 
Havel believes that we live in a world with “no unified meaning.. .where everything is 
possible and almost nothing is certain.”286
Benjamin Gregg believes that this gives rise to a condition that he calls normative 
indeterminacy:
282 Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review. 51.2 (1986): 
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Times. (Boulder: W estview Press, 1994): 145.
286 Vaclav Havel, “Post-modernism: The Search for Universal Laws,” Vital Speeches o f  the Day. 160.20 
(1994): 613-615.
106
[this] refers to the lack of clear, distinct, and rationally persuasive knowledge. It 
refers specifically to knowledge of what a normative rule means, and how groups 
and individuals should apply it.. .It refers to indefinite knowledge about norms 
as.. .direct guides to behaviour.. .The thesis of indeterminacy asserts that.. .no 
theory, rule of principle constrains us.. .to interpret or apply the norm in a 
particular way. Consequently a normative question or problem could have many 
different answers or solutions—yet all of them valid. But if different answers are 
equally valid, then validity can no longer serve.. .as a criterion to guide public 
policy.287
The idea of indeterminacy is an important one, as it means that while myths and 
norms may form structures within which actors perform social action, the subjective 
nature of the way in which those actors understand the myths and norms means that 
agency, too, is present. As Gregg describes, indeterminacy places a premium on 
interpretation:
norms, whose meaning and proper application are unknown or unclear, cannot be 
used without interpretation. Indeterminate norms cannot be used without the 
direct and vital intervention of human agency in social structures, such as 
society’s political and legal remine or cultural understandings. Only the 
interpreters, never the indeterminate norms themselves, can decide which 
meaning and applications are politically or morally acceptable and which are 
not?n
In the case of civil-military cooperation, as well shall see, the role of interpreter is 
played by actors within the people, the government and the military. However, it is 
perhaps most acutely applicable to the tactical level military commander who, while 
deployed ‘on the ground and in the field’ must put in place an effective plan. And while 
a commander may be guided by the norms, collective expectations, and myths found 
within their own professional, political, and social settings, it is they who must
287 Benjamin Gregg, Coping in Politics with Indeterminate Norms: A Theory o f  Enlightened Localism  
(Albany: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 2003): 1.
288 Gregg, 19. Emphasis added.
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decipher—and pass on—some meaningful message, as a guide to action. This allowance 
for reflexive subjectivity gives rise to the important concept that “meaning [cannot] be
'J O Q
thought of as somehow objectively ‘correct’ or ‘true’ by some metaphysical criterion”. 
Often times, military commanders find themselves in situations of combat, or at least 
crisis, which bear little resemblance to the abstract world of norms and myths. This has a 
profound effect on what is decided:
Norms can be interpreted only in ad hoc ways. The meaning of a norm is ‘found’ 
or ‘discovered’ within the situations in which the norm is applied. In the end, 
every instance of an indeterminate norm’s application can be accounted for only 
separately, by reference to specific, local, and contingent determinants. The 
meaning of a norm is elaborated in ad hoc ways to cover the idiosyncracies of a 
situation within which it is applied. The norm may be ‘stretched’ if need be to fit 
the particular situation.290
This final phrase reminds us, though, that the individual interpreter is not given a 
completely free hand in interpretation. The need to stretch norms reminds us that norms, 
if not absolute, do have power. As I have indicated above, actors strive to obtain and 
maintain legitimacy. In order to do so, no matter how liberal an interpretation may be, it 
must bear some resemblance to the normative, often mythical, expectations. This is what 
allows us to see individual interpreters, such as the fictitious Colonel Kurtz in Apocalypse 
Now, or the real-life Lieutenant Calley at My Lai, as having gone too far in their 
normative ad hocery. Not only must there be subjectivity (individual interpretation), but 
also intersubjectivity (mutual or collective understanding). In the Clausewitzian sense, 
each actor in the Trinity, then, may see the world within a framework informed by myth; 
however, as each actor is not disembedded from, but rather a part of, a larger society, the
289 Runciman 7.
290 Gregg 28.
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way in which he or she sees the world depends to a large degree on the other actors. This 
is akin to the Trinity’s maintenance of ‘magnetic equilibrium’: there may be room for 
manoeuvre, but it is limited. A move too far from any pole would upset the delicated 
balance. There is a latent dynamism inherent in this conceptualisation of social action: as 
myths are interpreted and reinterpreted, they are seen to be both enduring and 
malleable—perhaps not radically, but perceptibly.
Conclusion
Clausewitz’s Trinitarian approach to military activity provides us with an 
important framework within which to analyse and understand contemporary civil-military 
cooperation. Above all, Clausewitz tells us that war (and, by extension, all military 
operations) is not purely a military activity. Rather it is the result of inputs from all 
aspects of a state. The people contribute passion; the government provides direction; and 
the military applies its skill within the realm of chance to affect a result.
These contributions cannot be taken for granted though. They may change over 
time and across different states. Variations in emphasis, in intensity, and in capability 
abound and can mean that outcomes, too, are dynamic. Equally important, Clausewitz 
points out, are the relations between the actors. The links, for instance, between people 
and government or between the military and the people are not fixed. A war from one 
age may not resemble a war from another, given these changes.
However, this is not to say that within any given state, the spectrum for variation 
is infinite. Norms, which help inform both the actions and the relations between the 
actors, are passed on in the form of powerful narratives called myths. These norms speak 
to the values and characteristics that are meaningful within a particular social or cultural
109
environment. Norms concern topics such as the proper use of force, or the role or 
objective that particular society sets for itself. These might include ideas like ‘it is right 
for our society to help others in need’ or ‘we have a responsibility to respect the 
autonomy of other societies and not interfere in their internal affairs.’ Norms raise 
collective expectations and action that is not in accord with these expectations can be said 
to be illegitimate. Legitimacy, for any actor, is important because it enables and 
facilitates action. Without legitimacy, an actor must spend valuable resources explaining 
or defending how it operates within society.
As important as norms are, they are not absolute determinates of action. Their 
meanings are often vague, or in competition with other norms. This indeterminacy 
requires that individuals first must interpret norms before deciding how to implement 
them. So, despite the existence of a framework, such as the Trinity, and constraining 
guidelines, such as myths, agency is retained.
The notion that individuals strive for legitimacy in their actions, in the face of 
imprecise and conflicting normative environments, forms the basis for the analysis of 
how civil-military cooperation is carried out in by Canada. I will now look at how each 
actor in Clauswitz’s Trinity operates and what military activity results.
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Chapter 4:
The People: Ambivalent Supporters
“Active military combat is just not consistent with Canadians ’ self-image o f what we 
should be doing abroad... We continue to see ourselves as a kind o f Baden-Powell o f the 
world community, doing good deeds, not getting killed or killing others. ”
Allan Gregg, Pollster
“Is the Canadian society anti-military or just poorly informed about the military and its
role today and historically? ”
Seminar discussion question set at Canadian Army Tactics School, 1998
The intensity of the people’s role in military activity has changed from the days of
th  thmass mobilization war which characterized the West in the 19 and first half of the 20
901Centuries. When, for instance, NATO armies are deployed, the populations of most of 
Europe and North America may “sympathasize but do not suffer; they empathize but they
9 0 9  • ►do not experience.” However, that is not to say that the people have no role in 
contemporary operations. In democracies like Canada, the population has a significant 
influence on the way both the government and the military conduct themselves on the 
battlefield. So while Colin Mclnnes may be correct in his assessment on suffering, he is
9QTwrong when he says that “society no longer participates, it spectates from a distance.” 
Philip Everts believes that, “Whether the consequences are good or bad, and whether we 
like it or not, the public is.. .always involved in wars, their participation, conduct or 
prevention, and whatever their form, as participant or observer.” Therefore, he continues, 
“public opinion, what people think and the way they look at the world and how they act 
upon their convictions in the political process [is] not only a topic of concern to
291 Phillipe Manigart, “Mass Armed Forces in Decline,” in Lawrence Freedman, ed. War. (Oxford: Oxford 
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governments, but consequently also a major factor in understanding foreign policy and 
international politics.”294
This chapter will examine the role of the Canadian public in the formulation and 
shaping of foreign policy and military activity. The Canadian people, as a Trinitarian 
actor, while perhaps not projecting “hatred and enmity,” certainly provide the 
government and the military with a degree of passion to be harnessed. This passion is 
animated by the images of peacekeeping and other mythical ideals and, therefore, helps 
form expectations of what the Canadian Army should do at home and overseas. 
Furthermore, those expectations are not necessary enough to support robust, prolonged or 
coherent responses. The people may be fickle, but far from having no role, their 
contribution to their Trinitarian partners is important.
The people, as an entity, are more than opinion polls. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
it is their expectations that that form the basis upon which other actors are deemed to be 
legitimate or not. Therefore, their collective understanding about the importance of 
certain symbols, norms, and values— in essence, the myths—surrounding the nature of 
military activity can be influential to both political and military decision makers. They 
form the context and parameters within which military activity is conceived, deployed, 
and ultimately, evaluated.
Assigning the people a role in the shaping of military practice is not to dismiss or
'JQC
discount the difficulty in tracing it accurately or explaining it fully. This difficulty is
294 Philip P. Everts, Dem ocracy and M ilitary Force. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002): 2.
295 Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, “Introduction— Does Democracy Make A 
Difference?” in Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, eds. Canada Among Nations 1995: 
Dem ocracy and Foreign Policy. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995): 22; Everts, 9.
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compounded by the problematic nature of the polling conducted. As Pierre Martin has 
noted,
although the [Department of National Defence] has done extensive polling 
through the years, the results of these polls are not easily accessible, they tend to 
present a discontinuous image of the public’s policy preferences (i.e. few 
questions are consistently repeated over long periods), and they do not tend to 
make full use of modem techniques to assess both the causes of opposition
* * 9Q6to .. .policies and the true strength of support for these policies.
It is not the aim of this chapter to conduct quantitative analysis into the impact 
that public opinion has on defence policy. Rather this chapter aims to show what the 
people’s contribution is to the larger process of the formulation and execution of military 
practice. However, it is worthwhile reviewing the two schools of thought govern public
9 0 7opinion research. The dominant school of thought is the Almond-Lippmann tradition, 
which is based on Amercian research from the 1950s. Effectively, this school holds that
9QRpublic opinion is “volatile and incoherent, having little impact on policy outputs.”
Others, building on work which focused on the relationship between public opinion and 
the Vietnam War, have concluded that public opinion could have an effect on policy. 
Authors varied on the nature of that effect (some felt that it was constraining, others saw 
it as a significant driver) but concluded that the Almond-Lippmann tradition was not 
always and everywhere valid.299 Several authors examining the Canadian case (using
296 Pierre Martin, “The Future o f  Canadian Security and Defence Policy: Public Opinion and Media 
Dimensions,” Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century Research Paper (Waterloo, ON: CCS21, 
2004): 2.
297 For an in-depth review o f  the literature in this field, see Erin Carriere, Marc O ’Reilly, and Richard 
Vengroff, “’In the Service o f  Peace’: Reflexive Multilateralism and the Canadian Experience in Bosnia,” 
Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Washington, DC. 17 February 1999. 
[http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/cae01; accessed 25 April 2003].
298 Carriere et al, 2.
299 Carriere et al, 2-4.
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quantitative methods) tend to agree with the dissenting school of thought.300 Indeed, they 
would agree that “the public must and can be treated as a full partner in the making and
™ i
implementing of.. .policy.”
Listening to the People
One important indicator of the contribution made by public opinion is the value 
placed in it by governments and, increasingly, militaries. The importance attached to 
monitoring public opinion can be gauged by examining the level of resources dedicated 
to this task. While relatively modest, Canadian Forces spending on public opinion 
research, mainly in the form of polling and focus groups, has increase significantly since 
2004 (see Figure 4.1). The value placed on public opinion within the military should not 
be underestimated:
Public support is vital to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian 
Forces. It is important as the Government sets its priorities. It is invaluable to the 
men and women of the CF as they carry out their roles in support of Canada and 
Canadians. And, it is an indicator of the willingness of Canadians to have Canada 
play a meaningful role in the world.
The Department of National Defence is consistently one of “the 10 [government] 
departments and agencies that were most active in public opinion research” across 
Canada. Clearly, the Canadian military considers it “important to capture and track the 
views, perceptions and attitudes of Canadians toward the Forces.”
300 See Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, “Public Opinion: Obstacle, Partner, or Scapegoat?” Policy  
Options. (January-February) 2001: 66-72; Don Munton, “Defending the Canadian Public,” Canadian  
M ilitary Journal. (Autumn) 2003: 25-33; and John Kirton and Jenilee Guebert, “Two Solitudes, One War: 
Public Opinion, National Unity and Canada’s War in Afghanistan,” Paper presented for Quebec and War 
Conference, Universite de Quebec a Montreal (Montreal, Quebec. 8 October 2007.
301 Martin and Fortmann, 67.
302 Canada. Canadian Forces. “Preparing for Transformation: Public Support,” 25 May 2004. 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/preparing_trans/support_e.asp; accessed 23 September 2004.
303 Canada. Department o f  Public Works and Government Services. “Public Opinion Research in the 
Government o f  Canada: Annual Report 2005-2006,” (Ottawa, 2006).
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Figure 4.1: Public O pinion Spending 04
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Observers differ in their opinion as to the reasons underpinning this move. Denis Stairs 
believes that the Department of National Defence and the military conduct opinion 
polling, and public consultations (through a number o f mechanisms, some o f which will 
be described below), as a form of “defensive politics”. Because the public’s trust in 
government is low, Stairs contends, politicians and officials must be seen to measure the 
mood and preferences o f the electorate. Therefore, while “these consultations may, or 
may not, be genuinely intended as mechanisms for acquiring useful policy advice...it is 
highly unlikely in the present political climate that...a high-profile declaration o f 
government policy would be pursued on an ‘in-house’ basis alone.” The government has 
a “sense that the legitimation of whatever they do depends on their having embarked on 
ostentations displays o f ‘outreach’ activity as an integral part o f their approach to
j04 Data extracted and formatted by author. Canada. Department o f Public Works and Government 
Services. “Public Opinion Research in the Government o f Canada: Annual Report,” for the fiscal years 
2001-2002 to 2006-2007.
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decision-making.” On the other hand, Pierre Martin is less cynical. Polling and 
consulting the public are not defensive politics, Martin claims, but rather represents part 
of a larger evolution: “in foreign policy as in other areas of activity, governments have
in /
become more accountable to their publics.” Whether as an aspect of defensive or 
positive politics, there is a degree of commonality between these perspectives. 
Government in Canada seeks to find out what the people think about foreign and defence 
issues.
What does the government find out when it asks people about defence and foreign 
policy issues? The answer seems to accord with the first part of the Almond-Lippmann 
school of thought: Canadian public opinion certainly appears incoherent, and at times, 
even volatile. However, there are consistent aspects of it, which provide a clear, if 
muted, message. Jack Granatstein, a noted military historian, claims that “Canadians 
want their army to be fierce in war, social workers in peace.. .caring and efficient in 
natural disasters, and they want this without cost to them. This is not sensible, but that is 
the state of affairs.”307
It hardly seems surprising that what people say about defence issues depends on 
what is asked. For instance, there is lukewarm support, relatively consistent over time, 
for the armed forces (see Figure 4.2). This tepidity is matched by Canadian approval 
ratings for defence policy over a 21 year period (see Figure 4.3). However, armed only 
with this information, a decision maker would not know enough to even begin designing
j05 Denis Stairs, “The Future o f  Canadian Security and Defence Policy: NG O ’s, Public Consultations and 
the Security Policy Process,” Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century Research Paper (Waterloo, 
ON: CCS21,2004): 1. 
j06 Martin, 1.
307 Jack Granatstein, “The Army and the Nation: Issues and Questions,” The Army and the Nation. Report 
o f  Proceedings, Canadian Army Tactics School Seminar, 1-2 October 1998: F 1-5/5.
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a strategy. What do the people of Canada like or dislike about the military and defence 
policy? It is not clear from these data.
Figure 4.2: Support for the Military308
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In order to understand the character of public ‘support’ for the military in Canada, 
it is necessary to ask two further types of questions. First, it is important to understand 
the people’s policy preferences in priorities. In short, what do the people think the most 
pressing issues are for the country at any given time? This would allow, in theory, a 
decision-maker to allocate the necessary resources in order to address these priorities.
The military may or may not figure into the resulting strategy. Second, a decision-maker 
must contextualize public support for the military within the framework of what the 
people see as the military’s role. Armed with this information, a decision-maker would 
better understand why the military enjoys, or does not enjoy, the support of the people.
308 Data extracted and presented in current format by author. CROP, Inc. “Social Change and the 
Sociocultural Significance o f  the Canadian Forces,” Report prepared for the Department o f  National 
Defence. Polling conducted Novem ber 2006. Report published March 2007. n=2724.
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Figure 4.3: Public A pproval o f  D efence Policy309
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The Canadian people, when asked, do not seem to place defence high on the list of ‘most 
important issues to be addressed' by the government. Figure 4.4 shows the results from 
polling in 2007. Healthcare, the economy, and education top the list, with only 3% 
perceiving security and defence as their number one priority. It would seem, therefore, 
within this context, that the government could afford to concentrate on issues other than 
defence. However, when the same sample of people was asked to focus solely on 
defence and foreign policy issues, they provided conflicting information (see Figure 4.5). 
A majority expressed the opinion that “national defense” should be a high priority for the 
government.
309 Data extracted and formatted by author. Environics, Inc. “Canadian Public Opinion Trends,” Data 
compiled by the Canadian Opinion Research Archive (CORA). Average n=2164. 
[www.queensu.ca/cora/trends; accessed May 2007].
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Figure 4.4: Public Priority Issues310
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Figure 4.5: Foreign and Defence Policy Priorities311
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j l° Data extracted and formatted by author. Government Policy Consulting, Inc. “Government o f Canada: 
Views, Attitudes and Priorities o f Canadians,” Report prepared for the Privy Council Office. Polling 
conducted January 2007. Report published March 2007. n=4004.
311 Data extracted and formatted by author. Government Policy Consulting, Inc. “Government o f Canada: 
Views, Attitudes and Priorities o f Canadians,” Report prepared for the Privy Council Office. Polling 
conducted January 2007. Report published March 2007. n=4004.
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Adding to the confusion is the fact that, over time, responses change, a feature 
that is exacerbated when different questions are asked, and different polling firms are 
employed. For instance, when a poll was repeated several times over a period o f eleven 
years, public opinion as to ‘the most important issue facing the country’ appeared to be, 
as predicted by the Almond-Lippmann thesis, quite volatile (see Figure 4.6). This can be 
explained, perhaps, by the events dominating the news at the time o f the polling. For 
instance, it is not surprising to find concern over issues related to “world 
conflict/war/security” during the first quarter of 2003 as being the foremost concern of 
over 22% o f Canadians. What is surprising, perhaps, is that represents a ten-fold increase 
in four years, followed by a five-fold decrease the following year.
Figure 4.6: Most Important Issues Facing Canadians312
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312 Data extracted and formatted by author. Environics, Inc. “Canadian Public Opinion Trends,” Data 
compiled by the Canadian Opinion Research Archive (CORA). Average n=2024. 
[www.queensu.ca/cora/trends; accessed May 2007],
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A similar poll, conducted by the government Department of Communications, in 
2002 and 2003, seems to contradict some of the patterns seen in Figure 4.6. (See Figure 
4.7). Concerns over national security seem highest in the Fall o f 2002, not in the Spring 
o f 2003, around the time of the U.S. invasion o f Iraq. As noted by Martin, without 
further probing by the questioner at the time o f the poll having been conducted, it is 
difficult to understand these variations. Again, a clear picture o f Canadian public opinion 
does not arise, except to the extent that defence issues appear not to be the most 
important issues in the minds of Canadians. This, to a limited but somewhat helpful 
extent, can aid our understanding of the weak support expressed by Canadians for their 
military: the Canadian Forces are not the instrument best placed to address concerns over 
the economy, healthcare, and education.
Figure 4.7: Public Priorities 20 02-2003313
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313 Data extracted and formatted by author. Canada. Communications Canada. “Connecting with 
Canadians,” W inter 2002, Spring 2002, Fall 2002, Spring 2003 editions. Average n=5422.
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With that in mind we can turn to the second aspect o f contextualization and 
explore what it is that Canadians believe the role o f the military is. There are two aspects 
o f this line o f questioning: what is that role and what should it be? In 1995, according to 
a poll commissioned by the Canadian government as part o f the preparation for a new 
White Paper on policy, Canadians seemed very confident with regards to what they saw 
as the main, actual role for the Canadian Forces: 77% state that it was peacekeeping (see 
Figure 4.8).
Figure 4.8: Main Role for CF Overseas314
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Other polling, carried out by Environics over a period o f 27 years, speaks to the desired 
role of the Canadian military (see Figure 4.9). For the entire period, Canadians, when 
given the choice between “peacekeeping” or “traditional military” activity, chose
314 Data extracted and formatted by author. Insight Canada Research, Inc. “Canadian Opinions on 
Canadian Foreign Policy, Defence Policy and International Development Assistance 1995,” Report o f 
Polling Conducted for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department o f National Defence, and the 
Canadian International Development Agency. Polling conducted February 1995. Report published May 
1995. n=2009.
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peacekeeping as the role on which the CF ought to focus. While the ratio changes over 
time (with “traditional military” gaining ground in recent years), what is most interesting 
is the increased clarity o f opinion expressed over the period. In 1979, 38% of 
respondents answered that they did not have an opinion with regards to the military’s role 
(more than those who expressed peacekeeping as an response). By the year 2000, the 
number o f ‘don’t knows’ reduced to just over 3%.
Figure 4.9: Role of the CF315
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The public’s focus on peacekeeping was not limited to the role o f the CF. In 1995, 
Canadians believed that peacekeeping was the most important contribution made by 
Canada overseas, by a ratio o f 3:2 over the next choice, which was ‘don’t know’ (see 
Figure 4.10). Here, at last, Canadian public opinion appears clear: peacekeeping is 
important and should be the main role for the Canadian military.
jl5 Data extracted and formatted by author. Environics, Inc. “Canadian Public Opinion Trends,” Data 
compiled by the Canadian Opinion Research Archive (CORA). Average n=2024. 
[www.queensu.ca/cora/trends; accessed May 2007],
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Figure 4.10: C anada's C ontribution  O verseas316
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Against this mixture o f volatility, incoherence and consistency, it seems that the 
government decision-maker's options are not at all clear. A final set of data add more 
texture to the landscape. Perhaps the most important aspect of public opinion is the level 
of funding (and thereby importance) the people place on an activity (see Figure 4.11). 
While the findings shown in Figure 4.11 do not take into account trade-off points (that is, 
what other accounts should be increased or decreased in support funding preferences), it 
shows mounting support for the government to increase defence spending. It is not 
surprising to see a surge in desire for increased defence spending immediately following 
the September 11th attacks in the US. It is interesting to note that, similarly with the 
clarity on peacekeeping as the preferred role for the CF, the level o f indecision on 
spending has significantly reduced in recent years. Finally, given the rise in real 
spending since 1998 (which has been conspicuously announced in the press, by both
,16 Data extracted and formatted by author. Insight Canada Research, Inc. “Canadian Opinions on 
Canadian Foreign Policy, Defence Policy and International Development Assistance 1995,” Report o f 
Polling Conducted for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department o f  National Defence, and the 
Canadian International Development Agency. Polling conducted February 1995. Report published May
1995. n=2009.
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political parties when in power) it is perhaps normal to note a cooling off in demand for 
increased spending since 2002.
Figure 4.11: Public Preferences on Defence Spending317
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However, it should be highlighted that, in relative terms, Canada spends the second
T 1 o
lowest amount in NATO defence, beating only Luxembourg . In absolute terms, 
despite increases recently, spending levels, in real terms, are only now beginning to 
approach the level o f 1994 expenditure (see Figure 4.12).
jl7 Data extracted and formatted by author.
J18 NATO, NA TO-Russia Compendium o f  Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence. (Brussels: 
NATO International Staff, 2007): Table 3, page 10.
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Figure 4.12: C anadian D efence E xpenditure319
C anadian  D e fen ce  Expenditure (1988-2005)
2 .5 16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0 .5
o #  o #  qcP o>N *  cp o> Jp #  cp <p c£> oN -.cf*
i % of GDP —•— Constant 2 0 0 5  million USD
If the public opinion discussed so far has been difficult to read clearly, we might 
take solace in the fact that it has largely been in response to abstract, hypothetical 
questions. Focusing on an actual mission may provide us with a more concrete 
expression o f popular opinion regarding the Canadian military and its roles. In the spring 
of 2006, Canada altered its troop commitment to the Afghanistan mission, moving from 
Kabul, where it operated under command of N ATO ’s International Security Assistance 
Force in the capital, to Kandahar, where it would work, at first for, and then as NATO 
expanded, beside US forces in the much more dangerous south of Afghanistan. As 
casualties mounted, public opinion dwindled; a mere 41% supported the mission (on 
average) from March 2006 until July 2007 (see Figure 4.13).
,I9 Data extracted and formatted by author. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Facts on 
International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST Database), [http://first.sipri.org; accessed 12 March 
2007],
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Figure 4.13: Public Support for A fghanistan M ission
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Conclusions
In trying to determine why the military might be interested in public opinion, we 
are confronted with two contradictory theoretical arguments. First, given traditional 
Huntingtonian civil-military relations theory, there should be little need for such opinion 
data, outside of, say, for recruitment purposes. The military’s functional imperative 
should be such that it concentrates o f developing its relevant skills, acquiring adequate 
equipment, and so on. In Feaver’s application o f civil-military relations, the military’s 
primary concern is following the direction given to it by the government.320 There should 
be no need, then, for the military to concern itself with what the people think. Once their 
political masters have spoken, their duty is to obey, regardless of the popularity o f these 
orders with the ‘person in the street’.
320 Feaver, Peter. Arm ed Servants. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
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On the other hand, following Janowitz’s conception of the societal imperative, it 
is vital that the military fit into its wider society. It follows from that premise that in 
order to fit it, the military must know their social environment. The military does not 
have an inherent mechanism for gaining feedback, in the way that votes or sales figures 
function for politicians and commercial firms. Therefore, it needs to rely on polls and 
other such instruments to gain a sense of the public’s ‘views, perceptions and attitudes.’
A problem arises in the Canadian case. The message that one gains from the 
polling figures and in-depth focus group sessions can hardly be taken as a mandate. On 
the contrary, from the perspective of the military, it is not clear what the Canadian people 
want, that the Canadian public know what they want, or even that they know much about 
what it is they say they want. The people make a contribution to their Trinitarian 
partners, to be sure, but that contribution is largely one of ambivalence.
128
Chapter 5:
The Government: Delicious Ambiguity321
“Canada was beset by ambivalencies which... created their own complexities. ”
Henry Kissinger322
“Neurosis is the inability to tolerate ambiguity. ”
Sigmund Freud
At its most basic level, the relationship between the civilian, political leadership 
and the armed forces of a country appears straightforward. As one observer states, “a 
fundamental requirement of any nation is to ensure that the activities of its armed forces 
are subordinated to the political purposes of constitutional government; hence, the armed 
forces must be under civil control.”323 Not only does this arrangement prevent the violent 
hijacking of the state by the army, it ensures “an unbroken line of accountability from 
officers commanding... units in the field to the Chief of Defence Staff, to Parliament, and 
finally to the people.”324 Furthermore, this clear subordination is a virtue, not of 
expertise, but of role. The political masters in liberal democracies may not be up to date 
with the latest military tactics and technologies, but their job is to set priorities and 
provide direction: the uniformed, military expert “is not in a position to determine the 
value the people will attach to different issue outcomes.. .only the civilian [leader] can set 
the level of acceptable risk for society” by virtue of having been elected to be an
U c
responsible representative of the population. This positional power, according to Peter 
Feaver, is absolute: “Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be,
321 The term ‘delicious ambiguity’ is attributed to Gilda Radner, the famous comedienne who died in 1989.
j22 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 383.
323 R. Graham, “Civil Control o f  the Canadian Forces: National Direction and National Command,” 
Canadian M ilitary Journal. (Spring) 2002: 23.
324 Douglas Bland, “Parliament’s Duty to Defend Canada,” Canadian M ilitary Journal. (Winter) 2000- 
2001: 35.
325 Peter Feaver, Arm ed Servants. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003): 6 .
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the civilian view trumps it. Civilians should get what they ask for, even if it is not what
3 9 6  •they really want. In other words, civilians have the right to be wrong.” As Clausewitz
3 9 7succinctly stated, “political aims are the business of the government alone.”
Governments dictate, militaries deliver.
Or so the theory goes. The assumption underpinning this crude rendition of civil 
control of the military, is that governments (that is, politicians and senior bureaucrats) ask 
for something; that they actually dictate. Often the exchange is not as clear as a 
politician saying, ‘jump’ and a general responding (as he prepares to leap) ‘how high?’ 
Sometimes, political guidance does not come at all. Sometimes, when it does come, that 
guidance is vague, or contradictory.
The aim of this chapter is to look at the direction, in terms of foreign and defence 
policy guidance, provided by Canadian governments, from the mid-1990s to 2005, with 
an eye to gauging how it shapes military practice. It is worth stressing that the aim is not 
to critique the content of the guidance, but rather to gauge its impact. In so doing, we 
will consider the policy environment in which political leaders found themselves. From 
there it will be possible to identify the salient elements within contemporary Canadian 
foreign and defence policy (which, display a remarkable consistency, even as political 
control has passed from prime minister to prime minister, and political party to political 
party). Despite the presence of deeply held principles, the addition of new ideas and 
emphases, and changing circumstances, Canadian policy guidance can be seen, above all, 
to maintain political legitimacy in the particular Canadian setting. Perhaps ironically, 
then, this ambiguous guidance helps to further establish and shore up the basis for
326 Feaver, 6 . Emphasis added.
327 Carl von Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §28, Page 101.
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legitimate military activity. The Canadian Forces, in Freud’s terms, appears to have 
avoided neurosis: despite the indeterminate nature of contemporary foreign and defence 
policy the Canadian military has proven to be remarkably adroit in its interpretation of 
the government’s direction, and has translated that interpretation into concrete action, 
such as civil-military cooperation.
Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy: 1995-2005
Canadian foreign and defence policy, it has been noted, is full of “curious 
ambiguities.”328 There is no consensus over the threats to Canada and Canadians, and, 
equally, it has proven difficult for governments to articulate Canada’s national interests in 
a satisfying manner. This lack of certainty has been exacerbated since the end of the 
Cold War, which provided a context, while hardly a determinant, that did provide some 
shape to Canadian foreign and defence policy since the end of World War Two. As 
Robert Cooper has noted, for countries of the West, during the Cold War, “most foreign 
policy issues could be viewed in the light of a single overwhelming question.” Since the 
early 1990s, though, “this rather artificial unity of vision has been lost.” Confronted 
by the political challenges of the first Gulf War (Canada made a token air and naval 
contribution) and the international response to the violent collapse of Yugoslavia (where 
Canada played a major role as a troop contributor to the UN and NATO forces in Croatia 
and Bosnia since 1992), the Canadian Liberal government under Jean Chretien responded 
with a new White Paper on foreign affairs. Canada in the World took advantage of the 
change in circumstances brought about by the end of the Cold War. Rather than focusing
328 Louis Delvoie, “Curious Ambiguities: Canada’s International Security Policy,” Policy Options. 
January-February 2001: 36-42
329 Delvoie 36-37.
330 Robert Cooper, The Post-modern State and the World Order. (London: Demos, 2000): 2.
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on tasks (such as the defeat of a particular enemy, or the support of a particular ally or 
alliance), the White Paper sought to carve out themes that Canada would like to work on. 
In this sense, the government of the day was explicit in its intent:
to meet the challenges of an evolving world, the Government will pursue foreign
policy to achieve three key objectives:
• The promotion of prosperity and employment;
• The protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and
• The projection of Canadian values and culture.
Canada in the World was notable for several reasons. First, the previous White 
Paper had been published 25 years earlier. Second, it elevated the idea of “integrated” 
international action. The government signaled its desire to “draw on all available foreign 
policy instruments” in a coordinated fashion. It created, within the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, a Bureau for Global Issues, headed by an 
Assistant Deputy Minister, to deal with transnational (and interdepartmental) files, such 
as peacebuilding, population growth, and the environment. Third, it introduced the 
idea of ‘value projection’ as both an ends and means of foreign policy. Canada in the 
World contains the first official references to human security within the Canadian 
government. The doctrine of human security was to become the key to both Canadian 
foreign and defence policy for the remainder of the decade.
The person responsible for transforming these ideas into practice was Lloyd 
Axworthy. A long-serving member of parliament, Axworthy had always wanted to be 
foreign minister, and made it clear to his staff that he would be making the most of his
331 Canada. Canada in the World. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1995): i and 10.
332 Canada, Canada in the World, ii.
333 Canada, Canada in the World, 50.
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new cabinet appointment.334 He wanted to transform Canadian foreign affairs activities, 
and make a difference on the world stage. Axworthy had been looking for a way to 
address global problems, as it had become “overwhelmingly obvious to him that conflict 
had changed” since the end of the Cold War. At first he thought that human rights 
would be the best focus, but then decided that it was too narrow and legalistic to serve as 
a basis for a foreign policy agenda. Guided by ideas put forward in Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace, Axworthy wanted to focus on both conflict prevention and
*5 *5 O
post-conflict peacebuilding and needed an overarching theme to connect them both.
Furthermore, this new theme needed “new resonance, something to shock people’s
,,339conscience.
One of Axworthy’s first overseas trips as Foreign Minister, in March of 1996, saw 
him visit Bosnia. While there, he noted that the only Canadian presence he could detect 
was that of the Army, working as part of NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The 
soldiers with whom he spoke stated that they were trying to address the needs of the 
population by way of small community improvement projects, but complained of a lack 
of money.340 Axworthy could see that Canadian military peacekeeping “had a
334 Lloyd Axworthy, Navigating A New World: C anada’s G lobal Future. (Toronto: Knopf, 2003): 30.
Prior to January 1996, Axworthy had been minister responsible for Human Resources Development 
Canada (HRDC).
335 Interview with Heidi Hulan, former Political Assistant to Lloyd Axworthy (Ottawa, Ontario, 18 March 
2003).
336 Interview with Hulan.
3j7 Interview with Hulan.
338 Interview with Lloyd Axworthy, former Minister o f Foreign Affairs (London, 11 February 2003). See 
United Nations, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping,” Report o f  
the Secretary-General to the Security Council. A A/47/277 - S /24111. 17 June 1992: esp. para 52, and 
Section IV.
339 Interview with Paul Heinbecker, former Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister Mulroney and 
Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations under Lloyd Axworthy (London, UK, 14 
February 2003).
340 Interview with Axworthy.
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peacebuilding quality to it.”341 This event prompted Axworthy to take two important 
steps.
First, he made the first mention of the ‘theme’ he had been looking for. During his 
speech to the United Nations General Assembly delivered in September 1996, he claimed 
that, “Changing times have set us a new and broader agenda, which includes focusing on 
the security needs of the individual—in other words, sustainable human security.”342 
Axworthy had “appropriated the term” human security from the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), but took liberties with its focus. He “discarded UNDP’s 
narrow focus and their idea of measurement,” but seized on the idea of providing 
protection for individuals as a organizing principle for foreign policy.343 Axworthy used 
this occasion in a way akin to a ‘speech from the throne’, laying out his foreign policy 
agenda for the next four years: he signaled his wish to address the issues of anti­
personnel landmines, war-affected children, and small arms disarmament, all of which he 
understood to be within the rubric of human security. He was explicit in what Canada 
was going to do to further this agenda:
we are currently focusing our approach to these issues. We have started to rework 
our own tool kit to improve our ability to initiate and support peace-building 
operations in areas such as preventive mediation and dialogue; human rights 
monitoring and investigation; media and police training; judicial reform; and 
demobilization.344
341 Interview with Paul Heinbecker.
342 Lloyd Axworthy, “Notes For An Address by The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister o f Foreign 
Affairs to The 51st General Assembly O f The United Nations,” N ew  York, N ew  York. 24 September
1996.
343 Interview with Paul Heinbecker. See also United Nations Development Program, Human Developm ent 
Report 1994. (New York: UNDP, 1994). The report introduced the concept o f  human security, made up o f  
the freedom from fear and the freedom from want, (page 3). These, although not acknowledged in the 
report, form part o f  what American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt called “The Four Freedoms”, 
along with freedom o f worship and freedom o f  speech. See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “Annual Speech to 
Congress,” 6 January 1941. http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/od4freed.html; accessed 22 February 2006.
344 Axworthy, “Notes for an Address.”
134
Axworthy’s second step was to follow this speech up with a meeting between 
senior officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 
the Department of National Defence (DND), and the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA). At this meeting, held in October 1996, he laid out his 
vision for a focus on peacebuilding and human security, which required a coordinated 
approach across all departments, under the umbrella of the Bureau of Global Affairs 
outlined in Canada in the World. His ideas were not met with much enthusiasm.
DFAIT, in the words of one director, “would have to be dragged kicking and screaming 
into anything involving the military.”345 The CIDA representative at the meeting was so 
affronted by the notion that he actually said, ‘no’ to the foreign minister.346 The military 
was less opposed to cooperation, but cool to the idea of a peacebuilding focus, as they 
feared it would include having to hunt for indicted war criminals in Bosnia, something 
they were not eager to do.347 Axworthy, though, was not taking no for an answer: “he 
was pushing things pretty hard on this.”
The first concrete act that Axworthy wanted to achieve was the creation of the 
anti-personnel landmines treaty, what would be known as the Ottawa Process. He needed 
all three foreign actors within the government to cooperate. Because established 
“institutional links were not there”349 Axworthy’s approach was to hold a series of 
separate and joint meetings, cajoling and encouraging the parties to sign up to the 
initiative. For instance, he convinced the military leadership that a peacebuilding
345 Interview with Jill Sinclair, former Director General International Security Affairs, DFAIT (Ottawa, 30 
May 2003).
346 Interview with Axworthy.
347 Interview with Axworthy.
348 Interview with Heinbecker.
349 Interview with Sinclair.
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framework would allow the armed forces to gain additional funding, especially for 
“rebuilding as well as warmaking.”350 So-called “purists” from CIDA believed that such 
coherence, which necessitated having to cooperate with the military, “muddied the
i c t
waters” and was the beginning of militarized aid. They went so far as to put up 
“barriers to cooperation”, such as suggesting that they could not use money allocated for 
aid and development for security purposes, pointing to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
352restrictions.
Eventually, though, the three departments did cooperate and, 15 months after his 
speech to the General Assembly, Canada became the first country to sign the Ottawa 
Convention on 3 December 1997. The treaty was a success for Axworthy and a boost 
for the idea of human security, in and outside Canada.354 It also helped forge personal 
relationships amongst players from all three departments, relationships which would
o f f
prove useful as other issues were addressed. Over the next three years, Axworthy 
would promote his human security agenda, giving support to such initiatives as the 
creation of the International Criminal Court—and taking advantage of Canada’s election
350 Interview with Axworthy.
351 Interview with Hulan.
352 Interview with Sinclair; Interview with Mark Berman, the Deputy Director, Social Policies and 
Governance Directorate, CIDA (Hull, Quebec) 30 October 2002. There were no clear restrictions on 
funding, but the issue was sufficiently unclear to prompt the DAC to promulgate a set o f  guidelines on the 
subject. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Conflict, Peace and Developm ent Co­
operation on the Threshold o f  the 21s' Century. (Paris: OECD, 1997).
35j The full name o f  the treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition o f  the Use, Stockpiling, Production and  
Transfer o f  Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.
354 See Lloyd Axworthy and Sarah Taylor, “A Ban for All Seasons: The Landmines Convention and its 
Implications for Canadian Diplomacy,” International Journal. Spring 1998: 189-203; Lloyd Axworthy, 
“Introduction,” in Bob McRae and Don Hubert, eds. Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting  
People, Prom oting Peace. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001): 1-13.
355 Interview with Sinclair; Interview with Axworthy.
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to a two-year stint on the United Nations Security Council—raising the profile of conflict
•2 r r
diamond smuggling, small arms proliferation, sanctions for Angola, and other issues.
While the military was involved to some extent in these cases, the watershed 
moment, where the cause of human security came to most affect the Canadian Forces, 
was Kosovo. Three years into Axworthy’s tenure, “Canadian participation” in the NATO 
operations in the skies over and on the ground in Kosovo “was linked to the humanitarian
• • 1C7imperative.” Military action taken against Serbia in 1999 was seen by Axworthy as 
“an opportunity to substantially advance the credibility of the concept of human 
security.. .The ultimate test for a human security policy was a willingness to exercise 
military force to uphold the policies of protection—an argument we were able to advance
if o m
day after day in Parliament and the media.” Until Kosovo, human security, even to its
2 fQ
proponents, was “a genuine diplomatic innovation, but not a operational doctrine.” As 
detailed in Chapter 6, the initial military response to Kosovo was to undertake a major 
role in the air campaign, dropping bombs on military and strategic infrastructure targets 
in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. Air to ground sorties, though, could not be the sum 
of the Canadian intervention. Canada, and its NATO allies, “could not turn away from 
the humanitarian crisis taking place.. .That is why Canadian pilots are part of the effort, 
why we are providing humanitarian relief and why we are offering sanctuary for 5000 
refugees.” According to Heidi Hulan, the military leadership “got it instantly. They
356 McRae and Hubert, 267-273.
357 Interview with Hulan.
358 Axworthy, 186.
359 Interview with Heinbecker.
j6° Lloyd Axworthy, “Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda,” Notes for An Address By the Honourable 
Lloyd Axworthy, Minister o f  Foreign Affairs, to the Woodrow Wilson School o f  Public and International 
Relations, Princeton University. 7 April 1999: 2.
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knew that they needed to be engaged in human security in Kosovo.”361 The shape of the 
ground force elements deployed in Kosovo reflected that realization. As Hulan put it, 
Canada’s contribution to the Kosovo crisis was “a combination of the political imperative 
and the nature of the situation on the ground.”
Human security was the framework within which Axworthy and the Liberal 
government of Jean Chretien made good their promise to project Canadian values, so 
clearly announced in Canada in the World. However, in terms of putting it into practice, 
the government was divided. Politicians and officials from DFAIT saw CIDA as 
“terminally slow, unwilling to adapt.”364 CIDA, from its perspective, preferred to 
concentrate on long term development, rather than the short-term focus humanitarian 
assistance and reconstruction.365 As one senior CIDA director stated, the development 
agency was not happy about what it saw as the political agenda inherent in Human 
Security, but they had no choice but to “play along. We had to deal with real life.” 
Opinion in DND and the military was equally undecided. In Bosnia, civil-military 
cooperation practitioners felt that “it [was] CIDA’s mandates [they were] fulfilling, not 
the Army’s.”367 The senior staff officer responsible for civil-military cooperation, who
361 Interview with Hulan.
362 For a detailed discussion o f  the civil-military cooperation activity in Kosovo, see Chapter 6 .
363 Interview with Hulan.
364 Interview with Heinbecker.
365 Interview with Almir Tanovic, CIDA program officer, Canadian Embassy to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina) 3 January 2003. Also see Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The 
Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar. (Toronto: Viking, 2007): 272-273.
366 Interview with Helene Corneau, CIDA Manager o f programs in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania 1998- 
2000 (Gatineau, Quebec) 30 October 2002.
367 Interview with Captain Chris Atkin, CIMIC Project Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation 
Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 27 December 2002).
138
had been involved in several steering and working groups aimed at fostering cooperation 
between the three departments, characterized the best-case scenario as “coexistence.”
In 2005, the Liberal government of Prime Minister Paul Martin published what it 
believed to be a landmark document that aimed to correct this problem. Canada’s 
International Policy Statement—A Role o f  Pride and Influence in the World was billed as 
“the country’s first integrated plan designed to strengthen Canada’s role in the world.” 
The International Policy Statement (IPS) championed a whole of government approach 
to international affairs, an approach which was often referred to as 3D (diplomacy, 
defence, and development), or 3D + T (when international trade was included). In it, the 
government addressed global challenges (the threat of failed states, terrorism, poverty, 
etc.) holistically, stating how each department would apply itself to them, in a spirit of 
coherence and cooperation. Building on the theme of value projection contained in the 
1995 foreign policy statement of his predecessor, Martin claimed that “a doctrine o f  
activism that over decades has forged our nation’s international character...will serve us 
even better in today’s changing world. The people of our country have long understood
1*7A
that, as a proud citizen of the world, Canada has global responsibilities.” Launched in 
the aftermath of three best-selling critiques of Canada’s diminished international
• 171
capabilities , the IPS was an attempt by Martin to make up for drastic reductions in
368 Interview with Major P.W. (Peter) Hewitt, Staff Officer responsible for Civil-Military Relations and 
Environmental Health, Canadian Forces Joint Staff, International Operations (J3 International). (Ottawa, 
Ontario) 29 May 2003.
j69 Canada. “N ew s Release: Government o f  Canada Releases International Policy Statement,” (Ottawa: 
Office o f  the Prime Minister) 19 April 2005.
370 Canada. “Prime Minister’s Foreword,” C an ada’s International Policy Statement—A Role o f  P ride and  
Influence in the World. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2005): 1. Emphasis added.
371 Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our P lace in the World. (Toronto: MacMillan and 
Stewart, 2003); J.L. Granatstein, Who K illed  the Canadian Military?  (Toronto: Harper Publishing, 2004): 
and Jennifer Welsh, At Home in the World: Canada's G lobal Vision fo r  the 21st Century. (Toronto: Harper 
Collins, 2004).
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spending, cuts which he had made as finance minister a decade before. In essence, the
constraints alluded to in Canada in the World were lifted. As Martin described it
there was a slow erosion in Canada’s commitment to its military, to international 
assistance and to our diplomatic presence around the world.. .During the nineties, 
there were more cutbacks as our government made tough decisions to save the 
country from financial calamity. As a result, our international presence has 
suffered. But thanks to the sacrifice and resolve of Canadians, we have restored 
our fiscal sovereignty and have spent the past year renewing our investments in 
domestic priorities, such as health care. Now is the time to rebuild for Canada an
* • 377independent voice of pride and influence in the world.
If Kosovo served as the crystallization of Canadian international policy, as 
expressed in Canada and the World, then the focalizing event for the International Policy 
Statement was Afghanistan. Just as Canada in the World can be seen as an attempt to 
provide intellectual coherence to Canadian activity in the Balkans, which had begun 
before its publication, so too can the International Policy Statement be read as a way of 
providing guidance for the future, as well as describing Canadian activity of the recent 
past. Canadian participation in Afghanistan began in 2002 and the seeds for many of the 
ideas presented in the International Policy Statement were already planted by 2005.
Since 2006 and the rise to power of the Conservative Party of Canada, there has 
been no official policy document published. However, much of the previous policy, 
formulated under the Liberals, remains. The notion of the 3D approach, for instance,
* 171 ,
continues as a hallmark of Canadian declaratory policy. Hugh Segal, speaking as a 
Conservative Senator, further demonstrated the consistency, across time and political 
party boundaries, of the power of value-projection as a theme in foreign policy: “The
372 Canada. “Prime Minister’s Foreword,”: 2. Much has been made o f  Martin’s feelings o f  guilt over the 
cuts made in the 1990s, and o f  his desire to focus on foreign affairs because his father had been foreign 
minister a generation earlier. See John Gray, Paul Martin: The Power o f  Ambition. (Toronto: Key Porter 
Books, 2003).
373 Peter Mackay, “Extending Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan ‘right thing to do,”’ The Halifax Chronicle 
Herald. 11 September 2006: A12.
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primary purpose of foreign policy is the advancement of a country’s fundamental values
and core interests abroad.”374
Ambiguity: Inconsistency in words and deeds
Looking at the two key international policy documents, spanning the period under 
study in this thesis, it would appear that there was sufficient policy direction for the 
various departments, agencies, and the military to implement. However, the sources of 
ambiguity and indeterminancy stemmed not from the lack of documents, but from the 
content of those documents. Furthermore, as each actor interpreted and implemented 
these policies, a degree of inconsistency, or incoherence, developed across the 
government, giving rise to greater ambiguity.
In evaluating the content of the foreign policy guidance provided by the 
government, it is possible to see that the notion of ‘value projection’, and a later a 
‘doctrine of activism’, that gave rise to the most difficulties. Observers felt that they 
were poor substitutes for concrete objectives. Louis Delvoie, a former long-serving 
senior diplomat, complained that Canadian foreign policy as adrift and instead of 
identifying clear priorities, was instead searching for rationales. Denis Stairs, a 
prominent academic, titled his 2006 O.D. Skelton Lecture, “The Menace of General Ideas 
in the Making and Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy.” An editorial in a leading
374 Hugh Segal, “Compassion, Realism, Engagement and Focus: A Conservative Foreign Policy Thematic,” 
in Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, eds. Canada Am ong Nations: Minorities and Priorities. 
(Montreal and Kingston: M cGill-Queen’s, 2006): 27.
375 Louis Delvoie, “Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales,” 
Canadian M ilitary Journal. Summer 2000: 13-24.
376 Denis Stairs, “The Menace o f  General Ideas in the Making and Conduct o f  Canadian Foreign Policy.” 
2006 O.D. Skelton Lecture, http://www.international.gc.ca/department/skelton/stairs-en.asp; accessed 8 
May 2007. O.D. Skelton was Under-Secretary o f  State for External Affairs from 1925-1940. To deliver 
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newspaper accused the government of basing foreign policy and military action on 
nothing more than “just a confusing set of feel-good ideas.”377
While these ideas may have been somewhat fuzzy, they were portrayed as having 
two important hallmarks: they were new and they were Canadian. Two senior diplomats 
gushed that “the human security paradigm not only changes the way we look at the 
world, it leads to a new way of acting in the world—and to a new diplomacy.” No less 
humble was the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations: “Human 
Security is.. .a shift in the angle of vision: a new way of seeing things and doing things. 
Some consider it Copemican in its ambition. It is, at least, a paradigm shift in the
170
conduct of foreign policy.” As Axworthy saw it, Canada had a “particular” role to play 
in this new world. Canada had, he claimed, “attractive values, a reputation as an honest 
broker, skills at networking, a democratic tradition of openness, a willingness to work 
closely with civil society.” Together, this novelty and nationalism was supposed to 
achieve the stated goal of Canadian international policy. Both Canada in the World and 
the International Policy Statement claimed that Canada was to (re)claim a leadership role 
in the world. As Prime Minister Chretien recalled in his memoirs, “Canada has been able 
to maintain its international influence less by the success of its economy or the strength 
of its military than by demonstration of its values.. .Our values weren’t just the standards 
we wanted to achieve at home; they were the guidelines by which we intervened 
abroad.”381
377 Editorial. “Social work at gunpoint: Jean Chretien is confused about when to deploy the military,” The 
Ottawa Citizen. 15 July 2003: A 11.
378 McRae and Hubert, xxi.
379 Paul Heinbecker, “The Concept o f  Human Security: A Canadian V iew ,” Royal United Services Institute 
Journal. (December) 2000: 27.
380 Axworthy and Taylor, 193.
381 Jean Chretien, My Years as Prime M inister (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007): 335.
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Canadian foreign policy, as expressed in the 1995 and 2005 white papers, may 
have been explicit, but it was still full of ‘curious ambiguities’, both in terms of what was 
said and what was done. First, the objectives set out in Canada in the World, when taken 
as a whole, seemed to be strangely at odds with each other. Just what were Canadian 
values, given that its first priorities were ensuring Canadian prosperity and security? As 
Denis Stairs later noted that what Canadians seem to “want, in other words, is to be safe 
and rich, and we want to be seen as virtuous.”
Second, there seemed to be a disconnect between the ambitious, nearly open- 
ended set of objectives and the allocation of resources in order to realize them. The 1995 
White Paper itself contained its own warning: “Until we get our own financial house in 
order, we will be seriously limited in our ability to act abroad to further Canadian 
objectives. Canadians recognize that we cannot do everything that we would like and 
that we must be selective.. .We will not do everything we have done in the past, nor shall 
we do things as we have done before.” Unfortunately, the Government was less than 
explicit in describing exactly what would be cut; instead, at face value, Canada in the 
World can be said to add more to the foreign policy agenda.
The third curiousity is perhaps less puzzling when viewed in the light of the 
resource constraints mentioned above. While enumerating its policy ends, and warning 
of its lack of means, Canada and the World says little about the ways in which it might
382 Denis Stairs, “Myths, morals, and reality in Canadian foreign policy,” International Journal. Spring 
2003:240 .
383 Canada, Canada in the World, 8 . At the time, Canada was experiencing a severe financial crisis. The 
first budget o f  Jean Chretien’s government, in March o f  1995, was introduced by then Finance Minister, 
later to be prime minister, Paul Martin. The Canadian budget deficit in 1993/1994 was 5.8% o f  GDP and 
was reduced, through spending cuts, to 1.1% o f  GDP in 1996/1997. However, the country’s debt (the 
accumulation o f  years o f  deficit spending) was still 67% o f  GDP, one o f  the highest in the OECD. See 
International Monetary Fund, “IMF Concludes Article IV Consultations with Canada,” Public Information 
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achieve those ends. Here, it is ambiguous, as noted by a prominent non-governmental
think-tank in its contemporary critique of the White Paper:
Unfortunately, this framework [based on the three pillars of prosperity, security, 
and value projection] is so broad that it provides the government maximum scope 
to rationalize a very wide spectrum of responses to any given foreign policy
384issue.
While this observation is valid, it is unlikely that the Government was unaware of it, or 
that it was accidental. As Kim Richard Nossal would observe at the end of the Liberal 
government’s reign, Canadian foreign policy is replete with “the purposeful confusion of
■50c
values, goals, and interests.”
The problem with this confusion goes beyond the rhetorical. The logic of value-
projection as a policy can lead to several conclusions, not just those reached by the
Canadian government. For example, if Canada were committed to the values and
principles of Human Security, there would have been several options open to it when
faced with the challenge of Serbian aggression in the Balkans:
Canada, with its reputation as a non-combatant mediator of disputes and innovator 
of United Nations peacekeeping, might have offered high-level leadership on 
conflict prevention, development support and alternatives to bombing campaigns 
to resolve disputed issues, not just in Kosovo, but throughout the Balkans and at a 
much earlier stage. Canada’s successful federal state—officially bilingual and 
multicultural—was attained through constitutional, legal, policy, and economic 
incentives.. .Canada was uniquely positioned to offer leadership on self- 
determination, ethnic co-operation, and nation-building in Yugoslavia. Instead, a 
decade of disaster and lost opportunities followed as armed secession became the 
order of the day.386
384 Canadian Council on International Cooperation, “Canada in the World: A Review and Analysis o f  the 
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Indeed, whether or not the NATO campaign in Kosovo can be considered a victory for
'IQ ’1
values is not clear.
One can extend this logic further still and claim that if Canada possesses such 
strong humanitarian values, it should withdraw from its North Atlantic and North
TOO
American defence alliances, which do not so openly espouse those same values.
Finally, and predictably, a policy based on values can be seen as acquiring an imperative 
at the heart of its mandate. Failure to act in accordance with those declared values each 
and every time they apply can bring calls, not only of the foible of inconsistency, but the
lOQ
sin of hypocrisy, or “selective indignation”. Such universality is not possible, as 
Donald Smith, Canadian ambassador to Croatia, lamented: “I believe our view of human 
rights and our human rights objectives must be the same everywhere throughout the 
world. Unfortunately, there are constraints on governments. We cannot be everywhere 
and do everything.”390
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The notion of values in foreign and defence policy is controversial, but not unique
-3Q 1
to Canada, by any means. Observers, academic and otherwise, have long commented 
on a undercurrent of idealism in Canadian foreign policy. What makes it different in 
the case of the 1995 and 2005 White Paper is the formal importance placed on values: 
values changed from being a source of Canadian foreign policy to become the substance 
of that policy. While some values were expressly spelled out, such as respect for human 
rights, democracy, and the rule of law,” others are far more vague, such as tolerance, 
diversity, and thoughtful compromise.394 Again, it is worth highlighting that values were 
not a subsidiary focus within this policy document: on the contrary, the Government 
posited that “unity around these values permits the identification of a new compass for 
the development of foreign policy in a world where sweeping certainties have been 
replaced by doubts about what is ahead and where the surest path lies.”395 In previous 
government pronouncements, values had not enjoyed such prominence. In Challenge 
and Commitment, the Defence White Paper published in 1987, the Government stressed 
that its priority was “to promote a stronger and more stable international environment, in
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University o f  Toronto Press, 1969); Costas Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy  
1945-1995. (Montreal and Kingston: M cGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998); George MacLean, “Human 
Security in the National Interest? Canada, POGG and the ‘N ew ’ Multilateralism,” in Sandra J. MacLean, 
David R. Black, and Timothy M. Shaw, eds. A D ecade o f  Human Security: G lobal Governance and New  
Multilateralisms. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006): 63-72; and Micheal Byers, Intent fo r  A Nation. (Vancouver: 
Douglas and MacIntyre, 2007).
393 Canada. Canada in the World, 34-36.
394 Canada. Canada in the World, 1.
j95 Canada. Canada in the World, 7. The memoirs o f  foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy also used this
metaphor, as evinced by the title: Navigating A New World: Canada's G lobal Future (Toronto: Vintage,
2004).
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which our values and interests can flourish.”396 The 1992 Defence Policy paper
mentioned nothing about values, while the 1994 White Paper on Defence spoke only of
the need to provide for “the defence of Canada and Canadian interests and values.” In
terms of providing direction to the national instruments of foreign policy, including the
military, what is important about Canada in the World is not the presence of values, but
the adoption of value-projection as a governmental priority. Nossal reminds us that their
prominence should not be underestimated:
Each country’s history, its founding myths, its ideology, and its political culture 
will all affect how a country defines its interests, and therefore its foreign policy 
goals.. .But what has happened in Canada is that values, instead of just 
determining Canada’s foreign policy objectives, have been turned into Canada’s 
foreign policy objectives by the government in Ottawa.”398
This is an important distinction. If the values-based language could merely be dimissed 
as rhetorical, it would be of only passing interest. Equally, if the zeal for values 
expressed in the document were truly tempered by the lack of resources, its importance 
would be limited. However, value-projection did become policy, and took shape in the 
range of actions carried out in the period following the publication of Canada in the 
World, despite warnings about a shortage of resources. Eleven years after the publication 
of Canada in the World, the Conservative foreign minister Peter Mackay would 
demonstrate the persistency of values in Canadian foreign policy. Speaking ahead of a 
parliamentary debate on the extension of the Afghanistan mission, he claimed Canada’s
396 Canada. Challenge and Commitment. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1987): 3.
397 Canada. Defence Policy 1992. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1992); Canada. White P aper on Defence. 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1994): ii.
398 Nossal 7.
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operant values to be “freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of 
law.”399
Perhaps the most persistently invoked foreign policy role for Canada is that of 
‘peacekeeper.’ The idea that Canada, represented by Secretary of State for External 
Affairs Lester B. Pearson, invented peacekeeping serves as a distinguishing feature, 
setting Canadians apart from the Great Powers (Britain and France), who were thought to 
be too entangled in colonial ambitions, and more recently, the United States, who are 
thought to be too ‘American’. As discussed in Chapter 4, the myth of Canada qua 
peacekeeper is pervasive and powerful within the Canadian public. As such, it serves as 
the ultimate reference point for Canadian foreign policy. Any time a particular act or 
policy needs to be defended, Pearson or a Blue Helmet—or both—are harnessed to the 
task.400 The image of the Canadian peacekeeper—and of Canada as a nation of such 
peacekeepers—seems an indelible component of the Canadian mosaic. Uniquely, Ottawa 
is home to its own monument to peacekeeping; in turn, that monument adorns the reverse 
side of the ten dollar bill. A senior civil servant believes, or at any rate states, that “every 
school child learns that Canada is a peacekeeping nation.”401 A minister of national 
defence believes, or at any rate states, that “the UN is probably part of the DNA of most 
Canadians.”402 David Eaves provides a succinct summary of the story:
399 Mackay, “Extending Canada’s Mission,” A 12.
400 For example, when then minister o f  defence Paul Hellyer was looking for reasons to bolster support for 
his controversial proposal to unify the three military services into a single Canadian Forces organization, he 
claimed that this “would enhance their peacekeeping capabilities.” See Denis Stairs, “The Political Culture 
o f  Canadian Foreign Policy,” Canadian Journal o f  Political Science. 15.4 (December) 1982: 677.
401 Patricia Fortier, “The Evolution o f  Peacekeeping,” in Bob McRae and Don Hubert, eds. Human 
Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Prom oting Peace. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill- 
Queen’s University Press, 2001): 41.
402 Art Eggleton, “Speaking Notes for the Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister o f  National Defence at the 
M exico Defence College,” M exico City, Mexico. 22 January 2002.
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Lester B. Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his and Canada’s 
suggestion and deployment of a peacekeeping force that would separate opposing 
forces in the Suez while a peace plan was implemented.. .It was the birth of 
peacekeeping.. .The Crisis remains the defining moment of Canadian foreign 
policy, symbolizing Canada’s international role as a pacifist that puts global 
interests before national self-interest.403
Peacekeeping, as portrayed in this foundational myth, is something beyond rationality,
beyond explanation, a part of the national character, which, as Christopher Coker notes,
“lies in the practices and sentiments for which other nations have no words.”404
This incredible image persists, despite the reality of contemporary Canadian
involvement with UN missions 405 It has been the subject of criticism, usually from
military historians upset by lack of solid reason for its existence and influence 406 One
prominent historian made a representative observation: “for too many Canadians
peacekeeping has become a substitute for policy and thought.. .Some countries.. .try to
deal with problems by throwing money at them; our people and, to some substantial
extent, our governments try to deal with the world’s problems by sending
peacekeepers.”407 Whether or not this assessment is completely accurate, it certainly
403 David Eaves, “Central Myth o f  Canadian Diplomacy,” Toronto Star. 6 November 2006: B2.
404 Christopher Coker, The Warrior Ethos: M ilitary Culture and The War on Terror. (London: Routledge, 
2007): 108.
405 In 2007, Canada ranked 59 o f  111 nations contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions. See 
United Nations Association in Canada, The Canadian Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping. 3rd ed. 
(Ottawa: UNAC, 2007): 12.
406 See Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, Campaigns fo r  International Security: C anada’s Defence 
Policy at the Turn o f  the Century. (Montreal-Kingston: M cGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004); Sean M. 
Maloney, “From Myth to Reality Check: From Peacekeeping to Stabilisation,” Policy Options (September) 
2005: 40-46.
407 J.L. Granatstein, cited in Nader Hashemi, “Peacekeeping with N o Peace to Keep: The Failure o f  
Canadian Foreign Policy in Bosnia,” in Maya Shatzmiller, ed. Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and  
Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States. (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002): 205.
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begs the question why the image of peacekeeping has come to be so associated with 
Canadian foreign policy.408
The answer lies mainly in the fact that peacekeeping has been presented as a 
quintessential^ Canadian activity. Historically, Canada has played a “central role” in 
peacekeeping since its inception in the middle of the Twentieth Century.409 However, 
more importantly, peacekeeping “has been central to the definition of Canada’s national 
identity.”410 Peacekeeping is something that Canada does which distinguishes it from 
other countries. In that sense, 1956 marked the ‘end of empire’ not only for Great 
Britain, but also for Canada. It was not the Suez Crisis per se that is the milestone for 
Canada, but its role in the peacekeeping mission that followed it: “Pearson’s Nobel Peace 
Prize told Canadians that their country had arrived on the world stage.”411 Peacekeeping 
was not just ‘not British,’ it was also ‘not American’, an ever-present important 
distinguishing feature for Canadian governments 412 Bill Graham would stress 
peacekeeping
as a symbol of Canadian identity. After all, Canadians were at the origin of the 
concept of peacekeeping, and the term reflects who we are as a people.
Canadians believe passionately in peace, and they seek to promote it, to 
consolidate it and to maintain it. Our constitution, which is unique in the world in 
this regard, puts emphasis on ‘peace, order, and good government.’413
408 According to one former senior defence official, this question is rarely asked within political or policy 
circles. See Delvoie, “Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales,” 
11 .
409 Matthew Bouldin, “Keeper o f  the Peace: Canada and Security Transition Operations,” Defense and 
Security Analysis. 29.3 (September) 2003: 265.
410 Andrew Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: O ld  Habits and New Directions. (Scarborough: Prentice- 
Hall, 1997): 173.
411 J.L. Granatstein, War and Peacekeeping: From South Africa to the Gulf—C anada's Lim ited Wars. 
(Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1991: 2-3.
412 J.L. Granatstein, “The American Influence on the Canadian Military, 1939-1963,” in B.D. Hunt and 
R.G. Haycock, eds. C anada’s  Defence. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993): 137.
413 Bill Graham, “The Canadian Forces Mission in Afghanistan: Canadian Policy and Values in Action,” 
Speaking Notes for the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister o f  National Defence at the Conseil des relations 
internationals de Montreal (CORIM). (Montreal, Quebec) 22 September 2005. Original in French, 
translated by author: “comme un symbole de l’identite canadienne. Apres tout, les canadiens sont a
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A regard for Canadian exceptionalism is rooted, in part, in a key aspect of 
Canadian political life: national unity. National crises during both world wars occurred 
over the issue of compelling French Canada to fight for ‘Mother England’.414 The first 
post-War expression of Canadian foreign policy, made by then foreign minister, later 
prime minister, Louis St. Laurent, would ensure that such discord was never a problem 
again: “The first general principle upon which I think we are agreed is that our external 
policies shall not destroy our unity. No policy can be regarded as wise which divides the 
people whose effort and resources must put it into effect.”415 St. Laurent’s successors, 
arguably up until 2002, when Canada sent troops to Afghanistan, followed his advice: 
“foreign policy is one area where there has been a surprising degree of national consensus 
over the past fifty years.. .there are no national divisions.”416 Speaking in 2005, Michael 
Ignatieff echoed St. Laurent: “If we are distracted and divided at home, we cannot project 
power and influence abroad. Canada matters to the world only to the degree that Canada 
remains united at home. We can’t get the balance between foreign and domestic policy
I’origine du concept de maintien de la paix, et ce terme reflete ce que nous sommes en tant que people. Les 
canadiens croient passionnement en la paix, et ils s ’efforcent de la promouvoir, de la consolider et de la 
maintenir. Notre constitution, qui est unique au monde a cet egard, met Paccent sur «la paix, Porder et le 
bon gouvemement».
414 On the history o f  the two crises, see Pierre Burton, Marching to War: C an ada’s Turbulent Years 1899- 
1953. (Toronto: Anchor Canada, 2002) and J.L. Granatstein, C anada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping  
the Peace (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 2001). For an analysis o f  the differences between Anglo- 
and Francophone Canadian views o f  foreign policy, see Jean-Sebastien Rioux, “Deux solitudes : Pattitude 
des quebecois face a la sScurite et a la politique de defense canadienne,” CDFAI Research Paper. (Calgary: 
Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2005) and Jean-Christophe Boucher and Stephane 
Roussel, “From Afghanistan to ‘Quebecistan’: Quebec as the Pharmakon o f  Canadian Foreign and Defence 
Policy,” in Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen, eds. Canada Among Nations: What Room fo r  
Manoeuvre? (Montreal-Kingston: M cGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007): 128-158.
415 Louis St. Laurent, “Gray Foundation Lectures,” Delivered at University o f  Toronto, January 1947.
416 Fen O. Hamson and M.A. Molet, eds. Canada Am ong Nations: Big Enough to Be Heard. (Ottawa: 
Carleton University Press, 1996): 5.
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right unless both are aligned to serve the fundamental purpose of national government:
maintaining the national unity of our country.”417
The image of Canadian military activity as peacekeeping is especially important
in Quebec, where federal governments have insisted on portraying a strong, independent
Canada, as an antidote to separatist visions. However, there is another, perhaps more
subtle, strategy at work here. The logic of using peacekeeping as a point of reference
proceeds like this: ‘Peacekeeping is a nice thing to do. Peacekeeping is a Canadian
activity. Therefore, Canada is a nice country.’ Thus the moralism identifiable in
Canadian foreign policy is not so much about a crusade abroad, but rather about a ‘pep
talk’ at home. Peacekeeping may be about doing good, but it is also about feeling good.
Canadian soldiers are transformed from instruments of national policy into proxies for
national identity. Bill Graham, the Liberal defence minister, speaking in 2005, extolled
the virtues of the Canadian military at work in Afghanistan:
[The Canadian Forces have] a sophisticated set of skills and instruments, 
including combat capabilities, negotiation and diplomatic skills, and a willingness 
to help others rebuild their institutions in a way that is culturally sensitive to their 
distinct local needs. We are there to rebuild; winning battles is only part of the 
job.418
In so doing, he gave all Canadians a pat on the back as well:
Our men and women in uniform embody Canadian values of tolerance and respect 
combined with a steely determination to defend our rights. These values are a 
result of our history as a bilingual and multicultural nation that has, over the 
years, become one of the world’s most successful models of embracing cultural 
differences among one of the world’s most diverse populations.419
417 Michael Ignatieff, “To be realists and demand the impossible: balancing foreign and domestic policy,” 
Policy Options. September 2005: 5.
418 Graham, “The Canadian Forces Mission in Afghanistan,” 1.
419 Graham, “The Canadian Forces Mission in Afghanistan,” I.
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As Peter MacKay, the Conservative foreign minister, stated in 2006, “What
Canada does in Afghanistan matters at home.”420 MacKay, like his colleagues and
predecessors, understood that international policy and action rests on domestic
legitimacy. That legitimacy, in turn, relies on making the ‘appropriate’ connections to
Canadian idealized symbols, such as peacekeeping.
Of course, outside of the timeless world of mythical peacekeeping, real changes
were occurring. An astonished reporter remarked in 2005, after more than two years of
operations in Afghanistan, under the command of both NATO and the US, “Canada’s
peacekeeping role is changing.” More problematic, though, was her conclusion that
“Canada is moving away from its traditional peacekeeping role and becoming
Americanised.”421 This was not the kind of imagery that a Canadian politician
welcomed. When, in an interview, Graham was challenged he tried to limit the damage
by resorting to some rather opaque double-speak:
Question: Do you think Canada’s military is moving away from the traditional 
role of peacekeeping?
Answer: No, I think what is moving away is that peacekeeping is changing.. .The 
point is that Canada is a peacekeeping nation, but we have recognized that you 
cannot effectively be a peacekeeper in a place where there is open conflict going 
on.. .That’s exactly what we are going to be doing in Afghanistan. It’s 
peacekeeping, but it’s peacekeeping with the recognition that to be effective, 
you’ve got to have a combat capacity to defend yourself in a very volatile 
situation.422
420 Peter MacKay, “Canadian Foreign Policy and Our Leadership Role in Afghanistan,” Notes for an 
Address by The Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister o f  Foreign Affairs to the Canadian Defence and 
Foreign Affairs Institute, Ottawa, 30 October 2006.
421 Bea Vongdouangchanh, “Canada looks at expanding cooperation under NORAD: Graham.” The Hill 
Times. 26 September 2005: 18.
422 Vongdouangchanh, 22.
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Of course, Graham’s questioner was right, Afghanistan, as Graham’s 
Conservative successor would later admit, Afghanistan was “not a traditional 
peacekeeping mission. It never has been. There is no ceasefire to patrol, no negotiated 
peace agreement to respect. Al-Qaida and the Taliban are not interested in peace.”423 
Conclusion
Rather than being comprised of clear, straightforward objectives, constraints, and 
restraints, Canadian policy direction since at least 1995 has been marked by ambiguity. 
Additionally, Doug Bland describes contemporary civil control of the military as “a 
complex interplay of societal, political, and military interests, values, and 
expectations.”424 Government pronouncements appear rhetorical or abstract, despite 
protestations by politicians, claiming that “it is important.. .to be clear about.. .what we 
think should be done; otherwise we’re just spectators.”425 Micheal Ignatieff, in his run up 
to the leadership contest for the Liberal Party, warned senior public servants of the 
consequences of absent or unclear policy direction: “political indecision destroys 
bureaucracies, weakens their esprit de corps. Leaders must lead.”426
It would be preferable, then, if that leadership took concrete form, in the 
substance of a clearly expressed, well supported document, “a clearly articulated set of 
interests and values [that] allows is to ration resources and capabilities effectively.”427 
There is certainly no shortage of treatises, even within the Canadian context, which 
encourage the formulation, or suggest their own version, of just such a document. Colin
423 Mackay, “Canadian Foreign Policy and Our Leadership Role” 1.
424 Douglas L. Bland, “’Your Obedient Servant’: The Military’s Role in the Civil Control o f  the Armed 
Forces,” Unpublished paper, 2000. Mimeo in author’s possession) 1.
425 MacKay, “Canadian Foreign Policy and Our Leadership Role,” 7.
426 Ignatieff, 6 .
427 Ignatieff 1.
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S. Gray, writing in 1971, pleaded with Canada to develop its own “strategic thought” .
Canada, at the time, suffered from “the total absence of a clear, well-defined national
defence policy. Since the government came to power we have had ad hoc, irrelevant and
inconsistent measures taken, and we still have to hear the minister’s grand design.”429
Over thirty years later, Hugh Segal would criticize prime ministers John Diefenbaker,
Pierre Trudeau, and Jean Chretien because “they had no concept of how military,
diplomatic, and democratic capacity were jointly and severally essential to the
advancement of our genuine national interests and shared values.”430 Beyond mere
criticism, Segal offers a vision of what he believes required:
a “grand strategy for a small country” that integrates military, diplomatic, and 
foreign aid instruments in a thrust that preserves security and opportunity at 
home, advances leverage with our allies, and responds in an integrated way to the 
threats that are real from abroad.. .These need to be built into real plans and 
models that maximize the ability of each to engage constructively on Canada’s 
behalf, and that enhance the leverage of a combined application where appropriate 
and helpful.431
Going further still, Segal reveals the logical national instrument that such a grand strategy 
would necessitate, summed up as an “enhanced deployable military capacity, joined up 
with our key post-conflict transitional abilities and infrastructure”.432 This, according to 
Segal, is how clear policy should lead to concrete capabilities.
428 Colin S. Gray, “The Need for Independent Canadian Thought,” Canadian Defence Quarterly. 20.1 
(August) 1990 [1971]: 7-15.
429 Mike Forrestal, Conservative Defence Critic, in a speech to the House o f  Commons on 21 May 1971, 
cited in Colin S. Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question o f  Relevance. (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 
and Company: 1972): 2.
430 Hugh Segal, “A Grand Strategy for a Small Country,” Canadian M ilitary Journal. Autumn 2003: 3.
431 Segal 5. Compare his definition o f  grand strategy with that Paul Johnson’s definition o f  policy: “the 
capacity o f  the nation’s leaders to bring together all o f  the elements o f  the nation’s long-term (that is, 
wartime and peacetime) best interests. Paul Johnson, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace,” in Paul Johnson, 
ed. G rand Strategies in War and Peace. (London: Yale University Press, 1991).
432 Segal 6 .
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Perhaps, though, the search for such clarity in policy is illusory, or as Ignatieff
inadvertently suggests, an “intellectual task”, more suited to the classroom than the
political arena.433 As Denis Stairs characterizes it, this predilection for clarity
derives in part from a Cartesian dislike of the clutter of muddling through.. .There 
is a reassuring, though, often illusory, sense of order, and of control, that can 
result from being able to conceptualise disparate and eclectic phenomena as parts 
of an integrated whole, especially if this can then be subjected to analysis and 
evaluation from first principles and basic priorities 434
For those charged with developing national policy on foreign and defence issues, perhaps
this aversion to ‘muddling through’ is not as well developed as it may be in academic
circles.435 Looking out the window at the world—especially the post-Cold War world—
from Ottawa might be too daunting for some.436 Having to cut through the din of events
and construct a neat and understandable document could seem overwhelming. Janice
Gross Stein chastises such reluctance: “Well, get a life! Frankly! [The world] is
disorderly, messy and disorganized, but that doesn’t mean we can’t have policy.”437
Of course, even in the absence of explicit direction, governments indicate their
desires in more subtle ways. Rather than in formal policy statements and white papers,
government direction can be divined from its words and acts. Because actors are not
guided by clear objectives and parameters, they must use less formal, more general
information in their interpretations. Speaking of the Canadian stance on the 2003 Iraq
433 Michael Ignatieff, “Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada,” O.D. 
Skelton Lecture. Ottawa, 12 March 2004.
434 Stairs, “The Political Culture o f  Canadian Foreign Policy,” 688 .
4j5 One is reminded o f  the comic epithet that practitioners want to get things done, academics want to get 
things right, and bureaucrats are not fussed either way.
436 This applies not only to Canada. See Martin Shaw, Post M ilitary Society. (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1991): 1. For a look at a generation o f  men from Canada, largely educated in Britain, 
who did not shy away from the challenge o f  turbulent times, and as a result put in place most o f  the modem  
Canadian social, political, and economic architecture, see J.L. Granatstein, The O ttawa Men: The Civil 
Service Mandarins, 1935-1957. (Toronto: University o f  Toronto, 1998).
437 Janice Gross Stein, “Policy Is M essy Because The World Is Messy. Get Used To It.” Policy Options. 
January-February 2001: 73.
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War, one observer noted with frustration “Our attitude.. .is clear: What’s our policy?” 
There are dangers for actors involved in this ‘reading’ of governmental desires, though. 
Indeterminacy, as we have seen in Chapter 3, requires interpretation as the first step for 
those actors forced to operate in such an environment. That interpretation is subjective 
and therefore, can be inconsistent across organisations and time, giving rise to even more 
variability in the execution of policy than may exist in the policy itself. Actors, of 
course, are compelled to enter into some form of interpretation, even given these pitfalls. 
They cannot choose not to act; their survival (as measured by the continued allocation of 
resources) depends on their ability to gain and maintain legitimacy. A large part of 
gaining legitimacy for the military means ascertaining and following the government’s 
intent, no matter how hard it may be to read. For the government’s part, legitimacy, too, 
is a goal. The direction they give to the military must accord with the passions of the 
people. And since those passions are themselves ill-defined, it should not be a wonder 
that the resultant direction is often general and vague.
The military in Canada, it is true, has had to deal with ambiguous guidance from 
their political masters. They have been expected to cover the spectrum of capabilities in 
order to discharge whatever particular foreign policy objective they were assigned. Very 
often, the civilian master did not tell to the general to ‘jump!’ Rather, the message has 
been more subtle, akin to something like ‘move about in a vertical way, but please do so 
in keeping with the gentle and idealized expectations that we have formed and 
promulgated about you.’ However, the Radneresque deliciousness of the ambiguity (as 
alluded to in the title of this chapter) lies in the fact that there is room for interpretation—
438 William Watson, “Our Attitude on Iraq is clear: What’s our Policy?” Policy Options. May 2004: 80.
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within limits. In the next chapter we shall see how the military applied its own skills 
against this backdrop.
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Chapter 6:
The Military: Ambitious Institution, Ad lib Individuals
“Civil-military cooperation is the responsibility o f  old colonels not fit  for operations. ”
Opening Address to NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Course 
Oberamergau, Germany, October 2002
“Civil-military cooperation is a pseudo-military activity. ”
Canadian Commander, Task Force Mirage, December 2004
Although Clausewitz is correct in saying the war is the product of several factors, 
at its very core lays the military. Military activity may be initiated by the government 
and influenced by the people, but men and women, in uniform, on the ground, carry it 
out. Following the framework developed in Chapter 3, this chapter will examine the 
military’s part in the practice of civil-military cooperation439. The chapter is based on a 
series of two related questions. First, we will examine how the military conceived of its 
role. Second, we shall turn to how they turned that understanding into practice, vis-a-vis 
civil-military cooperation.
In doing so, it is important to look at the military at two distinct levels. The first 
is the level of the military as an institution. As an institution, the military has a corporate 
or organizational culture and a view of itself, which it takes the time and effort to record 
and publish. It is as an institution that the military establishes norms and does its best to 
transmit them through the development of doctrine, the inculcation processes inherent in 
training, the actual organistational and structural choices that are made, as well as 
through less formalized system of rewarding those who Tive up to expectations’, in part 
by promotion and appointment. The institutional military in Canada has a love-hate
439 Throughout this chapter, I w ill refer to the military and the Army. The military will refer to the entire 
armed forces (in this case, the Canadian Armed Forces, which is often referred to simply as the Canadian 
Forces, and abbreviated as the CF). The military is made up o f  naval, air and land forces. However, in 
terms o f  civil-military cooperation in the areas I am focusing on, the land forces, referred to as the Army, 
are the most germane.
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relationship with civil-military cooperation. On one hand, it is opposed to the idea of 
‘warriors’ losing sight of their main job: closing with and destroying the enemy. 
Activities, like civil-military cooperation, detract from a strict warfighting focus, and 
therefore, are to be avoided. However, on the other hand, the military as an institution 
understands that if it wants the legitimacy (in the eyes of the government and the people) 
it needs to conduct operations in places like Afghanistan, it needs to be able to present a 
less destructive image, more in line with the tradition, mythical image of peacekeeping.
It needs to create its own compelling strategic narrative. Civil-military cooperation can 
help it do just that.
The second level of the military is that of the individual. While the institutional 
military may write and play the music, it is the individual soldier—be it General or 
Private—who must perform the dance. As we shall see, the dance that is civil-military 
cooperation reflects a wide range of different interpretations. Some soldiers agree with 
the institutional military view of civil-military cooperation: they see it as a necessary evil 
to be tolerated and conducted as economically (in terms of resources and effort) as 
possible. Others regard this minimalist position as cynical and old-fashioned. They 
believe that the wars of the present and future, which are not like the conventional battles 
for which their old ‘Cold Warriors’ prepared to fight and for which they still pine, are
• t l isomething more like ‘4 Generation Warfare’, counterinsurgency, or stabilization 
operations. In these wars, civil-military cooperation provides a way of getting ‘amongst 
the people’: more than just a way of winning ‘hearts and minds’ it is a conduit through 
which intelligence can be gained from and through which key messages can be 
distributed to the local populace. A final group of soldiers see civil-military cooperation
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more as a genuinely humanitarian, or at the very least developmental, activity. It is a 
means by which states, economies, societies, and most importantly, individual lives 
might be rebuilt following devastating conflict. At the individual level, the military is 
undecided about civil-military cooperation and, as such, it is practiced in a fluid, almost 
personalized fashion, depending on the particular individual responsible for it at any 
given time.
How did the military understand its role in Canadian society?
The Impact of Somalia
The Canadian Army was rocked in the 1990s by the actions of soldiers within the 
Canadian Airborne Regiment who on 16 March 1993 apprehended, tortured, and beat to 
death Shidane Arone, a Somali teenager, while on operations in Mogadishu.440 The 
repercussions of that night went far beyond individual charges and trials: the government 
of the day established a commission of inquiry, whose five volume report, published in 
1997, detailed serious misconduct, neglect, and apathy within not just the Airborne 
Regiment, but the Army, Canadian Forces, and the Department of National Defence. The 
most visible step taken as a result of the Somalia Inquiry was the disbandment of the 
Airborne Regiment (a step not seen in the West since the disbandment of the French 
Premiere Regiment Etranger Parachutiste or 1REP, for rising up against the French 
administration in Algeria in 1961.) Perhaps less visibly but more importantly, the Inquiry 
attempted to look more deeply at the systemic problems that may have contributed to 
Arone debacle. In its report, the Inquiry included two key sections that set out the
440 The Canadian Forces selected the code name ‘Deliverance’ for this operation. For an expose on the 
affair see David Bercuson, Significant Incident: C an ada’s Army, the Airborne, and Murder in Somalia. 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996). A more analytical treatment can be found in Charles S.
Oliverio, “Operation Deliverance: International Success or Domestic Failure?” Canadian M ilitary Journal. 
Summer 2001: 51-58.
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foundations of how the military should work within society. In its first volume, it 
included a nine page essay entitled “Civil-Military Relations”, which emphasized the 
correct, legal, relationship between the military, and the government (made up of elected 
ministers and appointed civil servants). Its third sentence illustrates the thrust of the 
essay:
Civil control [of the military] is intended to ensure that decisions and risks 
affecting national defence and the employment of the Canadian Forces are taken 
by politicians accountable to the people rather than by soldiers, officials, and 
others who are not.441
This statement underlined a strong conclusion of the Inquiry: the politicians had taken
their eyes off the armed forces and bore responsibility for the corrosion of ethical conduct
that had occurred.
The Inquiry went further in its second essay, entitled “The Military in Canadian
Society,” contained in the fifth volume of its report. Not only had the government
neglected the military, so had the people of Canada:
Regrettably, in recent times little interest has been shown in our armed forces, and 
national discussions about defence policy or the operations of the CF have been 
rare.. .Overall, the military tends to make a faint imprint on the consciousness of 
many Canadians.. .The CF is increasingly out of the public mind 442
However, in the eyes of the Inquiry, the blame for this lacuna had to be shared between
the people and the military itself: “Whenever military leaders ignore their relation to the
larger society, they put the relationship between the armed forces and society at
risk.. .Military leadership must be sensitive to .. .public perception and work continually
441 Canada. The Somalia Inquiry. “Civil-Military Relations,” Volume 1, Chapter 6 . 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/som alia/volW lC6_e.asp; accessed 18 February 2003.
442 Canada. The Somalia Inquiry. “The Military in Canadian Society,” Volume 5, Chapter 43. 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/somalia/voI5/V5C43_e.asp; accessed 18 February 2003.
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to stay abreast of changing attitudes in society.”443 The Army had drifted too far from the 
society from which it came and this was the fault of the government, the military, and the 
people of Canada.
The government and the military responded rapidly to this criticism. First, the 
Chief of Defence Staff was relieved of command. Second, the Army published a 
landmark doctrinal publication aimed at demonstrating “that the army is a unique social 
institution which reflects Canadian values and character within the framework of military 
professionalism and the requirement for warfighting.”444 The manual became mandatory 
reading for all ranks in an attempt to articulate and instill an “ethos or moral code” which 
would become “the bedrock of the army’s preparedness in peace and is key to its 
effectiveness in war and operations other than war.”445 Canada’s Army stresses that this 
ethos is tied to Canadian society claiming, “the army constitutes national beliefs and 
ideals in action.”446 And while the manual was produced for distribution only within the 
Canadian Forces, it was hoped that the result would be conduct and performance by the
Army which would allow Canadians to “see that their army proudly reflects the best of
themselves, serving not only the needs of the nation, but helping Canadians make a 
difference in the world.”447
Nothing like Canada’s Army had ever been published before in Canada. It was 
meant to act as a ‘capstone manual’ within the military. It should be regarded as a 
philosophical expression of an overarching idea. All subsequent doctrine was to stem
443 Canada. The Somalia Inquiry. “The Military in Canadian Society,” Volume 5, Chapter 43. 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/somalia/vol5/V5C43_e.asp; accessed 18 February 2003.
444 Canada. The Army. C an ada’s Army: We S tand on Guard fo r  Thee. B-GL-300-000/FP-000. (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1998): i. The phrase “We Stand on Guard for Thee” is taken from the first line o f  the 
Canadian national anthem.
445 Canada. The Army. C an ada’s Army, i.
446 Canada. The Army. C an ada’s Army, ii.
447 Canada. The Army. C an ada’s Army, ii.
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from it, providing more detail and focusing on specific activities perhaps, but certainly 
keeping in line with its tenets.
The year after Canada’s Army was published, the Canadian Forces attempted to 
build on its foundations, in a paper that aimed at setting the course of the institution for 
the next two decades. In Shaping the Future o f  the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for  
2020 the CF stated the military’s role was to “defend Canadian values” and then went on 
to list what they were:
Democracy and the rule of law;
Individual rights and freedoms as articulated in the Charter [of Rights and 
Freedoms];
Peace, order, and good government, as defined in the Constitution; and 
Sustainable economic well-being.448
In addition to these values, the CF went on to state the “within Canadian society, issues
of diversity, gender, lifestyle, disability and family support will increase in
importance.”449 As the Somalia Inquiry had suggested, the CF needed to understand and
reconnect with Canadian society.
Moving beyond merely stating which values and issues were important to
Canadians, the Shaping the Future described the “security environment” within which the
Canadian Forces would be expected to operate:
There remain direct and indirect threats to our national security for which a 
military response may be required, including drugs, organized crime, illegal 
immigration, terrorism and the uncertainty caused by the growing proliferation of 
missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction. As with our allies, Canadian 
defence planning is now based upon the capabilities Canada needs to protect and 
promote its interests and values in a responsive manner, rather than upon direct 
threats to our well-being 450
448 Canada. Canadian Forces. Shaping the Future o f  the Canadian Forces: A Strategy fo r  2020. (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1999): 1.
449 Canada. Canadian Forces. Shaping the Future, 3.
450 Canada. Canadian Forces. Shaping the Future, 1. Emphasis added.
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The CF was clearly to be focused on values rather than threats. The archetypal role for 
the military was seen as “spearheading large, complex, time-sensitive security and 
humanitarian operations at a regional or national level.”451
Three points stand out in Canada’s Army and Shaping the Future. The first is the 
immediate and direct link they have with the Somalia Inquiry. The national (and 
international) disgrace of the Arone incident spurred the military to reestablish, as 
quickly as possible, a sense of legitimacy. Second, the idea that the military could help 
Canadians ‘make a difference in the world’ is a recurring theme, as we will explore in 
more depth below. Third, the two manuals exposed a profound contradiction: how could 
it be possible for an organization that reflected the best Canadian values, also have at its 
core the ability to fight and kill? Canada’s Army tried to square this tension somewhat 
by stating that those great Canadian values would need to be understood “within the 
framework of military professionalism.”452 Just what that meant, though, or how it might 
be implemented on operations, was not spelled out.
The Importance of Kosovo
The post-Somalia military spent a great deal of effort reconnecting with what it 
perceived to be Canadian society, attempting to regain legitimacy. Kosovo was the first 
real test of whether or not it had been able to do that, while retaining a degree of combat 
capability. Canadian air and naval assets were involved in the early stages of NATO’s 
operations against Serbia throughout 199 9453, but this did not mean the same level of risk
451 Canada. Canadian Forces. Shaping the F u tu re ,! .
452 Canada. The Army. C an ada’s Army, i.
453Six Canadian F-18 fighters operated out o f  the NATO air base in Aviano, Italy. In fact, Canadian planes 
flew  10% o f all NATO sorties, the most o f  any nation other than the United States. See David Bashaw, et
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associated with the commitment of ground forces. Risk not only from the possibility of 
incurring Canadian casualties, but also from the potential for the army to embarrass 
Canada, as it had done in Somalia. The mission to Kosovo, as we saw in Chapter 5, was 
extremely important to the government of Canada and Lloyd Axworthy’s idea of human 
security. The military understood this: it knew that it needed to succeed in Kosovo, 
needed to fit into a human security schema. The Canadian army contribution to the 
Kosovo mission was considerable454 and although they remained in the province for only 
twelve months, they acquitted themselves well.
The Kosovo deployment was important for the Canadian military for three main 
reasons. First, it demonstrated that it was possible for it to deploy quickly, in a manner 
that was relevant to the Canadian government. Human security was important and from 
time to time it would need a “hard edge”455. Second, since the mission was predicated 
on the need to deter Serbian forces from abrogating their political commitments, it was 
conceived of as needing a great deal of combat power. The army took this opportunity to 
highlight its warfighting capabilities by structuring its forces for combat and by 
deploying tanks, the first time its tanks had deployed on operations since the Korean
al., “Mission Ready: Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign,” Canadian M ilitary Journal. 1.1 
(Spring) 2000: 55-61.
454 The Canadian ground contribution included eight surveillance and medium utility helicopters; an 
armoured reconnaissance squadron consisting o f  ten state-of-the-art Coyote 8-wheeled vehicles equipped 
with 25mm cannons and a ground surveillance package capable o f  providing real-time coverage out to a 
range o f  15kms; and a mechanized infantry battle group made up o f  over 500 soldiers, with a troop o f  5 
Leopard I medium tanks, an armoured engineer troop, and three rifle companies. The Canadians were 
under operational control o f  the British-led multinational brigade and were assigned an area o f  operations 
in the Drenica Valley, the heartland o f  the Kosovo Liberation Army. See Mike Ward, et al., “Task Force 
Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment,” Canadian M ilitary Journal. 1.1 
(Spring 2000): 67-74.
455 Paul Heinbecker, “Human Security: Hard Edge,” Canadian M ilitary Journal. 1.1 (Spring) 2000: 11-16.
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War.456 The third way in which the Kosovo mission was important was due to the fact
that despite expectations, combat was not necessary: Serb forces left Kosovo, largely
intact despite the air campaign, without need for NATO land troops to apply force.
Almost immediately the mission became one of administering a failed state. Instead of
having to conduct an advance into hostile terrain, replete with anti-ambush tactics and
pitched battles, soldiers found themselves engaged in the allocation of accommodation, in
the coordination of relief and development assistance, and in reconstruction tasks 457
Even warfighting missions would entail ‘operations other than war’.
For the Army, Kosovo had shown that there was a space for asserting its own
values. Being a Canadian did not have to mean not being a soldier: military norms could
exist alongside civilian ones. Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffries summarized this feeling
somewhat tenuously in late 2000 when he wrote the introduction to an important
doctrinal report for the Army:
Volatile, uncertain, unsettling—call them what you will, the last ten years have 
most certainly been different from the previous forty. [Canadian Forces stationed 
in Germany] and NATO’s Central Front are no longer the focus of our 
professional lives. Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor and places yet to come to the 
fore have replaced them. The dangerous, yet relatively stable atmosphere of the 
Cold War has been supplanted by a world of instability and strife.. .Although our 
current focus is on peace support operations, the possibility of escalation to 
peacemaking, or indeed war, is always with us. In all we do we must never lose 
sight o f the fact that the bottom line in our business is war, and the Army must be 
prepared to engage in combat operations.458
456 Canada. Department o f  National Defence. “Press Relase: Canada Increases Contribution to Kosovo  
International Peace Implementation Force,” 11 June 1999.
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=726; accessed 31 October 2002.
457 For a detailed explanation o f  the kinds o f  activities that NATO, and in particular Canadian, ground 
troops had to carry out, see See Douglas E. Delaney, “CIMIC Operations During Operation Kinetic,” 
Canadian M ilitary Journal. Winter 2000-2001: 29-34; Mike Ward, et al., “Task Force Kosovo,”; and 
Christopher Ankersen, “Praxis versus policy: Peacebuilding and the Canadian Forces,” in Building 
Sustainable Peace , T. Keating and W .A. Knight, eds. (Edmonton/Tokyo: University o f  Alberta 
Press/United Nations University Press, 2004).
458 Canada. Director o f  Land Strategic Concepts. “Future Army Capabilities,” DLSC Report 01/01. 
January 2001: i.
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Although far from jingoistic, this reminder to the Army was an important marker: 
combat, and the skills and values that it requires, should not be neglected, even in 
Canada.
If the idea that it was okay for war to form part of the Army’s imagination began
to seep into the publication following Kosovo, it represented a perplexing inconsistency.
The Canadian Army, despite a decade of peace support operations, still thought a lot
about—and trained for—war. As the Director-General of the Land Staff Brigadier
General Vince Kennedy proclaimed in July 2000, the Army’s real problem was not what
was suggested by Lieutenant General Jeffries: the Canadian Army was not thinking too
soft, they were still stuck in their Cold War ways:
We are continually designing systems of command and control to fight and win at 
View 1 warfare [conventional, inter-state engagements] -  this is what we are 
comfortable with technical warfare against a uniformed and capable, but not too 
capable, world class enemy, system versus system, the ultimate Milton-Bradley 
game turn. And while we profess that View 2 warfare [asymmetric, intra- or sub­
state operations] has a majority overlap with View 1 in terms of capabilities 
needed, I suspect that this is overstated, and undoubtedly oversimplified, 
especially in execution. View 2 warfare pulls us back down from techno war to 
the chaos that is at the heart of the character of war, and personalizes war with its 
uncertainties, where malequipped commanders and staffs are not necessarily 
immediately able to adjust their less-than-optimum structures and thinking to the 
View 2 realities.459
If Kennedy was correct, and warfighting is how the Army thought, why was it 
necessary for Jeffries to remind the Army that warfighting should not be forgotten?
There are several possible explanations, but one stands out as most probable: Jeffries and 
Kennedy were addressing two different audiences. Jeffries, as the commander of the
459 V.W. Kennedy, “Command: The Dark Future,” Presentation at Future Army Capabilities Workshop, 13 
July 2000, Ottawa, Canada. The terms V iew  1 and V iew  2 come from NATO doctrine. See North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation. NATO Land Operations 2020 Study: The Nature o f  the Battlefield in 2020. (Brussels: 
International Military Staff, 1998).
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Army, was addressing the most senior military (outside the Army and within the 
Canadian Forces as a whole) and political leadership, introducing the notion that despite 
years of employing the army in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, warfighting 
was a possibility and something that deserved attention. Kennedy, as the person 
responsible for coordinating Army strategy, was addressing its various component 
elements, who were led by senior officers who had ‘grown up’ during the Cold War and 
perhaps continued to display a mentality best suited to it. Regardless of the accuracy of 
this explanation, the fact that senior Army officers were transmitting different messages 
suggests that there were different interpretations of the role of the organization.
The Power of Afghanistan
If Somalia and Kosovo were milestones along the route of the Canadian Army’s 
evolution, then the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent military intervention 
in Afghanistan was a turning point. As we have seen in Chapter 5, the Canadian 
government was keen to be involved in the international intervention in Afghanistan, but 
in a peace support capacity, something akin to what had occurred in Kosovo. However, 
that was not to be; on 22 February 2002, a Canadian light infantry battalion would deploy 
as a part of the American Operation Enduring Freedom, under the operational command 
of the 101st Airborne Division.460 The Chief of Defence Staff did not mince words when 
he declared, “We’re not there to do traditional peacekeeping. We’re there to bring 
security and stability to the region.”461 The Canadians would remain in Afghanistan for 
most of the next six years, under both American and NATO auspices and incur over
460 Canada. Department o f  National Defence. Press Release: Canadian Forces to Deploy to Afghanistan,”
11 December 2001. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=435; accessed 31 
October 2002.
461 Valerie Lawton, “Canada Joins al-Qaeda hunt,” Toronto Star January 8 , 2002: A l.
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seventy fatalities and many more injuries462. They would deploy not only infantry troops, 
but also special forces teams, artillery batteries, engineering squadrons, and a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team. At times they provided the largest contingent to the mission, and 
in recognition of this, Canadian generals would assume senior posts within the 
International Security Assistance Force, including as deputy commander and commander 
of the mission; as commander of the Multinational Brigade in Kabul; and as commander 
of Regional Group South based in Kandahar.
The early lessons from Afghanistan were reflected in the Army document 
Advancing with Purpose.463 This document highlighted that the Canadian Army was a 
capable organization that had the ability to rapidly mount and conduct operations that 
were at the centre of Canadian foreign policy and that the security environment was more 
complex than perhaps initially understood. The army could not focus solely on either 
what NATO called ‘View 1 ’ or ‘View 2’: they would have to be prepared to do both. 
Moreover, Advancing with Purpose contained a sense that the army had done well in 
Afghanistan, and could afford to assert itself. It made a deliberate move away from the 
sensitivities reflected in Canada’s Army and Shaping the Future: the Canadian public and 
the values they wanted were contributing factors to be considered as the army conducted 
its business, but they were neither the only nor the most important ones. In fact, the army 
presented both the Canadian government and people not as hierarchical superiors, but as 
equals (as illustrated in Figure 6.1).
462 There is evidence that the Canadian military in Afghanistan suffered a disproportionate level o f  
casualties, relative to the number o f  troops deployed, when compared with other NATO forces. See Steven 
Staples and Bill Robinson, “Canada’s Fallen: Understanding Canadian Military Deaths in Afghanistan,” 
Foreign Policy Series 1.1 A Report o f  the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. (September) 2006.
463 Canada. The Army. Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2002).
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Figure 6.1: Army Stakeholders
Allies
Army
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Leadership
Legitimacy
Gone was the Army afraid o f its own strength, portraying itself as subservient, and only 
marginally relevant. Indeed, the Army portrayed the national leadership (the government 
of Canada) and the people o f Canada as 'stakeholders’, alongside the Army itself, and 
other Allied militaries.
This conceptualisation illustrates that the Army set out to shake off, once and for 
all, the stigma of Somalia. It wanted the rest o f the Canadian Forces to trust them, just as 
it wanted its allies to recognize its expertise. Its performance on missions in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan had achieved these goals, as well as demonstrating the Army’s relevance to 
the government. Clearly the desire for legitimacy was still evident and for this the Army 
needed to continue to interact with the public. What is key in Advancing with Purpose, 
though, is that all o f this had to be done in such a way as to develop and foster a sense o f 
identity within the Army. The opening line o f Advancing with Purpose illustrates how
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far the Army had come from the sentiments expressed in Canada’s Army. “In every 
modem Western democracy,” the Army wrote, “the armed forces are the ultimate 
guarantor of the state itself.”464 The Army was not simply reflecting the values of 
Canadian society, it was now portrayed as its defender and as such it was felt that the 
“The Arniy needs to be more agile and lethal.”465 Tough talk for Canada.
However, as much as Advancing with Purpose tried to reassert a martial vision for 
the Army, it could not escape fully from its societal tether. Consider how the Army 
expressed its raison d ’etre: “The Army exists first and foremost: to protect vital national 
interests; to contribute to international peace and security; and to promote national unity 
and well-being.”466 While the first two missions reflect traditional military activities, the 
third serves to anchor the Army to Canadian society. As seen in Chapter 5, the concern 
for national unity is also a chief concern of the Canadian government.
As operations in Afghanistan continued, and as the profile of the Canadian Army 
increased at home, the confidence of the institution grew. By the spring of 2004, the 
Army would publish the sequel to Advancing with Purpose, an even more audacious 
expression of its determination to be regarded as an efficient fighting organization. 
Purpose Defined opens, understandably enough, with a clear definition of purpose: “Our 
Army must be prepared to fight and win in the 21st Century land battle.. .Domestically or 
internationally, we cannot fail.”467 The notion of the Army needing to be relevant 
remains, but is not expressed in terms of a connection to social needs. Rather
464 Canada. The Army. Advancing with Purpose: 4.
465 Canada. The Army. Advancing with Purpose: 12.
466 Canada. The Army. Advancing with Purpose: 5.
467 Canda. The Army. Purpose Defined: The Force Employment Concept fo r  the Army. (Ottawa: Queen’s 
Printer, 2004): 1.
172
In order to achieve strategic relevance, the Army must at all times provide the 
nation with decisive land-power.. .It must make a meaningful, timely and 
recognized contribution to Canadians.. .Above all, the Army must be tactically 
decisive.468
Gone are any references to Canadian values; instead, it asserts that Canadians want a 
powerful and effective army, capable of winning on the battlefield.
Over the course of ten years, following on from the disaster of Somalia, the Army 
leadership attempted to establish itself again, to dispel its image as disconnected and 
irrelevant. In doing so, however, they have highlighted the tension which exists between 
the need to ‘fit in’ with the social values of the wider society, while maintaining the 
ability to perform tasks which rely on the ability to generate and manage violence. The 
struggle to balance between the societal and functional imperatives (as discussed in 
Chapter 1) has meant that the Army has tried to be explicit about its relationship with the 
Canadian public, and about its professional capabilities and its desire to be seen as an 
effective fighting force. It is possible to see an evolution in the way that this has been 
handled. The earliest public pronouncement, Canada’s Army, can be interpreted as an 
almost desperate attempt to portray the Army as an institution that understands and 
appreciates the values and norms of Canadian society; this is the Army’s societal 
imperative manifesto. Six years later, confident in the fact that the relationship to the 
public had been reestablished, and following on from successes on the battlefields of 
Kosovo and Afghanistan, Purpose Defined articulates a much tougher message; this is 
the Army’s functional manifesto.
These declarations established a normative foundation for the Army. Together 
they form the strategic narrative that the Army developed over a period of nearly ten
468 Canada. The Army. Purpose D efined: 1.
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years. In relation to civil-military cooperation, however, the philosophical vision of the 
Army is too abstract to provide us with a clear understanding of how the Army 
operationalises these values. The first indications of how coherently this is executed can 
be seen through an examination of Army doctrine, which is the “formal expression of 
military knowledge and thought, that the army accepts as being relevant at a given time, 
which covers the nature of conflict, the preparation of the army for conflict, and the 
method of engaging in conflict to achieve success.”469 According to Christopher Lord, 
“Doctrine ideally combines experience ancient and modem in a balanced and reasoned 
whole, in such a manner as to provide a framework of understanding for all those 
collaborating in a .. .military venture.”470 It should be built on a “moral element”, but in 
reality is “a curious hybrid of analysis and folk wisdom, tradition and careful 
innovation.”471 Doctrine, then, like its normative foundations, contains a dynamism: it 
tries to provide intellectual guidance for the performance of activity in a changing 
environment, while at the same time retaining some degree of continuity with established 
and familiar practices. This tension is played out in Canadian civil-military cooperation 
doctrine, which over a period of over fifteen years, has evolved considerably, although 
not consistently. Sometimes civil-military cooperation is regarded as a supporting 
activity, undertaken as part of peacekeeping operations and on the margins of war; other 
times, it is described as a core activity, vital to the success of every mission.
469 Canada. The Army. Conduct O f Land Operations: Operational Level Doctrine For The Canadian 
Army. (Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, 1998): iv.
470 Christopher Lord, “Intermediate Deployments: The Strategy and Doctrine o f  Peacekeeping-type 
Operations,” Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper 25. (Camberley: Strategic and 
Combat Studies Institute, 1996): 11.
471 Lord 11.
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In some form or other, the Canadian Army has carried out civil-military
cooperation since at least the Second World War.472 Civil-military cooperation as
practice, though, came to the fore in the explosion of peacekeeping operations that
followed the end of the Cold War. Despite conducting civil-military cooperation
operations in the Former Yugoslavia, Africa, the Caribbean, and South East Asia, prior to
1998, the Canadian Forces had no single doctrinal manual dedicated to civil-military
cooperation.473 The publication of a manual entitled Civil-Military Cooperation in
Peace, Emergencies, Crisis, and War was an attempt to codify military thinking on the
topic, but strangely it (and the other doctrinal manuals published that year that contained
references to civil-military cooperation) did not reflect the realities encountered by the
Army over the course of the 1990s.474 The manuals seemed rooted in the teachings of the
Cold War, which in turn reflected the experience of the European theatre during World
War Two. Civil-military cooperation, the doctrine claimed,
may be critical to the achievement of military objectives. On the one hand, 
CIMIC can enhance support to an operation by obtaining supplies, information, 
facilities, services and labour resources with the cooperation of the local 
population. On the other hand, uncoordinated movement of civilians in the 
vicinity of operations, hostile actions by the population, or failure of the 
population to cooperate with friendly forces can significantly disrupt military 
operations 475
472 Stacey Douglas, “Toward a Comprehensive Canadian CIMIC Doctrine: Interagency Cooperation and 
the Influence o f  Allies in the Balkans,” Paper Presented to Conference o f  Defence Associations Institute 
Conference. 12 November 2002.
473 However odd it may be that Canada had no doctrine until 1998, it is worth noting that NATO had no 
formalized civil-military cooperation doctrine until 2000. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. A llied Joint Publication 9 (AJP 9). Civil-military 
Cooperation. (Brussels: SHAPE, 2000).
474 Canada. The Army. Civil-M ilitary Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis, and War. (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1998); Canada. The Conduct o f  Land Operations', Canada. The Army. Land Forces 
Information Operations. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1998).
475 Canada. The Conduct o f  Land Operations, 73.
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Civil-military cooperation as the military use of civilian labour and the
coordination of civilian populations on the battlefield was not what Canadian soldiers had
experienced in places like Croatia, Bosnia, Haiti or Cambodia. Civil-military
cooperation was about the distribution of emergency relief and reconstruction of
accommodation and infrastructure, alone or alongside UN agencies and NGOs, in places
where hundreds of thousands of people had been displaced. For that reason, the Army
found it necessary to provide a more useful guide for civil-military cooperation by
publishing a more informal, but more relevant, pamphlet. The February 1999 edition of
the quarterly Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers was dedicated to the topic of
civil-military cooperation. Its Foreword expresses a far more realistic vision:
In the past.. .the interaction between civilian organizations and the military may 
[have] been largely limited to mitigating the impact of one upon the other, with 
the military having the responsibility and authority to make this happen. [More 
recently] this interaction may include numerous areas of concern, and involve 
several civilian agencies, all requiring constant and detailed consultation. In all 
instances, there is the real and ongoing need for the military to become actively 
involved with civilian organizations as well as the population in general, and for 
this contact to be effectively planned and implemented to facilitate mission
476success.
The pamphlet contained information that was grounded in recent experience, based on 
reports from the field. It included sections on the organization of a civil-military 
cooperation cell within a unit; models for command and control; and a host of factors for 
consideration, such as where to locate civil-military cooperation projects and the legal 
aspect of negotiations. It was useful stuff, practically delivered, but it was a stop-gap 
measure. It provided suggestions for interested parties, but it was not doctrine.
476 Canada. The Army Lessons Learned Centre. “Lessons Learned in Civil-Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC),” Dispatches: Lessons Learned fo r  Soldiers. 5.3 (February) 1999: 1.
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The doctrinal shortcomings of the late 1990s were compounded by the fact that 
the Canadian Army offered no civil-military cooperation training courses. Officers who 
were interested, or who were assigned to ‘G5’ posts,477 were encouraged to take
• • • 4.78 •American, British, NATO, or non-military courses. One such non-military course was 
offered by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. Jointly funded 
by the Departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs, the Centre was run as a 
private, civilian ‘think tank’, with total independence in terms of curriculum 
development. It offered courses to civilians and foreign military officers, mainly from 
former Warsaw Pact or developing countries, as a part of Canada’s Military Training 
Assistance Program. Its version of civil-military cooperation, which was not a derivative 
of any particular military doctrine, became the major source of civil-military knowledge 
in the Canadian Army. Its approach, its definitions, its proscriptions were different from, 
and in some cases contradictory to, Canadian (and Allied) doctrine. This exacerbated the 
problem of weak doctrine in Canada, and had significant effects on operations 479
Regardless of its source (whether from formal doctrinal manuals, or the collected 
learnings from practitioners) or its method of delivery (whether from a military course 
conducted by an allied army, or an arms-length think tank) the thinking about civil- 
military cooperation in Canada was not very sophisticated. Civil-military cooperation 
was a supporting activity, meant to complement ‘real soldiering’. Commanders were 
busy prosecuting campaigns (whether in war or peacekeeping) and civil-military
477 Following the ‘Continental Staff System’ Canadian Army doctrine labeled all formation level staff 
departments with a G (originally indicating ‘general sta ff)  and a number; 5 (and later 9) indicated Civil- 
military Cooperation. The significance o f  this organizational decision w ill be discussed further below.
478 Canada. “Lessons Learned,” 36.
479 Interview with Major P.W. (Peter) Hewitt, Staff Officer responsible for Civil-Military Relations and 
Environmental Health, Canadian Forces Joint Staff, International Operations (J3 International). (Ottawa, 1 
November 2002).
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cooperation allowed them the freedom of action to pursue their objectives. Rebuilding
schools and houses would allow populations to return, perhaps, but that was only a side-
effect of the primary Army mission: providing security by defeating (or at least deterring)
those forces who sought to disturb the peace.
This was the doctrinal basis for civil-military cooperation throughout the Balkan
deployments, including Kosovo in 1999, and it was extant at the beginning of the
Afghanistan missions in 2002. However, doctrine, as it should, changed, because of the
Army’s experience in Afghanistan. Whether the missions there were to be called peace
support, stabilization or counterinsurgency, at a theoretical level at least, the need for
civil-military cooperation to take on more focus became apparent to the Army leadership.
In late 2003, the Army’s Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts published Towards the
Brave New World: Canada’s Army in the 21st Century, an edited volume with
contributions from military and civilian thinkers from Canada, the United States, and
Europe.480 Its preface summed up the problems faced by the Canadian Army:
Advancing ideas for a future Army structure is .. .laden with emotion. After all, 
we are all prisoners of our experience and carry with us the baggage of our 
formative training, assignments, and regimental affiliations. For most of the 
current Army leadership, this translates into the Cold War and the 4 Canadian 
Mechanized Brigade Group [stationed in Germany] experience. However, the 
post-Cold War era.. .shattered that old paradigm.. .Failed states.. .civil wars and 
unrest.. .prompted.. .Canada to undertake peace support operations [that] no 
longer resembled the classic peacekeeping model.. .These operations proved to be 
a dramatic departure from the doctrinal and operational model of the Cold War
480 Canada. Directorate o f  Land Strategic Concepts. Towards the Brave New World: C an ada’s Arm y in the 
21st Century. Bemd Horn and Peter Gizewski, eds. (Kingston, ON: DLSC, 2003).
481 Canada. Directorate o f  Land Strategic Concepts. Towards the Brave N ew World: v.
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The jumble of doctrine, wedged between a view of the past and a vision of the future had 
to change. As the authors of Towards a Brave New World stated baldly, “the status quo 
is untenable.”482
Unlike during the 1990s when most of the senior leadership of the Canadian
Army and the Canadian Forces had been trained for Cold War contingencies and was not
deployed to places like Yugoslavia, the Army leadership at the beginning of the 21st
Century had been company and battalion, brigade and division commanders in Croatia
and Bosnia. Most significantly, the two officers to serve as Chief of Land Staff since
2003 have been commander or deputy commander of the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Their experiences on operations shaped their views
on the role of the Army and the utility of activities such as civil-military cooperation. As
Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, the Chief of Land Staff, announced to the Army
Canada has one of the most flexible, durable, and task-oriented armies in the 
world. We have been this way for decades. We succeed at whatever mission 
we’re given. But the traditional battlefield of the last half of the 20th Century has 
changed. Wars are no longer about massive armies fighting each other over a 
period of several years. The threats that face a stable world come from suicide 
bombers, in the narrow streets of urban areas, or by belligerents that may or may 
not be supported by a recognized state government. Therefore, the Canadian 
Army is in the middle of a period of necessary change. We must modernize our 
long-held ideas of how we train and fight.484
A new idea was introduced to help move the Army away from its past. Beginning 
in early 2005, a key concept that was introduced into formal doctrinal thinking, was that 
of the ‘Three Block War’. As discussed in Chapter 2, the metaphor of the Three Block
482 Canada. Directorate o f  Land Strategic Concepts. Towards the Brave New World: v.
483 For a biography o f  Generals Hillier and Leslie, see
http://www.dnd.ca/dsa/app_bio/engraph/FSeniorOfficerAddressBook_e.asp?mLimit=Gen&SectChoice=l.
484 Canada. The Army. “A Soldier’s Guide to Army Transformation,” 24 July 2006  
[http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/5_4_l.asp; accessed 13 January 2007]
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War was first used by the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. It was an 
attempt to understand and explain the complexity of contemporary military operations, 
which had to focus on several activities at once. It was an attempt to replace a narrow 
focus on any one aspect of a military mission: warfighting and peacekeeping were not 
insulated from each other. Notions such as ‘low intensity’ or ‘high intensity’ no longer 
made any sense in places such as Somalia. Upon return from his tenure as Commander 
of the International Security Assistance Force, his promotion to General, and 
appointment to the position of Chief of Defence Staff, Rick Hillier began using the term
AQC
Three Block War in briefings to other military officers, the government, and the Press .
In one such presentation, he claimed that the “default focus” of the Canadian Forces was
on “conventional operations” against “Hostile Nation Forces” (which he labeled “The
Bear”, in reference to the Soviet Union), while they adopted an “ad hoc approach” to
“asymmetric operations” against “Non-State Actors” (which he labeled “The Snakes”).
Instead, since the main threat to international peace was from “Failed States”, the focus
should be changed to reflect the realities of the “Three Block War”, which he explained
consisted of “warfighting, stability operations, and humanitarian operations”.
Hillier’s use of the Three Block War metaphor resonated with the Army. In a
statement aimed at the entire Army, Leslie wrote
We will immediately recognize that this [The Three Block War] is exactly what 
we’ve been doing on operations.. .You need to be able to conduct a direct action, 
take out terrorists, conduct a cordon and search.. .face down or destroy a militia or 
remove a suicide bomber. But we can also search out the good folks, support
485 According to Leslie, Hillier first used the term in October 2003, when he was Chief o f  Land Staff. See 
Andrew Leslie, “The 2004 Haycock Lecture: Boots on the Ground: Thoughts on the Future o f  the Canadian 
Forces,” Canadian M ilitary Journal. Spring 2005: 23, footnote 44.
486 Rick Hillier, “Setting Our Course: The Way Ahead for the Our Canadian Armed Forces,” Speech to 
Launch the Defence Policy Statement, 19 April 2005.
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them and enable them to achieve stability and to what do they need to do to
• 4 8 7rebuild their lives, their families, their communities and their countries.
The Three Block war provided a framework for understanding contemporary operations, 
and underlined the importance of activities such as civil-military cooperation.
However, the specific doctrine that followed Hillier’s speech continued to portray 
civil-military cooperation as a support function. In the 2006 manual Civil-Military 
Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, civil-military cooperation is defined as 
a “military function that supports the commander’s mission by establishing and 
maintaining coordination and cooperation between the military force and civil actors in
4 8 8  •the commander’s area of operations.” Civil-military cooperation should be carried out 
in order to “enhance a commander’s situational awareness” by gathering information 
from the local population. Furthermore, civil-military cooperation “may contribute to 
force protection by building trust and confidence.”489 The manual did add more detail on 
how to conduct assessments and design relief and reconstruction projects, but envisaged 
civil-military cooperation remaining under the auspices of a separate directorate within a 
commander’s staff.490 Seen in this light, civil-military cooperation would not be a main 
thrust, but simply a side-show. There was no trace of the Three Block War here.
Eleven-months later, though, the latest Canadian Army doctrinal manual 
appeared to correct that.491 Land Operations in the Modern Age broke with existing 
written thinking and instead “drew on living doctrine,” the actual experience of soldiers
487 Canada. The Army. “A Soldier’s Guide to Army Transformation,” 24 July 2006  
[http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lFEnglish/5_4_l.asp; accessed 13 January 2007]
488 Canada. The Arm y. Civil-M ilitary Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. B-GL-355- 
001/FP-001. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2006): 2.
489 Canada. The Army. Civil-M ilitary Cooperation Tactics, 3.
490 Canada. The Army. Civil-M ilitary Cooperation Tactics, 19.
491 Canada. The Army. Land Doctrine in the Modern Age. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2007).
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in places like Afghanistan.492 Land Operations in the Modern Age addresses the kinds of 
missions Hillier described in his Three Block War speech. According to one of its 
drafters, the aim of Army is to “target the environment in counterinsurgencies and peace 
support operations more than we target our adversaries. The objective is to conduct 
activities in order to affect the will and behaviour of the population in order to engender 
support and to isolate the enemy.”493 The Army, according to the doctrine, would 
conduct a number of different activities; some like seizing “key terrain objectives” or 
defeating “land based adversaries” were clearly linked to combat. Others, though, 
reflected a more subtle use of Army resources; the Army would have a “positive 
influence on populations,” “enable other agencies to operate,” and “serve as a symbol of 
political commitment.”494 This doctrine was grounded in the complex situations that 
Canadian soldiers had operating in from the Balkans, to East Timor, to Afghanistan. The 
spectrum of conflict that the Canadian Army would work in stretched from “peaceful 
interaction” all the way to “general war” and would include “peace support”, “counter­
insurgency” and “major combat” operations 495 Activities (the name for the things the 
Army would do while on operations) would take place on two planes: the cognitive and 
the physical. The idea of any activity was to affect the behaviour of an adversary, in 
order to achieve some objective. On the physical plane, the Army would conduct 
physical activities, which would produce effects on an enemy’s capability. On the 
cognitive plane, the Army would conduct influence activities, which would produce
492 Interview with Major General S.A. Beare, Commander Land Force Doctrine and Training System, (by 
by telephone 24 April 2007).
493 Interview with Major D.J. Lambert, Director o f  Army Doctrine 4, Officer o f  the Director General Land 
Capability Development, (by telephone, 7 March 2007).
494 Canada. The Army. Land Doctrine in the M odern Age, Ch 3, p. 4-5.
495 Canada. The Army. Land Doctrine in the Modern Age, Ch 3, p. 11.
182
cognitive effects on an enemy’s will. Civil-military cooperation was now termed an
influence activity.496
As both these planes (the cognitive and the physical) were equally important to
achieving success, the goal was to address them comprehensively. Moreover, the planes
could be mutually reinforcing: affecting an opponent’s capability could affect his will,
and vice versa.497 Comprehensiveness meant realizing that
The need to influence a target audience may be key to the long-term success of a 
mission. For example, key to success in a counter-insurgency campaign is the 
need to separate the insurgents from physical and moral support of the populace 
and gain and maintain the support of the populace for the campaign.
Commanders at the lowest levels must be made to understand the importance of 
such influence activities and the effects, positive and negative, that may be gained 
from them.498
This had a major impact on the way in which civil-military cooperation was to be 
understood:
CIMIC [Civil-military cooperation] has moved from supporting operations to 
being operations...CIMIC and the related activities (reconstruction, governance 
development, etc.) are considered influence activities because of their ability to 
inform, demonstrate, influence, and persuade.. .CIMIC activities therefore need to 
be coordinated with the overall operational plan, in terms of impacts upon civil 
audiences and their leaders in order to ensure that activities work to support 
overall objectives.499
Civil-military cooperation would no longer be a part of a subsidiary general staff
department (G5 or G9), but rather move to the main department responsible for
implementing a commander’s operational plan (G3).500
Indeed, civil-military cooperation was no longer conceived as a supporting
activity, but rather a key way in which a commander could achieve an objective, a kind of
496 Canada. The Army.
497 Canada. The Army.
498 Canada. The Army.
499 Canada. The Army.
500 Interview, Maj. D.J.
Land D octrine in the 
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Land Doctrine in the 
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Modern Age, Ch 5, p. 9. 
M odern Age, Ch 5, p. 5. 
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“maneouvre on the cognitive plane” of warfare.501 Doctrinally this evolution mirrored 
the transition that had occurred with the Army’s philosophy: a move from ad hoc 
peacekeeping to determined warfighting. But whether we speak of vision or doctrine, we 
are speaking of words, of ideas, of how the Army would wish things to be. While this is 
important, it is vital to follow Iver Neumann’s advice and turn to an examination of 
practice. If this is what the Army thought, what did the Army actually do?
How did the Army turn understanding into practice?
While the Army seems to have eventually constructed a doctrinal context for 
civil-military cooperation, its record of civil-military cooperation as a practice seems to 
be less coherent. Examining operations from Kosovo (1999), Bosnia (2002-2003) and 
Afghanistan (2002-2007) it is possible to see that civil-military cooperation is a varied 
activity, whose ultimate shape depends, to a large degree, on the individual understanding 
of those carrying it out, rather than on a unified or common understanding across and 
throughout the institution. These appear to not evolve over time, with advances and 
reverses in approach apparent across missions.
Such a lack of common understanding is perhaps understandable given that very 
few of those involved in conducting civil-military cooperation appear to have consulted 
Canadian doctrine. In Kosovo, the officer responsible for civil-military cooperation did 
not consult any doctrinal manual. Given the fact that the unit was given only six weeks 
to mount the operation, there “were too many other things to prepare for, like getting the
501 Canada. The Army. Land Doctrine in the Modern Age, Ch 5, p. 9.
502 Iver Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case o f  Diplomacy,” Millennium: 
Journal o f  International Studies. 31.3 (2002).
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soldiers ready for their battle tasks.”503 This meant that over the course of the mission,
where over $750 million was spent on civil-military cooperation, the officer felt as if he
were “flying by the seat of [his] pants.”504
Others read the Canadian doctrine but found it out of touch with the realities that
they faced on the ground. Speaking of his time in Afghanistan in 2005-2006, the
Operations Officer of the Provincial Reconstruction Team, looked elsewhere for ideas on
civil-military cooperation:
At the time of the operation, I had not read CIMIC doctrine in detail. Instead, I 
skimmed what was available, and continued my reading on campaigns such as 
[British operations in] Dhofar, Malaya, and previous Soviet operations in 
Afghanistan. The small amount of doctrine that I did read was not particularly 
helpful, as we did not have concrete guidance as to what National wished us to 
accomplish in terms of CIMIC.. .We did not fall in on a coherent plan.505
This, of course, is compounded by the fact that no training existed on the doctrinal
foundations of civil-military cooperation; any such training provided came from other
organizations. In Bosnia in 2002, an officer charged with coordinating civil-military
cooperation activities within the Battle Group headquarters stated, “for us, there was no
real doctrine. Our SOPs came to us from the US and other places, like PPC [Pearson
Peacekeeping Centre].”506
Exacerbating the individual focus of civil-military cooperation was a lack of
relevant guidance or direction from superior headquarters, namely either Army or the CF,
503 Interview with Major D.E. Delaney, Officer Commanding Combat Support Company, First Battalion, 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, responsible for Civil-Military Cooperation on Operation 
Kinetic, Kosovo July-December 1999 (Kingston, Ontario, 23 October 2002).
504 Interview, Delaney.
505 Response to questionnaire from Major G. Zilkalns, Operations Officer, Canadian Provincial 
Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, Afghanistan July 2005-February 2006 (by email, 5 August 2007).
506 Interview with Captain G. Longhurst, G5 Operations Staff Officer, Infantry Battle Group on Operation 
Palladium, Bosnia September 2002-March 2003 (Camp Maple Leaf, Zgon, Bosnia, 28 December 2002).
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or anywhere else.507 This lack of direction meant that individual commanders were left 
to conduct a mission analysis on their own, divining their own priorities and emphases.
As such, some had no clear idea of where or how civil-military cooperation fit into their 
operations. The Commanding Officer in Bosnia, when I called to introduce myself and 
arrange to meet him on operations in order to conduct research, said, “I am glad you 
called. I am just in the middle of trying to write my concept of operations for the Battle
CAO
Group. I have been given a CIMIC cell: I just don’t know what it’s for.” The first
Commanding Officer in Kosovo, regarded civil-military cooperation as a “dangerous 
distraction,” a form of “mission creep” that would lead his unit to “over extend and 
become so enmeshed in CIMIC that they would lose sight of the real mission, which was 
the provision of security.” Besides, since the unit was only going to be in the country for 
a short time, “any CIMIC effect would be transitory and non-self-sustaining.” He had to 
be careful, he felt, not to “go ahead building things and providing services that are 
unsustainable, because it will raise the population’s expectations.”509 His successor 
expressed his confusion even more succinctly, “Our focus was initially on warfighting, 
but there was no warfighting to be done. So, we went on to the next thing to be done: 
helping people.”510
There was a cascade effect in this regard, where each level, in the absence of clear 
doctrine and direction was ‘free’ to interpret what civil-military cooperation meant 
according to their own experience. In Kosovo, Delaney relied on his experience as a staff
507 Interview with Delaney.
508 Interview with Lieutenant C.R. King, Commanding Officer, Infantry Battle Group on Operation 
Palladium, September 2002-March 2003 (by telephone 17 August 2002).
509 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel S. A. Bryan, Commanding Officer, Infantry Battle Group on 
Operation Kinetic, K osovo July-September 1999 (Ottawa, Ontario, 31 October 2002).
510 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel S.B. Brennan, Commanding Officer, Infantry Battle Group on 
Operation Kinetic, K osovo October-December 1999 (Kingston, Ontario, 29 October 2002).
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officer in a divisional headquarters six years earlier where, in preparation for a mission to
evacuate foreign nationals from Haiti, some standard operating procedures (SOPs) had
been hastily prepared.511 The fact that these SOPs focused more on preventing refugees
from interfering with military operations, rather than on relief and reconstruction, may
have contributed to the confusion felt by other members of the mission. The officer
appointed as the ‘project manager’ (who was reassigned one month into the mission from
the Reconnaissance Platoon) felt that civil-military cooperation on the operation was an
“ad hoc, word of mouth affair”.512
Not every commander was confused. In some cases, a commander’s mission
analysis did reveal the importance of civil-military cooperation. The Commanding
Officer in Bosnia in 2000 conducted “a detailed mission analysis,” which led him to
understood the role of civil-military cooperation as that of a
combat multiplier, which enabled the entire mission. It was a tool to influence the 
population. Good people got aid, bad people did not. We were not neutral, had to 
get involved in the local political scene. We used CIMIC as a way in. Our motto 
was, ‘help until it hurts.’ And we found that the bad people weren’t really in need 
of help anyway. The way we figured it was, if war breaks out, then we have 
failed in our mission, so we need to do whatever we can to prevent war. If we can
C 1 *3
do that, we win.
Similarly, the Commanding Officer of the first Canadian unit in Afghanistan in 2002 
recognized that
We were not going to be doing humanitarian assistance. We were going to be 
nation-building. We couldn’t accept the idea of a phased approach, with combat 
first, then peacekeeping. It all had to happen at the same time, on different lines
511 Interview with Delaney.
512 Interview with Captain O.A.J. Savage, CIMIC Project Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Kinetic, 
Kosovo August-December 1999 (Kingston, Ontario, 29 October 2002).
513 Interview with Major S. Wyatt, Senior Liaison Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Palladium, 
Bosnia February to September 2000 (Kingston, Ontario, 30 October 2002.)
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[of operation] but working together. CIMIC was part of what we called ‘conflict 
termination’. It was how we supported everything else that we were doing.514
The Canadian general in charge of Multinational Brigade Northwest in Bosnia 
went a step further. He did not see a separation between civil-military cooperation and 
‘other’ operations. In his words, “I was the senior CIMIC officer. All operations are 
CIMIC in the modem world. We need civil-military engagement to achieve our 
mission.”515
Some commanders may have started a mission with very little idea about civil- 
military cooperation, but once they realized the nature of operations, they developed a 
clearer idea of how civil-military cooperation would help them achieve their mission. 
Indeed the commander who did not even know what he had a civil-military cooperation 
cell for went on to develop a sophisticated and far-reaching model of civil-military 
cooperation as economic development. In a letter seeking increased funding for 
Community Improvement Projects he stated that: “Without stimulation to the local 
economy and efforts to build greater economic capacity, unemployment and poverty will
c I /:
remain high providing fertile ground for future social action and potential conflict.”
It is interesting to note the variety of approaches devised by commanders. Owing 
to the lack of clear doctrinal or command guidance, they were largely left to improvise 
and ‘figure it out’ for themselves. Some saw their role as that of facilitating relief. They 
saw that there should be a clear division of labour between what relief agencies did and
514 Interview with Colonel P. Stogran, Commanding Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Apollo, 
Kandahar, Afghanistan February-August 2002 (Ottawa, Ontario, 29 May 2003).
515 Interview with Beare.
516 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel C.R. King (Commanding Officer Infantry Battle Group, Operation 
Palladium, Bosnia September 2002-March 2003) to Commander, Canadian Task Force Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, (Reference Number 3375-20-4 CO) dated 8 December 2002: 1-2.
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what the military did. The military might provide information to aid providers, or ensure 
coherent coverage, or marry up needs with resources. This was the case in Kosovo, 
where the civil-military cooperation thrust was to find donors with money (such as aid 
agencies like CIDA or DFID) and NGOs who needed to deliver services (such as CARE 
or the Albanian organization Mother Theresa) and have them build shelters in areas 
where the Battle Group was operating. Using this formula, the Battle Group in Kosovo 
was able to coordinate the delivery and construction of over 5000 shelter kits, with a 
range of partners, from UNHCR, to NGOs from Albania, Canada, Italy, Japan, Sweden,
C I O
the United Kingdom and the United States. The emphasis was on ensuring an efficient 
coverage of the Canadian unit’s area of operation; without coordination there would have 
been redundancy or gaps in shelter distribution. When the military got involved with 
actual projects at all it was as a last resort, often in order to address those projects that no 
one wanted to take on. For instance, in the town where the Battle Group was located a 
large community centre, which also served as a high school, that was extensively 
damaged. It required more than simple carpentry to be fixed. It required major repairs, 
such as re-roofing and the provision of windows and a new furnace. No single donor or 
NGO could complete the project. The Battle Group took on the role of project 
coordinator, hired a local engineer, divided the work into smaller projects, obtained 
money ($150,000) and found organizations willing to do the work.519 As the 
Commanding Officer later said, it was worthwhile trying to help the NGOs do their work
517 Interviews with Delaney, Savage.
518 Memorandum from Major D.E. Delaney (Officer Commanding Combat Support Company, Responsible 
for Civil-Military Cooperation, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Kinetic, Kosovo, July-December 1999) to 
Commanding Officer (Reference Number 3350-62) dated 9 December 1999.
519 Memorandum from Delaney, Annex D.
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because, “We were going to feel the effect of their failures, in terms of an unhappy
C^A
population, so we might as well share in their successes.”
The idea of a division of labour was not only espoused by the Canadians in 
Kosovo. One non-commissioned officer involved with civil-military cooperation in 
Bosnia in 2002 described his role as “pimping. NGOs have money, we give them
C 'J  1
projects to do.” Indeed the staff officer overseeing all civil-military cooperation from 
Ottawa felt that such a separation was vital, lest anyone think that they were “getting in 
bed with an NGO or municipal government...We’re good at soldiering, NGOs are good at 
the humanitarian thing: let’s find ways of complementing each other.”
What is missing from this, though, is any indication of an overarching objective. 
Why should militaries, particularly the Canadian Army, be involved with civil-military 
cooperation in the first place, regardless of the modalities of how they comport 
themselves?
Civil-military cooperation as a ‘feel good’ and a ‘do good’ activity
Not surprisingly, many, especially those soldiers personally involved with civil- 
military cooperation believe that the reason the Canadians bothered was “part of a larger 
goal of helping others.” Reconstruction, in particular, was a clear expression of 
Canada’s, and by extension, the international community’s, “desire and ability to help in 
the healing process and bridge the ethnic divide.”524 Aid represented more than charity 
or material improvement, it was a form of “non-instrumental communication” with the
520 Interview, Bryan.
521 Interview with Sergeant G. Powell, Company CIMIC Sergeant, Infantry Battle Group, Operation 
Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 27 December 2002).
522 Interview with Hewitt.
523 Interview with Brennan.
524 Interview with Savage.
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local population. The fact military personnel carried out that civil-military
cooperation, but in a non-aggressive manner, “without weapons in plain sight” helped
restore the community’s “sense of dignity and self-worth, while at the same time
humanizing the military image.” In Bosnia, one civil-military cooperation operative
believed that she was not “really peacekeeping here. It’s more about making the locals
feel better about themselves.”527 Even staff officers at headquarters felt some degree of
moral imperative to lend a hand. According to one:
I mean, what happens to the people while we’re fighting? They are the collateral 
damage. And, when you look at it, even before we got involved in the fighting, 
the people were being mistreated by their own leaders. Somebody has to do 
something to sort the people out.528
For some commanders, there was little intrinsic value in conducting civil-military 
cooperation activities, but there were collateral benefits. One of the most basic of these 
was that rebuilding schools or distributing humanitarian relief supplies was, according to
C ' J Q
the civil-military cooperation officer in Kosovo, “good for the boys.” In other words, 
it was a morale boost for the soldiers. “It makes the troops feel good, a part of something 
larger than just patrols or guarding the gate [to the camp].”530 “It provides soldiers with a 
sense of accomplishment, a sense that they have made a difference.” Even units that 
had no formal association with civilians developed ways of “getting involved.” A field 
engineer troop in Bosnia used their own time and money to rebuild a school for thirty
525 Interview with Savage.
526 Interview with Savage.
527 Interview with Lieutenant Heather Burke, Company CIMIC Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation 
Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 29 December 2002).
528 Interview with Hewitt.
529 Interview with Delaney.
530 Interview with Brennan.
531 Interview with Bryan.
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children in the town of Drvar. In Kosovo, several military policemen and interpreters, 
formally tasked with guarding the helicopter airfield, organized and led a Cub Scout
• f '1 '3
troop in Glogovac. Even those commanders who had developed some understanding 
of the mission specific function of civil-military cooperation identified troop morale as a 
“good reason to continue” even when faced with funding shortages.534 One civil-military 
cooperation specialist was rather blunt in his assessment of why Canadian soldiers were 
involved in civil-cooperation in the first place: “We are happy to sell a little hope, but
CTC
basically, we are salving our own consciences.”
Unfortunately, though, civil-military cooperation as a ‘feel good’ exercise can 
lead to problems, as was the case in both Bosnia and Afghanistan. In Bosnia, soldiers 
discovered an elderly Muslim woman living in an unheated goat pen near to their camp. 
Several groups (such as military police and mechanics) who passed by her dwelling came 
to ‘adopt’ her, providing her with food and clothing (often sent from Canada for this 
purpose). Because she was a nearby and symbolic victim, she became a “pet” of the unit, 
receiving much more aid than others in similar situations. This became a problem for the 
civil-military cooperation team, as they were left the difficult task of explaining her status 
to local leaders and, eventually, of requesting the commanding officer to halt further 
‘donations’ to her.536 In Afghanistan, the civil-military cooperation team found 
themselves having to arrange for “photo opportunities” so that Canadian soldiers could 
deliver teddy bears from home to local children. This perplexed community leaders and
532 Interview with Captain Chris Atkin, CIMIC Project Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation 
Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 27 December 2002).
533 Personal observation, Glogovac, Kosovo, August-December 1999.
534 Letter from King, 2.
535 Interview with Powell.
536 Interview with Powell.
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created confusion as to the real purpose and value of more formal civil-military 
cooperation projects.537
Civil-military Cooperation as ‘Intelligence Gathering’
Commanders also saw civil-military cooperation as a means of gathering 
information, with the short-term benefit of providing force protection to their own troops. 
Of course, since civil-military cooperation usually entails a degree of interacting with the 
population, it is easy to regard those soldiers involved in it as “the eyes and ears of the
C'JO
commander.” As a civil-military cooperation officer explains:
A [commander] gathers his knowledge / power by gaining information about the 
environment he is operating in. Guidance is issued for the collection of 
information in the form of a .. .matrix. CIMIC operates in a broad spectrum 
gathering information across the width and depth of the.. .matrix.. .Command 
gathers much of its information through various sources that interact with a 
variety of organizations including local citizens, government, local as well as 
international NGOs and the [international community]. Much of the valuable 
information gathered is done through established relationships based on trust, 
respect and reciprocity. CIMIC plays a significant role in the information 
gathering process as much of the key information is generated from CIMIC 
members who create those valuable relationships with people. After information 
is processed.. .it then becomes intelligence, which can be used in the decision 
making process by command.
Regardless of the process by which it is generated, the reasoning behind using 
civil-military cooperation as a source of intelligence goes beyond mere presence: it is 
viewed as a means of gaining support for the mission. If building schools and feeding 
some of the hungry can reduce the amount of rock throwing, mine laying and ambushes 
targeted at military forces, then that in itself is an achievement. As one Canadian 
commander in Bosnia put it, “CIMIC offered an opportunity to enhance force protection
537 Interview with Beaubier.
538 Interview with Hewitt. This sentiment is echoed by a commander in Kosovo, who called those charged 
with civil-military cooperation as “an excellent set o f  sensors.” Interview with Bryan.
539 Graham Longhurst, “Civil Military Co-Operation -  The Inukshuk,” The Bulletin. 10.1 (January) 
(Kingston: The Army Lessons Learned Centre, 2004): 4.
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by demonstrating to the local population that we were there to support them.”540 Civil-
military cooperation, then, is the means by which the military force engages with the
local population in order to ‘tame’ or ‘soothe’ them. Humanitarian relief (in the form of
emergency food and clothing) and small development projects (such as basic
infrastructure reconstruction) are used to this end. In short, the logic behind ‘civil-
military cooperation qua force protection’ is that people will not bite the hands that feed
them. As stated in the formal orders regarding the distribution on humanitarian
assistance in Afghanistan in 2002
The overarching purpose [of civil-military cooperation] is to improve the quality 
of life for persons in the immediate vicinity of [the Canadian Army’s location]. 
This will have the effect of also giving a favourable image of the Coalition, 
particularly Canadian Forces personnel, and of reinforcing the security of 
Coalition of personnel and assets.541
In a subsequent mission to Afghanistan, this time in Kabul, the civil-military cooperation
mission was even clearer: “to enhance force protection to Canadian and [International
Security Assistance Force] personnel and provide support to the local population.”542
In this regard, the relationship between civil-military cooperation and intelligence
is quite straightforward. The primary CIMIC function is to placate the locals, and the
intelligence aspect of this effort is twofold. First, information may be traded for
assistance. Aid becomes conditional on ‘good behaviour’, a component of which is seen
as a reliable flow of information about possible threats.543 Second, the process of moving
amongst the population, handing out food or supervising reconstruction projects, allows
540 Interview with Wyatt.
541 Third Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group Headquarters (3PPCLI BG 
HQ), “Fragmentary Operations Order 09 -  Humanitarian Assistance Plan,” 7 March 2002: p. 2, para 
3a(l)(a).
542 Briefing to Author, Task Force Civil-Military Cooperation Cell, Operation Athena, Kabul, Afghanistan, 
August 2004-January 2005 (Camp Julien, Kabul, Afghanistan, 6 December 2004).
543 3PPLCI BG HQ, Fragmentary Operations Order 09, p. 2, para 3a(l)(b)ii. This practice was also 
acknowledged by officers in Kosovo (Interview with Delaney) and Bosnia (Interview with Wyatt).
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for opportunities for contact with locals, both the ‘average person’ and the existing social
and political leadership. As guidance to Canadian troops in Afghanistan makes clear,
civil-military cooperation activities were tactical, not altruistic, in nature:
Any HA [humanitarian aid] distributed should be targeted and deliberate. No aid 
should be given without a deliberate intent of gaining the support of the local 
populace, and therefore increasing our force protection and engendering a strong 
flow of HUMINT (human intelligence).544
An article written for the families of soldiers serving in Afghanistan at this time expands
on this point:
Our patrols involve Canadian soldiers meeting and interacting with the local 
population in as friendly and non-threatening a way as possible. We voice our 
concerns (through interpreters), and they voice theirs. We want to preserve the 
security of the airfield, and we can best do that by that by developing a close 
relationship with our neighbours in the airfield vicinity... It’s in everybody’s best 
interests to get Afghanistan back on its feet. In the short-term, we want to keep 
villagers on our side, so that they can help us detect A1 Qaeda and Taliban 
elements that are still active in Kandahar province. Last week, local farmers 
pointed out a landmine that had been laid on a road in our sector. A few days ago, 
a local boy showed us to three rockets that had been fired at but missed the 
airfield.54
Civil-military cooperation, it seems, is a way of buying the villages’ loyalty. This is the 
often cliched ‘hearts and minds’ rationale for performing civil-military cooperation, 
expressed by one sergeant as “force protection through friendship.”546
The advantages from civil-military cooperation, from this perspective, are 
indispensable in providing early warning to deployed troops through local contacts. By 
2000, this kind of low-level civil-military cooperation related intelligence was credited as 
providing 60-70% of all information received at the battalion level within Canadian
544 3PPLCI BG HQ, Fragmentary Operations Order 09, p. 2, para 3a(l)(b)i.
545 Alexander Watson, “PIC Patrol article,” Mimeo in possession o f  author.
546 Interview with Sergeant T. Beaubier, Task Force Civil-Military Cooperation Liaison NCO, Operation 
Athena, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 2004-January 2005 (Camp Julien, Kabul, Afghanistan, 14 December 
2004).
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elements of NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR)547. In 2002, the intelligence collecting 
non-commissioned officer assigned to civil-military cooperation project patrols was
C A O
considered to be “the best intelligence] source in the [American-led] brigade.”
However, there are suggestions that, in Afghanistan at least, the importance of CIMIC- 
related intelligence might extend beyond the unit level: one analyst credits intelligence 
arising from civil-military cooperation as providing evidence of “active disinformation by 
[a foreign] intelligence [agency] about Canadian CIMIC efforts.”549
Despite these suggestions, there are limitations with the use of—and undue 
reliance on— civil-military cooperation as a source of intelligence. Civil-military 
cooperation are often untrained in intelligence gathering and can lack the necessary 
‘situational awareness’ of wider intelligence issues to be of more than basic assistance.550 
Indeed, in Bosnia, despite rhetoric from commanders to the contrary, one intelligence 
officer confided that he relied on CIMIC personnel only for “passive collection, which 
amounts to a series of requests to ‘report if observed’. I do not task them to pump people 
for information. I don’t expect a lot from them, but they do provide raw data which 
sometimes acts as a trigger for further investigation.”551 This ‘collateral’ approach to 
intelligence gathering is borne out by the fact that personnel involved with civil-military 
cooperation in Kosovo, and other missions in Bosnia and Afghanistan, who claim that
547 Interview, Wyatt. Commanders from missions in K osovo (1999) and Bosnia (2002) also credit civil- 
military cooperation with providing critical intelligence, although they do not assign a numerical estimate 
to its value. Interview with Brennan; Interview with Bryan; Interview with Longhurst.
548Interview, Captain Alexander Watson, Civil-Miltiary Cooperation Officer, Infantry Battle Group, 
Operation Apollo, Kandahar, Afghanistan, February-August 2002 (St-Jean sur Richelieu, Quebec, 10 
November 2004).
549 Interview, Confidential Source, Canadian Intelligence Officer, Ottawa, 23 March 2005.
550 Interview with Captain James Godefroy, Unit Intelligence Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation 
Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 28 December 2002).
551 Interview with Godefroy.
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they were “never tasked with intelligence collection.” In one case, the formal guidance 
to the civil-military cooperation team was “to work towards filling the commander’s PIRs 
[primary information requirements], but the reality was, they were only finalized six 
weeks after we started operations.”553
Gauging the success of the relationship between civil-military cooperation and 
intelligence can be extremely difficult. The necessary metrics for determining ‘lives 
saved due to tips from locals directly attributable to humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction efforts’ are simply impossible to design, let alone observe. As a Canadian 
commander of a multinational brigade remarks, “We are looking for signs that we are 
succeeding in rebuilding this country. Unfortunately, we are trying to measure things 
with a stopwatch when, in fact, we should be using a calendar.”554 In fact, relying on 
civil-military cooperation as a shield can be misleading: at the beginning of the Falujah 
uprising in the spring of 2004, a CNN reporter asked a bewildered US Army captain why 
the Iraqis were shooting at his company. He responded by saying that he had no idea; he 
and his men had recently completed over one hundred community improvement projects 
and the Iraqis should not have been reacting the way they were.555 Nonetheless, if 
Western militaries are able to help reduce casualties in their forces, even if only 
hypothetically, the price of a few humanitarian or development projects will not be seen 
as a burden. One life saved because of a ‘bomb not planted’ will be seen as worthwhile.
552 Interview with Savage; Interview with Delaney; and Interview with Captain D. Myles, Task Force Civil- 
military Cooperation Officer, Operation Athena, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 2004-January 2005 (Camp 
Julien, Kabul, Afghanistan, 14 December 2004).
553 Interview with Longhurst.
554 Interview with Beare.
555 CNN, World News Today, 0703 (Central Mountain Time), 8 April 2004.
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Civil-military cooperation as ‘Information Operations’
There were signs, though, that civil-military cooperation does serve a higher 
military purpose, beyond mere force protection. Many officers regarded civil-military 
cooperation as a force multiplier, something that allowed the commander to focus on his 
main mission.556 By increasing the credibility of the military forces in a given theatre of 
operations, civil-military cooperation was an activity that could be exploited to provide 
for better freedom of action. According to one civil-military cooperation operative,
c co
“We are here to achieve the commanding officer’s intent.” The only difficulty with 
viewing civil-military cooperation in this way is that the terms ‘force multiplier’ and 
‘commander officer’s intent’ are so fungible as to be meaningless. In essence, given the 
wide variations in understanding of missions, coupled with the variations in the 
understandings of civil-military cooperation itself, civil-military cooperation becomes ‘all 
things to all people’ and as a result, retains no intrinsic meaning. As one officer summed 
it up, “The military’s mission in Bosnia is to create a safe and secure environment.
CIMIC works with a network of NGOs and locals to do just that. Therefore, CIMIC 
supports the overall mission.”559 Civil-military cooperation is seen as an ancillary 
function, supporting something, somehow.
556 Interview with Lieutenant J. Watt, Company CIMIC Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation 
Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 27 December 2002); Interview with 
Master Warrant Officer J. Fink, Company CIMIC Warrant Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation 
Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 27 December 2002); Interview with Major 
Michel Boire, J5 Campaign Planner, NATO LANDCENT/KFOR HQ, June-November 1999 (Kingston, 
Ontario, 23 October 2002); Interview with Hewitt.
557 Interview with Delaney; Interview with Bryan; Interview with Wyatt.
558 Interview with Fink.
559 Interview with Watt.
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However, there were more focused understandings of civil-military cooperation, 
beyond the view of it as an activity only undertaken to improve the lives of the local 
population, or as a simple source of information about threats to the peacekeeping force. 
As a component of a larger Information Operations campaign, CIMIC helps to gather 
information that a commander will need in order to make decisions. Are the locals 
content? What are their concerns? What needs to be done? The answers to these kinds 
of questions allow commanders to ‘fine tune’ their activities, changing emphasis from, 
say, deterring aggression from military elements, to addressing intimidation from 
organised criminal groups or reducing corruption and political thuggery. As a 
commander of Canadian troops put it: “Civil military interface can provide useful 
intelligence [which] allows you to see the direction of the conflict, to figure out what the 
drivers are. The more you know, the more influence you have, the better you can push 
the right levers. The value of CIMIC is getting the real idea as to who’s who.”560 
In Bosnia in 2002, after an initial period of confusion, a very sophisticated 
arrangement was developed to select, implement and exploit civil-military cooperation. 
Lacking any specific doctrinal framework, the unit adopted a targeting approach; that is, 
it viewed a civil-military cooperation activity in the same way as any other military 
weapon: an instrument for creating an effect. In this way, they created a targeting board, 
with representatives from the operations, psychological operations, intelligence, public 
affairs, and civil-military cooperation teams. Each civil-military cooperation activity 
would be designed in such a way as to tie into other activities and ‘target’ specific groups 
of people, whether it was the local population or the community leaders. Each target 
group might be given a different message, with a view to producing a different effect.
560 Interview with Bryan.
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Not only were the desired effects enumerated, so where ways by which the unit could 
measure the level of effectiveness of any given activity. When a particular civil-military 
cooperation activity was carried out, all actions would be coordinated to make the most 
out of the occasion.561 One such event provides a clear illustration of the principle. After 
many months of fundraising, coordination, and construction, a multi-ethnic community 
centre was rebuilt in the Bos Petrovac area of northwestern Bosnia. An official opening 
was planned for 10 January 2003. Psychological Operations staffs would place 
announcements in the local press and on the NATO-funded current affairs radio 
programs, as well as distributing leaflets and flyers. Public Affairs staffs would circulate 
press releases and ensure press coverage of the event itself. Intelligence operatives would 
seek to understand the existing social and political networks in the communities by 
watching who attended the opening. The range of effects that were to be achieved 
spanned the spectrum of possibilities devised by the Canadians, modified from American 
information operations doctrine:
Inform Provide information/counter misinformation
Influence Change perceptions and attitudes
Warn Provide notice of intent
Co-opt Gain cooperation
Disrupt To temporarily interrupt the flow of information
Isolate Minimise the power or influence of someone
Encourage Inspire to act in a particular manner.562
In the press release produced for the event, the unit closed with this simple message:
While the Canadian Battle Group’s primary focus in to maintain a safe and secure 
environment, SFOR supports the international community in helping Bosnians
561 Interview with Captain K. Barry, Information Operations Officer, Infantry Battle Group Operation 
Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 6 December 2003).
562 Information Operations Targeting and Tasking Matrix to Support Bos Petrovac Community Centre 
Opening— 10 January 2003. Dated 5 January 2003. NATO/SFOR Confidential. Declassified 6 January 
2003.
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rebuild their nation, through initiative such as the reconstruction of the Bos 
Petrovac Social Welfare Centre.563
Civil-military cooperation, clearly, was more than just ‘helping people’. It was seen as a 
way of altering behaviour.
The process in Afghanistan in 2002 was not dissimilar. Rather than conducting 
CIMIC projects in their own right, other elements were combined to achieve a synergistic 
effect. So-called “PIC Patrols” were formed, whereby elements of psychological 
operations, intelligence, and CIMIC were integrated into single tactical groups. These 
groups would travel through villages, stopping to discuss with locals topics such as the 
arrival or departure of young men in the area, seeking any knowledge of upcoming para­
military or terrorist activity, or the pre-occupation identity and role of key actors in the 
community. Often these discussions were predicated on, or revolved around, civil- 
military cooperation projects (either those completed, underway, or required in the 
future). Patrols would visit wells or schools that had been completed in a village, and use 
this opportunity to gather, and disseminate, more information.
There were those who preferred to use civil-military bluntly, but still with the aim 
of influencing behaviour. In Bosnia, one commander saw “[civil-military cooperation] as 
a carrot that can be withdrawn.. .If we don’t get cooperation, perhaps we should stop our 
projects in this area.”564 Others understood civil-military cooperation as an activity 
contributing to a longer-term change in behaviour. In Afghanistan in 2005
civil-military cooperation would enable us to buy goodwill, and show the 
populace that there were immediate, tangible benefits to themselves in exchange
563 “Press Release for Bos Petrovac Social Welfare Centre,” Sub Lieutenant Petra Smith, Public Affairs 
Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia,
5 January 2003).
564 Interview with Major S. Carr, Officer Commanding, ‘C ’ Company, Infantry Battle Group, Operation 
Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 30 December 2002).
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for supporting the legitimate government. This would eventually improve the
local security situation, and would create a body politic more in line with Western
ideas than what was then in place, which was essentially tribal feudalism.565
The CIMIC-intelligence relationship goes well beyond first-order force protection 
matters. Force protection, while important, is essentially a ‘wait and see’ defensive 
tactic; aid is distributed and development assisted in the hopes that information can be 
acquired. There is often a more active component to civil-military cooperation, one that 
aims to not only protect soldiers but also change the behaviour of the local population.
For example, in Bosnia, the Canadian commander stated that by 2002, at least, “CIMIC 
[was] involved in both changing the behaviour of locals and influencing that behaviour 
(carrot and stick).” Accordingly, the desired results of CIMIC “community 
improvement projects” were many:
a. Reward reform minded leaders/communities;
b. Deter obstructionism;
c. Build public confidence and long-term hope;
d. Increase civic awareness and identity;
e. Build inter-ethnic cooperation; and
f. Improve community relations with SFOR.566
CIMIC is a two-way conduit for information, and therefore, a means to achieving 
information superiority: messages can be sent out to the population in the course of 
CIMIC activities and the effect of those messages can be monitored with the collection of 
intelligence. More than that though, CIMIC is not just seen as a shield, but as a lever for 
accomplishing the wider mission.
565 Questionnaire response from Zilkalns.
566 Presentation prepared by Lieutenant Colonel C.R. King, Commanding Officer, Infantry Battle Group 
Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 6 December 2003).
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Conclusion
The Canadian Army was deeply shaken by the events of Somalia in the early 
1990s and struggled to articulate a balanced account of its place within Canadian society. 
At first, in Huntington’s terms, it emphasized its societal imperative (to fit in) at the 
expense of its functional imperative (to fight wars). Conceptual tensions existed between 
an image of the Canadian Army as a peacekeeping force and an image of the Canadian 
Army as a Cold War force. Both these images, though, were at odds with the reality of 
the missions that the Army found itself deploying on, in places like Croatia, Kosovo, and 
East Timor.
However, a string of successful and high profile operations, beginning with
Kosovo, demonstrated that the Army could be relevant and effective. Doctrinally, the
Canadian Army gained confidence and began to cast activities such as civil-military
cooperation as intrinsically linked to warfighting, and not merely as support functions.
The aim of not only civil-military cooperation, but of all military operations, then is
similar: “in the pursuit of an overall objective, a commander must do what it takes to deal
with actors and factors that get in the way.”567 From one point of view, the doctrine of
“manoeuvring on the cognitive plane”568, written in 2007, is an attempt to capture that
concept, one that has been understood and practiced, in varying degrees, by the Canadian
army since 1999. From another perspective, though, the evolution has been patchy and
sporadic. Even as late as 2005, an officer figured that
The reason we do CIMIC operations is that we have blundered our way into 
them.. .Essentially, we began with some very low-level “feel good” projects in 
Yugoslavia...and as our allies began emphasizing CIMIC we decided to pretend
567 Interview with Beare.
568 Canada. The Conduct o f  Land Operations, 9.
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to play. In the standard CF manner, we have paid some lip service towards 
CIMIC without actually committing the resources and work necessary in order to 
create a real capability.569
If we look at the conceptual progression that runs through civil-military 
cooperation doctrine over the past decade and compare that with ways in which 
commanders and practitioners have understood and practiced civil-military cooperation, 
we do not see a neat correlation between thought and deed. Instead, variations in 
individuals’ understandings of civil-military cooperation has led to elements of different 
purposes being present in several missions, sometimes ahead of doctrinal development, 
sometimes behind it.
In Clausewitzian terms, the military, as a Trinitarian actor, can be seen to have 
applied its skill to the problems it encountered on the battlefield—the realm of chance. In 
so doing, it first had to grapple with the notion of how best to apply that skill. Was civil- 
military cooperation a part of the solution to the problem posed by contemporary peace 
support and counterinsurgency operations? Or was it a relic of the ‘simpler’ times, of 
peacekeeping and Cold War conventional warfare? It is clear that only once the 
Canadian Army was able to cast civil-military cooperation as a core activity, rather than a 
complementary or even supplementary activity, was any coherent strategy for carrying it 
out possible. Doctrinally, this state of understanding was reached after a progressive 
series of revisions, but this tidy evolution was not matched in practice. This is due in 
large part to the variations in personal understanding of the commanders and practitioners 
involved, who had differing experiences and perspectives. That the Canadian Army had 
(and has) no civil-military cooperation training course of its own, but rather relies on
569 Response to questionnaire from Major G. Zilkalns, Operations Officer, Canadian Provincial 
Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, Afghanistan July 2005-February 2006 (by email, 5 August 2007).
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other institutions for its provisions, must contribute to the lack of a common 
understanding. Individuals were left to interpret formal doctrine (if they bothered to read 
it) and the norms that underpinned it as they saw fit. Several practitioners claimed that 
they received little or no direction from their military chain of command in terms of how 
they should regard civil-military cooperation. Furthermore, traditional military norms 
that regard combat as the ultimate goal of a soldier provided little guidance in situations 
where housing returning refugees or creating economic growth were the priority.
To call the resulting approach to civil-military cooperation ad hoc at first seems 
fitting. However, it is instructive to note that the approaches undertaken by Canadian 
soldiers do not appear to be ‘to the purpose’ as ad hoc would suggest. If this we the case, 
each mission or operation would have a different approach, tailored to the specific needs 
of that situation. Instead, what we see is a range of approaches, some simple, some 
sophisticated, taking place on a number of missions, whether those missions are in a 
Kosovo (an early intervention operation), in Bosnia (by 2002, a mature mission), or 
Afghanistan (from 2002 until the present, a mission that includes a far greater degree of 
poverty and conflict than anything experienced in the Balkans). The more appropriate 
Latin descriptor would, then, appear to be ‘ad lib \ connoting improvisation according to 
the preferences of the performer.
This chapter has examined the Canadian Army has translated its understanding of 
its role in society into action in the field. In terms of Clausewitz’s Trinity, we have now 
looked at each of the actors and seen how they have played their part in determining the 
character of military activity. In the next chapter, we will focus on the relationships 
between those actors, looking specifically how the government and the military attempted
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to use civil-military cooperation as a means of maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the 
people of Canada. Extending the idea that civil-military cooperation has been ad lib, the 
next chapter will demonstrate that just as for a musician, improvisation must occur within 
limits.
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Chapter 7
Putting it all Together: Building an Effective Strategic Narrative
“The military commander must develop more political orientation, in order to explain the 
goals o f military activities... He must develop a capacity for public relations. ”
Morris Janowitz, The Military Professional
“I  often get asked... why are you there?... We're there because you sent us...As a 
soldier, it's not my job to explain why you sent us. Soldiers don't do that. We tell you what 
we’re doing, we tell you how we're doing it, but we should not be in the position o f  
explaining to the people o f  Canada why we’re there. The responsibility for that lies with 
the political leadership and those who sent us. ”
Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie
The evolution of civil-military cooperation as a military activity can be seen as an 
attempt by the Canadian Army to come to terms with its identity as a fighting 
organization. By putting civil-military cooperation into a decidedly warfighting context, 
they have been able to distance themselves from the image of peacekeeping. This 
allowed them to develop a mature and balanced account of what they do, even if it is not 
practiced consistently yet.
However well that strategy may have worked internally, it is important to recall 
that the Army does not exist in a vacuum. A resurgent military, embracing a robust role 
as a capable, combat force still has to exist within the framework of its wider social and 
political landscape. The functional imperative of being effective, in the Canadian case at 
least, cannot fully trump the social imperative to fit in with the expectations of the 
government and the people, which, as we have seen, are still largely grounded in a 
peacekeeping tradition. This ‘fitting in’ is about gaining and maintaining legitimacy and 
it can be accomplished in two distinct ways. The first is to alter one’s practices; that is, to 
conduct activities that are in line with the legitimate ideal. The second is to emphasise 
those activities, to highlight them, and to make them take on more importance than might
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normally be the case. In both these senses, civil-military cooperation becomes ‘the price 
to be paid’ by the Canadian Army for being permitted to continue its more martial 
activities, indeed, its existence. The government of Canada is quick to underscore the 
‘good works’ of the Canadian Army as well. For them, a military that ‘does good’ fits in 
with their overall political and policy goals, as we have presented them in Chapter 5.
This chapter will explore how the Canadian Army and Government have gone 
about promoting the military in the image expected of Canadians. It is, returning to the 
model sketched out in Chapter Three, an examination of how the military, as an actor, 
interacts with its Trinitarian partners, and an illustration of the partnership strategies that 
are developed in order to maintain legitimacy. Perhaps unwittingly, but effectively 
nonetheless, the doctrinal model developed by the Army for influencing the behaviour of 
its enemies on the battlefield, has come to be skillfully applied to the home front as well. 
The Military History of An Unmilitary People570
The First World War was the last time Canada was ‘forced’ to deploy its military 
forces. Since then, Canadian military operations have been voluntary affairs, prompted 
less by a fear of extinction or ambition for gain, than by other factors. As Joe Jockel and 
Joel Sokolsky point out, “The Canadian government has the luxury of choosing when and 
where it will commit the Canadian military in support of Canadian values and, if it 
chooses to participate, to select the level of commitment.”
570 Taken from the title o f  a seminal book in Canadian military history. George F.G. Stanley, Canada's 
Soldiers: The M ilitary History o f  an Unmilitary People. (Toronto: MacMillan, 1974).
571 Prior to the Statute o f  Westminster o f  1931, when the United Kingdom declared war that declaration 
applied to all o f  its dominions and colonies as well. In 1939, Canada exercised its new found sovereignty 
by waiting a full week after Britain’s declaration before declaring war on Germany.
5 2 Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, “Lloyd Axworthy’s Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue o f  Canadian 
Defence Policy,” International Journal. Winter 2000-2001: 18.
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While that luxury is certainly a blessing for the country as a whole (there would 
be no shortage of people and states who would wish to be in the same situation) it does 
pose challenges for the Canadian Army. As the Dean of Arts of the Royal Military 
College is reported to have explained to members of the Pentagon staff in a meeting after 
September 11, 2001: “Canada's military problem is that Canada has no military
f 'T ' l
problem.” This reality is reflected in the legislative mandate given to the military in 
Canada:
The Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence are unique among 
government agencies and departments in that neither has a stated statutory 
purpose.. .Therefore, the government of the day must choose how it wishes to use 
the Canadian Forces. This condition places special responsibilities on the 
government and Parliament to give clear direction to the Canadian Forces and to 
oversee its activities carefully.5 4
As we have seen in Chapter 5, clear direction does not always come. Neither do the
explicit choices about the use of the Canadian Forces. A leading Canadian newspaper’s
editorial page ran the headline “Social work at gunpoint: Jean Chretien is confused about
ff*7C
when to deploy the military.”
This state of affairs should not be surprising. According to Micheal Desch, when 
states are confronted with neither internal nor external military threats, the “objective 
threat environment.. .does not determine a military’s mission.” Instead, “we need to 
consider the role played by the prevailing ideas about the military’s proper mission and
573 Joel Sokolsky, cited by Desmond Morton, “National Defence: A Little Common Sense,” Address to the 
Empire Club, 17 April 2002. Sokolsky was building on the famous work o f  C.P. Stacey, the eminent 
Canadian military historian. See C.P. Stacey, The M ilitary Problems O f  Canada: A Survey O f Defence 
Policies A nd Strategic Conditions Past A nd Present. (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940).
574 Canada. The Somalia Commission. “Civil Control o f  the Armed Forces.” Volume 1, Chapter 6 . 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/som alia/voll/vlc6_asp; accessed 18 Feb 2003.
575 Editor, “Social Work at Gunpoint: Jean Chretien is confused about when to deploy the military,” The 
Ottawa Citizen. 15 July 2003: A 12.
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its role in society.”576 Essentially, Desch is saying that the notion of the functional 
imperative cannot rule supreme in the absence of a clear requirement and, instead, the 
miltiary’s societal imperative becomes more important. His use of the term proper to 
describe the mission of the military connotes the idea of legitimacy. The military must 
do what it is expected to do. In the United States, that might be to “fight and win the 
nation’s wars”. The Army in Canada, however, is located within one of Charles 
Moskos’s “warless societies,” and is therefore bound to face “goal displacement,” 
whereby the lack of a clear and pressing need for armed force means that, quite literally,
^77
the government is spoilt for choice as to what to do with its military. While perhaps 
not the “fireproof house” that Senator Dandurand described in 1924, Canada in the 1990s 
certainly was a long way from the “flammable materials” of internal or external 
threats.578 What the proper mission for the military might be in these circumstances is 
not evident.
Certainly in the beginning of the 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, and faced 
with successive budget cuts, the Canadian Forces came to resemble what Morris Janowitz 
had labeled a “constabulary force”, which he defined as a force that is
continually prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks
viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a
5 7 9protective military posture.
576 Michael C. Desch, “Threat Environments and Military Missions,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Plattner, eds. Civil-M ilitary Relations and Democracy. (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996):
15.
577 Charles Moskos, “Armed Forces in a Warless Society,” in Lawrence Freedman, ed. War. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994): 137-139.
578 On 17 June 1924, Senator Raoul Dandurand, the Canadian representative at the fifth League o f  Nations 
assembly in Geneva, uttered the phrase “Canada is a fireproof house far from flammable materials,” in his 
opposition to Article X o f  the League Charter, which obligated member states to provide military assistance 
when another state was the victim o f  armed aggression.
http://www.international.gc.ca/department/history/canada5-en.asp; accessed 17 April 2007.
579 Morris Janowitz, “The Future o f  the Military Profession,” in Malham M. Wakin, ed. War, Morality, and  
the M ilitary Profession. 2nd ed., (London: W estview Press, 1986): 59.
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The implications of such a transition would have subtle effects on the military.
On one hand, its members would acquiesce and take up their new role quietly, entering
into a clear understanding with the population:
The constabulary officer performs his duties, which include fighting, because he 
is a professional with a sense of self-esteem and moral worth. Civilian society 
permits him to maintain his code of honour and encourages him to develop his 
professional skill...He is integrated into civilian society because he shares its 
common values.580
To a certain extent, this is an accurate picture of what happened to the Canadian Army 
following the Somalia scandal. The publication of Canada’s Army and Shaping the 
Future (discussed at length in Chapter 6) demonstrated the Army’s willingness, or at least 
its resignation, to go gentle into that dark night. The Army was saying that it was fully 
prepared to carry out the kinds of values-based missions the government wanted it to, 
even if those missions were not clearly defined. If that meant becoming a constabulary 
force, so be it.
As predicted by Janowitz, however, not everybody in the Canadian military was
quite so ready to abandon the functional imperative:
Heroic leaders.. .tend to thwart the constabulary concept because of their desire to 
maintain conventional military doctrine and their resistance to assessing the 
political consequences of limited military action which do not produce 
‘victory.’581
Whether they were heroic or not, there were Canadian officers who resisted. The 
publication of Advancing with Purpose and the manuals that followed it proved that.
However clear the military was about the need to maintain combat capability, it 
still faced the problem that the government had not decided on its proper mission.
580 Janowitz, 78.
581 Janowitz, 64.
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Canada was not alone in this. Writing in 1991, Martin Shaw stated that “There is greater 
uncertainty today about the roles of war and military institutions in human society than at
C O 'l
any time in the Twentieth Century.” Eleven years later, Phillip Bobbitt observed a
similar phenomenon:
What seems to characterize the present period is a confusion about how to count 
the costs and benefits of intervention, preparedness and alliance. What does the 
calculus for the use of force yield us when we have done our sums? Only an 
unconvincing result that cannot silence the insistent question: “What are our
r o i
forces for?” Because no calculus can tell us that.
Jacques Van Doom warned that when armed forces find themselves in situations 
where basic questions such as ‘What are our forces for?’ cannot be answered easily, they 
face a “crisis of legitimacy”. And since, “the sources of legitimacy are part of a certain
• c o cpolitical culture and are an expression of a particular social climate,” any attempt to 
regain legitimacy must reflect that culture and that climate. As we shall see, it is 
precisely this that the Canadian Army did.
Canada, like most countries, has an image of itself as an actor on the international 
scene. For many Canadians, as we saw in Chapter 4, that image remains one of a 
progressive state, a “helpful fixer” in international relations.586 Indeed, as Doug Bland, 
notes, “The notion that an ‘unmilitary people’ has a discemable way to use force, 
including at times, deadly and indiscriminate force, may seem alien to Canadians and
582 Martin Shaw, P ost M ilitary Society. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991): 1.
583 Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield o f  Achilles: War, Peace and the Course o f  History. (London: Penguin, 
2002): 7.
584 Jacques Van Doom , “The Military and the Crisis o f  Legitimacy,” in Gwynn Harries-Jenkins and 
Jacques Van D oom , eds. The M ilitary and the Problem o f  Legitimacy. (London: Sage, 1976): 18. The 
phenonomon o f  indecision and doubt would appear to be widespread within the West. See Timothy 
Edmonds, “What are armed forces for? The changing nature o f  military roles in Europe,” International 
Affairs. 82.6 (2006): 1059-1075 and Anthony Forster, “Breaking the covenant: governance o f  the British 
army in the twenty-first century,” International Affairs. 82.6 (2006): 1043-1057.
585 Van Doom, 21.
586 A term o f  derision attributed to former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. See 
http://www.intemational.gc.ca/department/history/canada9-en.asp; accessed 17 April 2007.
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their political representatives raised on the myth that Canadians are peacekeepers.”
This understanding must have an impact in shaping what the “proper mission” for the 
Canadian military is. Moreover, as the rhetoric surrounding military interventions over 
the course of the 1990s began to take on a ‘value-based’ rather than an ‘interest-based’ 
justification, it seemed logical that the military response would also be value-based. As 
Colin Mclnnes makes clear, the West, including Canada, went to war in the name of “the
• • c o ovictim of rape in Bosnia [and] ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.” Moving into the early
Twenty-First Century, we might add to this the Bhurka clad-women and illiterate girls of
Afghanistan. Jockel and Sokolsky go so far as to state that
Anything that can threaten life or welfare of the individual—war, poverty, the 
environment, and the very government under which people live—becomes a 
legitimate concern for the international community and a justification for
589intervention.
The point is that this is why we are expected to fight and it has a profound impact on the 
way we are expected to fight. If we are outraged about the destruction of livelihoods in 
some far off land, should not our response be not only to stop (or even punish) those who 
are destroying, but also to reconstruct those livelihoods that are destroyed? After all, the 
welfare of the individual and the establishment of a stable way of life is what we want for 
ourselves and what we created through our network of social programmes. If foreign
587 Douglas L. Bland, “War in the Balkans, Canadian Style,” Policy Options. October (1999): 18. Andrew 
Bacevich notes that the United States has a similar self-image: “The cause o f  peace and justice might from 
time to time impel the United States to use force; but peace-loving Americans did not make war on others.” 
Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences o f  U.S. Diplomacy. (London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002): 48.
588 Colin Mclnnes, Spectator Sport War: The West and Contem porary Conflict. (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 
2002): 29.
589 Jockel and Sokolsky, 8 .
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policy mirrors domestic policy, the answer seems obvious: “Military intervention can be 
seen as another form of foreign aid.”590
On one hand, this perspective on the use of force runs contrary to the institutional 
ideals of the military. Surely soldiers are warriors, not social workers? In 1999, when 
then-Prime Minister Jean Chretien referred to the Canadian Forces as “boy scouts” (in his 
mind a positive connection with their role as peacekeepers) the military was furious.591 
On the other hand, however, some analysts believed that such a perspective was 
responsible for “rescuing Canadian defence policy from military irrelevance and strategic 
sterility.”592
Furthermore, the Canadian military was being pushed to alter not only its mission 
but its approach. In a seminar discussing the role of the Canadian Forces in 2000, 
following the publication of Shaping the Future o f the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for  
2020, it was made clear that the military had no choice but to address its style of 
“governance”:
Not only is the specific role of the CAF [sic] being modified, the institution is also 
forced to adapt to important changes in its environment that have little to do with 
its original vocation. In a pluralistic, heterogeneous, factured and turbulent social 
context, the need for legitimacy by the CAF [sic] requires that it becomes more 
adaptive to change, more representative of this social reality and capable of 
maintaining more rigourous ethical standards than the general citizenry.
It would seem inescapable for the Canadian military: the societal imperative would have
to be addressed.
590 Jockel and Sokolsky, 3.
591 Sharon Hobson, “Canada— Readiness at a Price,” J a n e’s Defence Weekly. 17 September 2003: 45.
592 Jockel and Sokolsky, 1. Concerns about strategic sterility in Canada have been widespread amongst the 
analytical academic community since at least the early 1970s. See Colin S. Gray, “The Need for 
Independent Canadian Strategic Thought,” Canadian Defence Quarterly. 20.1 (1990): 7-15 [this is a 
reprint o f  a 1971 article o f  the same name.]; Colin S. Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question o f  
Relevance. (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1972).
593 Robert Higham and Gilles Paquet, “The Challenges o f  2020: A Citizen’s Perspective,” Discussion Paper 
presented at University o f  Ottawa, Centre o f  Governance. 9 March 2000.
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Building An Effective Strategic Narrative
It is possible to discern a concerted effort to portray the Canadian military and 
Canadian soldiers in a way that corresponds to the expectations of the Canadian public. 
This effort is surprisingly constant across time, is taken up equally by military 
commanders and politicians, regardless of party affiliation. This is despite changes in the 
internal narrative developed by the military, one that stressed a move away from 
peacekeeping as a leit motif. This is despite changes in the nature of the military 
interventions to which Canadian governments committed troops. What emerges is a 
campaign to ‘sell’ Canadian military activity in a certain light.
In highlighting the Army’s ‘humanitarian’ side, senior military commanders and 
politicians used two techniques. The first was to stress the link between current Canadian 
military activity and the peacekeeping and humanitarianism that the public has come to 
respect and expect. The second technique was to demonstrate not only how ‘Canadian’ 
the military’s activities were but how ‘Canadian’ the soldiers were who conduct them. 
Humanitarian Missions
In his speech to the House of Commons announcing the deployment of Canadian 
troops to fight as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Minister of 
National Defence Art Eggleton was careful to remind Canadians that “one of the 
objectives of the coalition is to assist with the humanitarian needs of the Afghanis [sic] in 
the region.”594 Speaking at the parade welcoming those same troops home, a new 
defence minister remarked to the soldiers that they “led patrols into treacherous Afghan
594 Honourable Art Eggleton, “Comments to the House o f Commons” . Hansard: House o f  Commons 
Debates. 19 November 2001.
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mountains.. .protected both allies and the local population from AY Qaida 
incursions.. .and carried out much needed humanitarian work.”595
This rhetoric set the tone for the next four years. Many speeches would be made 
saying things such as “The Afghanistan mission is right for Canada.. .It speaks to 
Canadians’ Pearsonian instinct to help a country in distress, to provide security, which is 
the sine qua non for progress.”596 Bill Graham, speaking in 2004, spoke of how the 
Canadian Army had “worked to improve the shattered infrastructure of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, including helping to build and repair schools, water systems and roads.” 
Graham remarked on how the Canadian soldiers were responsible for “important signs of 
progress: bustling streets, packed cafes and well-stocked stores. Hundreds of thousands 
of refugees are returning to their homes, and essential infrastructure is on track to be 
rebuilt.”597
The Canadian military ensured that this perspective of its work was showcased in
the press releases and mission backgrounders distributed to media outlets. This is how
they characterized the Canadian Forces’ role in Kosovo:
As well as performing the patrolling and observation duties intrinsic to peace- 
support operations, the Canadian contingent carried out humanitarian aid 
operations, such as roofing buildings, reconstructing schools and medical 
facilities, installing small bridges, and building playgrounds. Under an agreement 
with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Canadian
595 John McCallum, “Speaking Notes for the Return o f  3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light 
Infantry Battle Group from Afghanistan,” Speech delivered in Edmonton, Alberta. 9 August 2002.
596 John McCallum, “Speaking Notes for the Minister o f  National Defence,” Speech Delivered at the 
Conference o f  Defence Associations Annual General Meeting in Ottawa, Ontario. 27 February 2003.
597 Bill Graham, “Speaking Notes for the Minister o f  National Defence,” Speech delivered at the 
Multinational Task Force (North West) Change o f  Command Parade in Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1 
September 2004. Translated from the French original by author: “des signes importants de progress: rues 
animees, cafes bondes et magasins bien achalandes. Des centaines de milliers de refugies sont rentres chez 
eux, et les infranstructures essentialles sont en voie de reconstruction.”
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contingent received $750,000 in CIDA funding for small-scale humanitarian
CQO
projects.
A similar resume was completed for Bosnia:
Through civil-military cooperation efforts, hundreds of necessary infrastructure 
projects have also been completed...,such as building rural electrical systems, 
reconstructing schools and repairing water wells, septic systems, bridges and 
roads have enabled the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to return to their land and 
homes, re-establish local businesses and begin to rebuild their lives.. .In their 
personal time, many CF members have also volunteered to participate in 
community projects to improve the quality of life of the local people. In countless 
ways over the years, hundreds of CF members have raised and donated thousands 
of dollars and given their time and skills to improve the lives of the people of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. From donating school supplies, toys and clothing for 
children to purchasing furnaces, bedding and first aid equipment for orphanages 
and hospitals, Canadians have made notable contributions towards improving 
conditions for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.599
Newsletters and articles were produced by the military detailing Canadian civil-military
cooperation activities, with titles like “Helping Clinics Better Serve Community,”
“Canadian Soldiers Give Hope to Kabul Students,” “Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction
Team Helping to Build Capacity, Communities.”600
The message of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces was
clear: when you think of the Canadian Army, think humanitarian reconstruction. The
message was sometimes taken to extremes and can seem overdone. For instance, when
the military announced that it would be purchasing four C-17 strategic airlift and 17 C-
598 Canada. Canadian Forces. “Past Operations: Operation Kinetic Task Force K osovo,” 
http://www.dnd.ca/site/Operations/kinetic_e.asp; accessed 4 May 2001.
599 Canada. Canadian Forces. “Backgrounder: Canadian Forces Contribution to Bosnia-Herzegovina,” BG- 
04.029. 30 August 2004.
600 Canada. Canadian Forces, “Helping Clinics Better Serve Community,” Feature Story. 25 February 
2005; Private Jaimee Penney and Warrant Officer Jim Kolar, “Canadian Soldiers Give Hope to Kabul 
Students,” Feature Story. 25 September 2005; Kristina Davis, “Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team  
Helping to Build Capacity, Communities,” The M aple Leaf. Special Edition. July 2007: 4-7. The M aple 
L eaf is a military newspaper published by the Canadian Forces, similar to American military’s Stars and  
Stripes.
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130 tactical airlift airplanes for a total of $8.3 billion601, Lieutenant-General Michel 
Gauthier, the Commander, of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) 
claimed:
This strategic airlift capability is great news for our expeditionary forces and for 
Canada. It will provide us with an unprecedented level of responsiveness, 
independence and strategic agility. Among many other things, strategic airlift will 
enhance Canada's ability to project humanitarian assistance to any part of the 
world. The Canadian Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team - the DART - 
will use strategic lift to great advantage by deploying more troops and more 
equipment more quickly to alleviate suffering in those parts of the world afflicted 
by crisis due to natural disaster.602
It is difficult to believe that the Canadian government would spend what amounts to
nearly 50% of the annual defence budget on one equipment purchase purely for
humanitarian and disaster relief. The subordinate clause, ‘among many other things’
emphasised in the passage above covers, presumably, transporting main battle tanks to
Afghanistan, the first mission that these planes actually performed. Even the deployment
of those tanks, though, contained a reference to rebuilding: “The presence of the tanks in
Afghanistan will improve the security environment and allow others to focus on the
reconstruction effort.”603
In 2005, the Canadian Forces changed their recruitment campaign to reflect the
idea of new mission focus for the military. Taking the form of on-line videos and
advertisements shown before feature films and on television, the campaign has actors
portraying Canadian soldiers rescuing victims after natural disasters and assisting
refugees fleeing from conflict. The video is grainy and gloomy; the music is mournful,
601 Canada. Canadian Forces, “N ew s Release: ‘Canada First’ Defence Procurement: N ew  Strategic and 
Tactical Airlift Fleets,” NR-06.033. 29 June 2006.
602 Canada. Canadian Forces, “CF Reaction: Strategic and Tactical Airlift Fleets,” 29 June 2006. 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Focus/first/reaction_e.asp#airlift; accessed 15 July 2006. Emphasis added.
603 Canada. The Army, “Army News: The Leopard 2A6M  is now in Afghanistan,” 07-789. 14 September 
2007. http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/English/6_l_l.asp?id=2253; accessed 2 October 2007.
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but moving; the victims are predominantly women and young people. The tag lines are
inspiring: “Fight Fear, Fight Distress, Fight Chaos, Fight with the Canadian Forces.”604
The Canadian military, then, are rescuers, bearers of hope and comfort. While the
campaign does use the word ‘fight’ repeatedly, the public is encouraged to fight abstract
nouns, not concrete enemies. Even the choice of abstract nouns is instructive: the Army
is not fighting ‘terror’—which might be how an American military advertisement would
phrase it—but rather elements which are resonant with the idea of human security, with
its dual focus on freedom from fear and freedom from want. This is not combat, but
something altogether ‘nicer’, even more noble.
Canadian soldiers: Canadians first, soldiers second
In addition to highlighting the kinds of tasks performed by the military, generals
and ministers also spoke of the kinds of people who performed those tasks. In 1999, then
Chief of Defence Staff, General Maurice Baril, made one such speech that claimed, “The
Canadian Forces are putting the moral convictions of Canadians into action.”605 At the
time, Canadian fighter-bombers were destroying targets in Serbia and Kosovo. Later that
year, the Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant-General William Leach, praised the work of
the soldiers deployed in Kosovo:
Every day, these young soldiers, Canadian men and women, have to deal with real 
human security issues.. .In the many missions we have participated in for some 50 
years now, the Canadian Forces have gained substantial experience in skills in 
conflict resolution, confidence building, and peace monitoring...The Canadian 
Forces clearly have much to contribute to the advancement of human security.606
604 See http://www.recruiting.dnd.ca/v3/Default.aspx?bhcp=l for the on-line component o f  the campaign. 
The slogan to ‘Fight with the Canadian Forces’ replaced the previous, long-standing motto: There’s No  
Life Like It.
605 General Maurice Baril, “Speaking Notes to the Business Council on National Issues— K osovo,” Speech 
delivered to the Business Council on National Issues in Toronto, Ontario. 14 April 1999.
606 Lieutenant-General William Leach, “Canadian Forces Perspectives on Human Security,” Speech 
delivered to Atlantic Canada Diplomatic Forum in St. John’s Newfoundland. 5 November 1999.
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There is no mention of the use of force, or even of the presence of arms. The Canadian 
Forces soldiers of 1999 are to be seen as kindler, gentler, more relevant and acceptable to 
Canadians. Speaking in 2005, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie reinforced this image, 
claiming that the work of Canadian soldiers was “saving lives and protecting people” in 
Afghanistan.607 No mention was made of the ‘other work’ Canadian soldiers had 
performed in 2002, such as that done by its snipers, including killing members of the 
Taliban from over 2.4 kilometers away. In fact, the snipers were recommended for 
Bronze Stars for their valour by the American Army, but the Canadians delayed their 
awards for nearly two years. Leslie insisted that Canadians “use force to protect 
people under [their] charge. In fact, the CF has evolved into a very sophisticated 
instrument for doing this stuff—peacekeeping, peacemaking, stability—whatever its 
called.”609
Politicians, too, projected the message. On the occasion of the deployment of 
troops to Kosovo, then Prime Minister Jean Chretien informed the House of Commons 
that “the sole objective [of the mission] was the principal objective that Canada has 
pursued for many years in Kosovo: a fair and just peace.”610 Speaking in Mexico in 
2002, while Canadian soldiers were preparing to fight under American command as part 
of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Liberal Minister of Defence, Art Eggleton stated 
that
The UN is part of the DNA of most Canadians. Our involvement in all aspects of 
the UN’s activities certainly is proof of this, particularly in the field of
607 Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, “Panel Presentation,” Speech delivered to the 8th Annual 
Peacebuilding and Human Security Consultations in Ottawa, Ontario. 20 January 2005.
608 Michael Friscolanti “Record-breaking snipers were treated fairly: Canadian Forces ombudsman,” 
M aclean ’s Magazine. Apr 25, 2007: 5.
609 Leslie, “Panel Discussion”.
610Right Honourable Jean Chretien , Comments to the House o f  Commons. Hansard: House o f  Commons 
Debates. 27 April 1999.
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peacekeeping. In fact, a former Canadian Prime Minister and Nobel Prize winner, 
Lester Pearson, was instrumental in the creation of peacekeeping during the Suez 
Crisis in 1956. Since them Canada has participated in virtually every UN 
mission. The protection of civilian populations is now central to the mandate of 
many of these missions.611
Canadian soldiers were not simply killing machines; they were capable of
far more nuanced things. As the Liberal Minister of National Defence Bill Graham noted
Dealing with situations in failed or failing states is not simply about waging war 
“over there.” Rather it requires a sophisticated set of skills and instruments, 
including combat capabilities, negotiation and diplomatic skills, and a willingness 
to help others rebuild their institutions in a way that is culturally sensitive.. .We 
are there to rebuild society, winning battles is only part of the job. Our soldiers 
are truly warrior-diplomats.612
Rebuilding societies is an activity far more in keeping with what the people of Canada
were used to. It was something of which all Canadians could be proud. Other ministers
had echoed the sentiment, claiming that Canadian soldiers made a “world of
difference”613 wherever they went, and even acted out of a sense of “altruism”.614
This realization extended across party boundaries. The Conservatives, too,
reminded the public of the reasons Canadian soldiers were in Afghanistan: “We’ve made
a commitment based on what we as Canadians hold dear: freedom, democracy, rule of
law, and respect for basic human rights.” And the Army’s part in this? “They are
standing up for what we believe in.”615
611 Arthur Eggleton, “Speaking Notes for the Minister o f  National Defence,” Speech Delivered to the 
M exico Defence College in M exico City, M exico. 22 January 2002.
612 Bill Graham, “The Canadian Forces Mission in Afghanistan: Canadian Policy and Values in Action,” 
Speech delivered to Liberal Party in Vancouver, British Columbia. 9 November 2005.
61J David Pratt, “Speaking Notes for the Minister o f  Defence,” Speech to the Standing Committee on 
National Defence and Veterans Affairs delivered in Ottawa, Ontario. 1 April 2004.
614 John MacCallum, “Why Afghanistan? Why Canada?” Speech delivered to the Calgary Chamber o f  
Commerce in Calgary, Alberta. 12 September 2003.
615 Peter Mackay, “The Hard Questions: Speaking Notes for the Minister o f  National Defence,” Speech 
delivered to the Chateauguay Chamber o f  Commerce in Chateauguay, Quebec. 17 October 2007.
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The idea that Canadian soldiers were a ‘force for good’ emerged in several of the 
interviews I conducted with senior military commanders. The commander of Canadian 
troops in Kosovo felt that his men and women “warmed to civil-military cooperation 
tasks, because of who they are.”616 The commander of the first deployment to 
Afghanistan claimed that “the single best aid-worker in the world was a Canadian
f t  1 7soldier.” While commanders, such as Lieutenant-Colonels Bryan and Stogran, may 
have been vague as to what they meant, others were more explicit. One commander 
involved with operations in Afghanistan in 2004 felt that “the national characteristics of 
Canadians allowed its soldiers to conduct civil-military cooperation effectively: 
tolerance, acceptance, and respect.” Furthermore, “the desire for Canadians deployed
• f 1 8overseas to do good, to do what is right, is irrepressible.” Major-General Beare, the 
commander of a multinational division in Bosnia, went even further: “We [Canadians] 
are culturally suited for this kind of operation. It is a part of our national culture. We do 
things for the right reasons, for the sake of Canada. It’s visceral, from the troops. We 
ask ‘What needs to be done?’ rather than ‘What do I want to do?’”619
Perhaps the clearest example of the effort to portray Canadian soldiers as 
something Canadians could believe in came from then Chief of Land Staff, Lieutenant- 
General Rick Hillier during a memorial service to two soldiers killed by a suicide bomber 
in Afghanistan:
It is the soldier, not the journalist, who guarantees freedom of speech. It is the 
soldier, not the politician who guarantees our democracy. It is the soldier, not the
616 Interview with Bryan.
617 Interview with Stogran.
618 Interview with Colonel P. Kummel, 1 December 2004. Camp Mirage.
619 Interview with Beare.
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diplomat that becomes a tangible expression of a nation’s willingness to extend its 
values and its ideals worldwide.620
The speech was an attempt to do two things. First, Hillier aimed to glorify the deaths of
the two soldiers, to make them more important than the accidents and ‘friendly-fire’
• • • • f kJ I •incidents of previous missions . Second, he aimed to demonstrate the value that the 
Canadian military brought to the country. It was an attempt, perhaps, to make Canadians 
and soldiers proud of their Army.
It is possible to examine the campaign to portray the Canadian military in a softer 
light from a different perspective, by looking at an example of when the opposite was 
attempted. By focusing on aspects of the Afghanistan mission that were perceived to be 
‘un-Canadian,’ the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Prime Minister found themselves 
facing an unhappy population. In the summer of 2005, General Hillier warned the 
Canadian public that the Afghanistan mission might entail casualties—on both sides:
“We are not another [government] department. We are the Canadian Forces and our job 
is to be able to kill people.” In a television interview the same summer, General Rick 
Hillier said that the Canadian Forces were in Afghanistan because of “detestable 
murderers and scumbags” and that Canada’s job was to “take them out.” To some, this 
candour was found to be refreshing, but many others were not impressed. This comment
620 Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, “We will remember: Tribute to Sgt Robert Short and Col Robbie 
Beerenfenger,” Speech delivered at Canadian Forces Garrison Petawawa, Ontario. 7 October 2003.
621 Canadian soldiers had been killed on peacekeeping missions, including in the Balkans, largely due mine 
strikes and traffic accidents. In their first deployment to Afghanistan in 2002, four Canadian soldiers were 
killed when an American F -16 pilot engaged them with a 500 pound bomb. See the Seventh Canadian 
Book o f  Rembrance for a listing o f  all military related deaths on operations since 1947 (excluding those 
during the Korean War).
http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=collections/books/b7thbook; accessed 1 September 
2007.
622 Bruce Campion-Smith, “Canada’s troops head for battle; N ew  role fraught with Danger,” Toronto Star. 
23 July 2005: A l.
623 General Rick Hillier, cited in Daniel Leblanc, “General's talk o f  terrorist ‘scumbags’ praised,” The 
Globe and Mail. 16 July 2005.
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posted to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s website is indicative of that negative 
reaction:
We definitly [sic] need a debate in Pariliament [sic] about this confusing snowjob 
of changing our "Peacekeeping Image" to one of seeking out in the words of Rick 
Hillier "murderous scumbags". I do not believe Mr. Hillier should be speaking for 
Canadians on the world stage as Canadians are very divided about having our 
reputation as progressive thinkers and seekers of the truth taken away from us.624
f*y ^A prominent columnist echoed this sentiment, claiming “we’ve created a monster.”
Hillier had gone too far, too far outside the public expectations, too far removed from
Canadian tradition. As Bill Graham, the defence minister at the time, later recalled,
“comments about scumbags put the nature of the mission in a totally different light and
we lost our ability to persuade people that it was what I call ‘peacekeeping heavy.’”626
This move caused Hillier to be regarded as illegitimate in the eyes of many Canadians.
Shortly after coming to office, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, a Conservative,
flew to Afghanistan and delivered his first foreign policy speech. Although his speech
contained references to humanitarianism and peacekeeping, he chose to use language
similar to that of American President George W. Bush in emphasizing Canada’s
commitment to the mission:
Our Canada is a great place, but Canada is not an island.. .And what happens in 
places like Afghanistan threatens and affects all of us back home in our own 
country... Standing up for these core Canadian values may not always be easy at 
times. It’s never easy for the men and women on the front lines. And there may 
be some who want to cut and run. But cutting and running is not your way. It’s 
not my way. And it’s not the Canadian way. We don’t make a commitment and 
then run away at the first sign of trouble. We don’t and we won’t.
624 Sherry Smith, posted to http://www.cbc.ca/news/about/burman/20060426.html on 26 April 2006.
625 Andrew Coyne, “W e’ve created a monster,” The National Post. 19 April 2006: A17.
626 Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar. (Toronto: Viking, 
2007): 200.
627 Stephen Harper, “Address by the Prime Minister To the Canadian Armed forces in Afghanistan,” 
Speech delivered in Kandahar, Afghanistan. 13 March 2006.
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\In the eyes of the government, the reaction from the public was overwhelmingly 
negative . So much so, that the Clerk of the Privy Council (the most senior public 
servant in the country), Kevin Lynch, addressed a memorandum to the Prime Minister on 
the subject. In it, referring on a study commissioned from a public relations firm, Lynch 
wrote that public support for the mission in Afghanistan was only forty per cent. 
However, “if put in a broader context of helping the Afghan people—especially if the 
diplomacy and development elements are mentioned alongside the defence efforts—the 
mission still elicits support of a solid majority of people.” The public relations firm
was more specific, suggesting dropping references such as “cut and run” and using terms 
such as “rebuilding,” “enhancing the lives of women and children,” and 
“peacekeeping.” Indeed, in the executive summary of report prepared for the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the public relations firm provided
£ -1  I
a convenient table outlining “concepts to reinforce” and “concepts to avoid” :
628 Aaron Wherry, “Losing their Focus: The Conservatives struggle to sell Afghanistan in language 
pollsters would love,” M aclean's Magazine. 20 February 2007: 3.
629 Alan Freeman, “Change tune on war, PM told,” The Globe and Mail. 13 February 2007: A 1; Allan 
Woods, “To sell Canada on war, try ‘hope’ but not ‘liberty’,” The Toronto Star. 17 February 2007: A l.
630 Freeman, A l. I was shown a copy o f  the original memorandum written by Kevin Lynch, which 
included the report from the firm Strategic Counsel. Since the memorandum is classified ‘Secret’, I was 
unable to obtain a copy. Their advice was based on focus group work done in connection with a national 
poll conducted in May 2006. See for the polling data, but not the focus group work, see Strategic Counsel, 
“A Report to the Globe and Mail and CTV: Federal Budget and Afghanistan,” 5 May 2006. 
http://www.thestrategiccounsel.eom/our_news/polls/2006-04-10%20GMCTV%20May3- 
4%20(May%205).pdf; accessed 13 February 2007.
631 The Strategic Counsel, Public Perceptions o f  C anada’s Role in Afghanistan. Report prepared fro 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. POR No. 243-06. I November 2006.
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Vocabulary/Terms/Phrases/Concepts 
to Reinforce
Rebuilding
Restoring
Reconstruction
Stability
Security
Reinforcing and supporting basic 
human rights
Enhancing the lives o f  women and 
children
Part o f  an international effort 
Providing peacekeeping and peace 
support 
Hope
Opportunity
A future for the Afghan people
Vocabulary/Terms/Phrases/Concepts
to Avoid
Freedom, democracy, liberty— in 
combination this phrase comes across 
as sounding too American 
Avoid developing a line o f  
argumentation too strongly based 
on...im posing Canadian values. 
Protecting Canadians 
Fighting terrorism/the War on Terror 
9/11— References to September 11th 
simply tend to reinforce perceptions 
that this is an American war 
Linking Canada’s involvement too 
closely with American actions in the 
region.
In essence, what the Clerk and the Strategic Counsel were suggesting was a return 
to the kind of rhetoric Canadians were used to. Shortly after Lynch’s memorandum, the 
Department of National Defence created a new webpage, aimed at explaining the 
Afghanistan mission to Canadians. It is entitled ‘Why are we there?’ and runs only two 
pages. On it, the Department has written a twenty paragraph essay which is filled with 
terms listed in bold-face type. It is instructive to examine those highlighted terms: 
UN-sanctioned mission... improve the security situation...
assist in rebuilding the country... consent and at the request of the people...
hope for a brighter future... promote development...
delivery of programs and projects... economic recovery and rehabilitation... 
addressing humanitarian needs... rebuild their lives and their country...
laying the foundation... Canadian tradition...
we are making progress... troubled region...
reconstruction and a better life... nation building...
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help build a democratic and secure society...
While the words “Taliban” and “terrorist” are mentioned on the website, they are not
placed in bold-face type. Also notably absent is any reference to what the Canadian
Army might actually do to the Taliban.
After Lynch’s message to the Prime Minister, the tone of the speeches also
changed. In September the Minister of Defence said:
It’s fitting that we’ve gathered on Parliament Hill, because Afghanistan is about 
nation-building.. .1 am so proud that our country is represented by such dedicated, 
brave, caring—such decent—men and women. I’m proud of them, and I’m proud 
of the work they’re doing in Afghanistan.
His colleague, the Minister for International Cooperation, told the House of
Commons Committee on National Defence that
Our troops are there to protect with a purpose. Their role is to help expand a 
democratic Government of Afghanistan’s reach in Kandahar...to address sources 
of insecurity and to create conditions conducive to long-term development. This 
means starting with basic needs. In the province of Kandahar alone [Canadian 
soldiers] have made tangible improvement in the life of villagers and the rural 
population.634
It would appear that Lynch’s advice was taken to heart.
Manoeuvring on Whose Cognitive Plane?
Considering the development of the campaign to portray the mission and soldiers 
of the Canadian military in a certain, ‘public friendly’ light, it is possible to categorise it 
as an attempt by the military and political leadership to generate what Lawrence 
Freedman calls a strategic narrative, which he defines as
632 Canada. Department o f  National Defence. “Why are we there?” 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/afghanistan/why_e.asp; accessed 30 November 2006.
633 Gordon J. O’Connor, “Speaking Notes for the Minister o f  National Defence,” Speech delivered to Rally 
in Support o f  Canadian Forces in Afghanistan Hosted by CFRA Radio in Ottawa, Ontario. 22 September 
2006.
634 Honourable Marie Josee, “Committee Evidence,” Hansard: House o f  Commons Committee on National 
Defence. N D D N  29. 12 December 2006.
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Compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which 
inferences can be drawn.. .Narratives are designed or nurtured with the intention 
of structuring the response of others to developing events. They are strategic 
because they do not arise spontaneously but are deliberately constructed or 
reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current.
The notion that the Army is a force made up of decent, altruistic Canadians engaged on
missions of mercy is strategic. Its aim is to increase public support for the institution and
its operations, in short, to bolster its legitimacy. In so doing, senior military commanders
and politicians—across party lines and over time—have exploited what they believe are
the Canadian public’s preferred images and motifs. As Freedman states, narratives “may
rely on appeals to emotion, or on suspect metaphors and dubious historical analogies.”
The invocation of Lester Pearson’s name and the association of tanks with reconstruction
are but two examples of references that are suspect and dubious.
According to Michael Vlahos, such narratives have three related purposes:
First, it is the organizing framework for policy. Policy cannot exist without an 
interlocking foundation of “truths” that people easily accept because they appear 
to be self-evident and undeniable. Second, this “story” works as a framework 
precisely because it represents just such an existential vision. The “truths” that it 
asserts are culturally impossible to disassemble or even criticize. Third, having 
presented a war logic that is beyond dispute, the narrative then serves practically 
as the anointed rhetorical handbook for how the war is to be argued and 
described.637
Because they draw on existing symbols, strategic narratives can be seen as attempts to 
unify—or at least consolidate—the understanding of an issue. They represent concerted
635 Lawrence Freedman, “The Transformation o f  Strategic Affairs,” Adelphi P aper  379 (London: Taylor 
and Francis for the International Institute o f  Strategic Studies, 2006): 23. The term has been adopted and 
expanded by several others, in many different contexts. See, for instance, Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin, 
Sabine Selchow, “Human security: a new strategic narrative for Europe,” International Affairs. 83.2 
(March) 2007: 273-288.
636 Freedman, 23.
637 Michael Vlahos, “The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy o f  Protracted Conflict— and Defeat,” 
National Interest Online. 5 September 2006. http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id= 11982; 
accessed 1 October 2006.
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efforts to build or shape intersubjective knowledge, in the hopes that the result will have
enough meaning to form the basis for effective social action.
As discussed in Chapter 3, we can view this in Clausewitzian terms. Clausewitz
understood well the vagaries and contradictions in the relationships between the people,
the government, and the military. He did not paint a simple or simplistic picture of how
war was waged. On the contrary, he displayed a keen appreciation for subtly and
compromise. One such appreciation is appropriate to further our understanding of how
civil-military cooperation is used in the Canadian case:
Sometimes the political and the military objective is the same. . .In other cases the 
political objective will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, 
another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose 
and symbolise it....The less involved the population and the less serious the 
strains within the states and between them, the more political requirements in 
themselves will dominate and tend to be decisive. Situations can thus exist in 
which the political object will almost the sole determinant.638
In the kinds of peace support and stabilization operations that the Canadian Army has
found itself involved in over the last decade or so, we have seen a divergence in
objectives. At times, it was unclear what the political objective was; perhaps just ‘being
there’ was enough. For the Army, it might be said that the military objectives were not
so much objectively military (that is, relevant to the immediate battlefield) but rather
institutional. In any event, the expectations of the Canadian people were such that both
government and military came to understand that it mattered how the military acted just
as much as what they did.
The need to paper over that divergence leads to the combined effort by the
military and the government to create a single strategic narrative that serves both
638 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Michael Howard and Peter Peret, eds. and trans. (London: David  
Campbell Publishers, 1993): Book 1, Chapter 1, §11, Page 91.
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interests. In line with Poggi’s concept of power sharing, the holders of political and
military power are attempting to tap into the normative power of the people, in order to
increase their legitimacy and enable them to more easily pursue their particular interests.
The concept of narrative generation can be seen in another light, though. The
military doctrine of information operations described in Chapter 6 speaks of “influence
activities” that are designed to “affect behaviour” of a particular target. The idea is that,
by performing activities, such as civil-military cooperation, it is possible to shape the
“understanding” and “perception” of the target, and thereby mold their “will.” 639 Of
course, ‘will* is the key:
Will changes behaviour and enables individuals to overcome fear and adversity as 
well as the cohesion that holds them together. It includes cognitive aspects such 
as belief in a cause, indoctrination and judgment as well as emotive responses 
such as patriotism, ethnicity, religious zeal, and esprit de corps.640
As written, such influence activities are aimed at influencing an opponent and the
population that supports him. For instance, Canadian doctrine suggests
CIMIC activities may assist in civil reconstruction in order to engender moral 
support form a government and its populace and to enhance the perception of the 
campaign and its legitimacy amongst a local populace.641
The idea of generating such legitimacy has been suggested as critical in peacekeeping642
and counterinsurgency.643
However, the idea of strategic narrative and its use in generation of legitimacy in
this case has been applied to the domestic government and population. The Canadian
639 Canada. The Army. Land Doctrine in the Modern Age. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2007): Ch 5, p. 9.
640 Canada. The Army. Land Doctrine in the Modern Age, Ch 5, p. 3.
641 Canada. The Army. Land Doctrine in the Modern Age, Ch 5, p. 7.
642 James Gow and Christopher Dandeker, “The Legitimation o f  Strategic Peacekeeping: Military Culture, 
the Defining Moment,”in D.S. Gordon and F.H. Toase, eds., A spects o f  Peacekeeping. (London, Frank 
Cass: 2001): 123.
643 United States, United States Army Field Manual 2-24 Counter insurgency. (Washington, DC: United 
States Government Printing Office, 2006); Christopher M. Ford, “Speak N o Evil: Targeting a Population’s 
Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency,” Parameters. 35.2 (Summer) 2005: 51-66.
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Army can been seen to have used a focus on civil-military cooperation as an “influence
activity” targeted at Canadians. Indeed, in the targeting exercise in Bosnia, described in
Chapter 6, the Canadian government and population were listed as targets.644 Canadian
military doctrine, imperfectly applied in operations abroad, has been skillfully adapted
for use on the home front.
The effectiveness of the campaign, though, has not been clear. Public opinion for
the Afghanistan mission, for instance, remained mixed in 2007. And while reaction to the
campaign has not been as hostile as that which met General Hillier’s tough talk or Prime
Minister Harper’s ‘cut and run’ speech, observers have expressed concern over the use of
“spin” and “propaganda”.645 Writing in a French language newspaper, Francis Dupuis-
Deri, asks, “L'armee canadienne en Afghanistan: mission guerriere ou humanitaire?”
(Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Combat or humanitarian mission?) and mocks the
campaign to promote the softer side of operations in Afghanistan as Orwellian:
In the language of Big Brother, a cat is a dog.. .Who, indeed, would publicly 
declare to wage a dirty war, unjust and bloody?...Big Brother’s propagandists 
would certainly approve.646
However, the fact that a particular strategy has not, so far, generated overwhelmingly
positive results does not negate the fact that the strategy was developed and deployed.
The Canadian Army uses civil-military cooperation activities to fight for ‘hearts and
minds’—including Canadian ones.
644 Information Operations Targeting and Tasking Matrix to Support Bos Petrovac Community Centre 
Opening— 10 January 2003. Dated 5 January 2003. NATO/SFOR Confidential. Declassified 6 January 
2003.
645 Kady O ’Malley, “Opening a new front: Is the Canadian military trying to win the media war too?” 
M aclean's. 11 July 2007: 4.
646 Francis Dupuis-Deri, “L'armee canadienne en Afghanistan: mission guerriere ou humanitaire?”, Le 
Devoir. 27 June 2007 : B2. Translated from the French original by author: “Dans le langage de Big  
Brother, un chat est un chien...Q ui, en effet, declarerait publiquement mener une guerre sale, injuste et 
sanguinaire?...Les propagandistes de Big Brother auraient certainement apprecie.”
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Conclusion
Clearly, none of the operations performed by the Canadian military in the recent 
past have been about the defence of Canada or Canadians. No enemies have manifestly 
threatened Canadian territory, no matter how the echoes of 11 September 2001 may 
sound. Canadian wars (if we can call them that) have been wars of choice and have been 
about Alliance partnership and global citizenship more than they have been about self- 
defence or acquisition. As Lawrence Freedman explains, this state of affairs can be 
troublesome:
When the security of the state is threatened by a large and self-evidently hostile 
enemy then all social and economic resources can be mobilized in response.
When, by contrast, there is a debate to be had about the nature of the threat and 
whether matters are made better or worse by direct action, military operations 
appear to be more discretionary and national mobilization on even a modest scale 
becomes more difficult.647
Again, Clausewitz points out that this can have ramifications for the army:
The less intense the motives, the less will the military element’s natural tendency 
to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven 
further from its natural course [that is escalating violence] the political object will 
be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war [total annihilation of the 
enemy] and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character.
Given this perspective, it should not be surprising that the Canadian Army has
adopted a highly politicized approach to the way that it promotes its activities. Having
found itself isolated and illegitimate after Somalia, the Army struggled to ‘get its message
out’ effectively. A former Chief of Defence Staff stated that the problem was deeply
rooted in the Canadian Forces to the extent that “it has great difficulty differentiating
between its own institutional interests and aspirations and the real interests of the state,
647 Freedman, 7.
648 Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §25, Page 99.
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viewing both as coincident when, in fact, they are often very different.”649 What changed 
over the period of our study is not so much an abandoning of those institutional interests, 
but rather the adoption of a strategy to better meet the interests of the government, and 
the expectations of the people. The Army’s legitimacy depended on its ability to act in 
accordance with the ideals held in the minds of the government and the people. In so 
achieving these societal imperatives, the Army was counting on being given the freedom 
and the resources to achieve its functional imperative.
649 Gerard Theriault, “Democratic Civil-Military Relations: A Canadian V iew,” in J. Hanson and S. 
McNish, eds. The M ilitary in Modern D em ocratic Society. (Toronto: Canadian Institute o f  Strategic 
Studies, 1996): 10.
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Conclusion:
The Many Whys of Civil-Military Cooperation
A society only articulates itself as a nation through some common intention among its
people.
George Grant, Lament for A Nation650
This is the only story o f mine whose moral I  know. I  don’t think it’s a marvelous moral; I  
simply happen to know what it is: We are what we pretend to he, so we must he careful
about what we pretend to be.
Kurt Vonnegut, Mother Night651
In his famous semi-autobiographical novel Slaughterhouse Five, which details in 
his unique style the terror-bombing of Dresden, Kurt Vonnegut’s main character, Billy 
Pilgrim, who has been abducted by aliens, asks a simple question, “Why?” The aliens 
look at Billy with a wry smile, saying, “That is a very Earthling question to ask.. .Why 
anything!...Because this moment simply is ... Well, here we are.. .trapped in the amber of 
this moment. There is no why.”652 In trying to figure out why a particular practice is 
conducted in the way that it is, it is tempting after some research, a few interviews and 
some observations, to come to this conclusion. There is often little conscious 
understanding on the part of those performing a complex activity, such as civil-military 
cooperation, as to the reason behind their mission. The Operations Officer of the 
Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, Afghanistan, speaking of his 
experience with civil-military cooperation in 2005, echoes this sentiment when he states 
that, “Notably missing was a representative from any government department.
Essentially we saw our mission as follows: It was an economy of force operation
650 George Grant, Lament fo r  A Nation: The Defeat o f  Canadian Nationalism. (Montreal-Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005 [1965]): 66 .
651 Kurt Vonnegut, M other Night. (London: Vintage, 2000 [1961]): vii.
652 Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughter House Five. (Toronto: Laurel, 1991): 76-77.
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intended to buy time.. .In my opinion, the reason we do CIMIC operations is that we have 
blundered our way into them.”653
At the same time, different elements may place different values on the task, some 
regarding it as a strategic activity, necessary for ‘higher purposes’, far from the actual 
tactical performance of the activity itself. The Tralfamadorians may, then, be wrong: 
there may be many whys, not none. This thesis has been about addressing the answers to 
those multiple whys. The research question that framed our inquiry was “Why is civil- 
military cooperation practiced the way that it is?” This concluding chapter will provide 
the answers to that question, as well as suggesting avenues for further exploration.
At the highest level, civil-military cooperation—as conceived of and practiced by 
the Canadian Army in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—is the product of the Canadian 
people’s passion; the Canadian governments’ direction; and the Canadian Army’s skill.
If any of these actors had discharged their functions in a different way—if the Canadian 
people expressed the desire to punish the Yugoslav army, without regard for the Kosovar 
population, for instance—then the resulting action would have been carried out 
differently. It is important to note that it is not the mere existence of Clausewitz’s 
Remarkable Trinity which is responsible for the military practice, but rather the particular 
way in which each actor discharges its function and the relationships between the actors 
themselves. In the Canadian case, the people are ambivalent. Their passions are tepid, 
not intense. As Desmond Morton states, “Canadians will live in the future much as they 
have lived in the past—day by day... .Canadians want their country to play a modest,
653 Response to questionnaire from Major G. Zilkalns, Operations Officer, Canadian Provincial 
Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, Afghanistan July 2005-February 2006 (by email, 5 August 2007).
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responsible and constructive role in a sometimes dangerous and often cruel world.”654 
Clearly, a passion bearing the hallmarks of modesty and responsibility is very much 
different to one marked by hatred and enmity.
The people’s passions, though, are not alone in shaping military activity. The 
government, simply put, harnesses the people’s passion and converts it into direction. 
Here we can see the immediate effect of lukewarm passions. Not only are do they tend to 
be mild mannered, but the public choices of Canadians are often contradictory, as 
Chapter 4 has illustrated. Canadians want to eat their cake, and have it, too. Faced with 
such an ambivalent mandate, the government in Canada tends to hedge its bets, providing 
equally fuzzy direction to its various departments. As noted in Chapter 5, this ambiguity, 
while perhaps confusing, can be pregnant with opportunity. Consensus is rarely formed 
and individual government departments and agencies take advantage, often continuing 
with pre-existing programmes or introducing new ones, which they feel are actually the 
most important.
The military is no different in this regard. Over the course of the 1990s and the 
first decade of this century, following from the nadir that was the Somalia dabacle, the 
Canadian Army, in particular, attempted to construct for itself an image of martial 
competence and relevance. This has reached its apogee under the eye of Chief of 
Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, who has put forth an image of the Canadian Army as 
one of competence and combativeness. Canadian developments in doctrine and 
investments in equipment demonstrate the journey from a highly segregated 
understanding of the military’s role, with warfighting and peacekeeping separated, to a 
more comprehensive approach, one which tries to contextualise a variety of roles for the
654 Desmond Morton, Understanding Canadian Defence. (Toronto: Penguin, 2003): 212.
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military within a coherent framework, more in keeping with the nature of the post-Cold 
War, and even more so, the post-911, world. While this evolution can be seen as a 
maturation of thought and self-respect, it can be also understood in a way akin to that 
which Stephen Posen saw the American military in the 1990s: “There is no permanent 
norm defining what is or is not the dominant professional activity of the organisation.”655 
This indeterminancy is a key characteristic of the landscape within which 
Canadian civil-military cooperation has been practiced. There is neither clear direction 
nor permanent norms and this requires that each actor interpret what little that does exist 
in search of.. .In search of what exactly? In Chapter 3, we discussed that norms, as 
depicted in myths, help shape the goals of each actor. However, as we have seen, this is 
not always and everywhere the case. The norms are weak, the myths persistent but 
empty of definition, and the interests of the actors such that only strength and clarity 
could hope to align them. In this regard, Ann Swidler helpfully points out that while the 
dominant cultural model “argues that culture shapes action by supplying ends or values 
towards which action is directed,” this may be too simple an explanation of the role of 
values, norms, and myths.656 She believes that an alternative approach to cultural aspects 
of action is more helpful. Swidler sees culture, “as a ‘tool kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals 
and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds 
of problems.” Accordingly, she sees culture’s “causal significance not in defining ends
655 Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and M ilitary Power: India and Its Armies. (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1996): 266.
656 Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review. 51 (1986): 
273.
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of action, but in providing cultural components that are used to construct strategies of 
action.”657
The construction and deployment of strategies of action, built using a tool kit 
replete with stories of Pearsonian peacekeeping, has been examined at length in Chapter 
7. These strategies, utilised by both the government and the military, are critical to our 
understanding of civil-military relations, writ large. Governments do not clearly dictate 
their instructions and militaries have more choices that merely obeying or disobeying, 
working or shirking in Feaver’s terms. The relationship between these Trinitarian actors 
is far more dynamic than conventionally portrayed.
The nature of that relationship can be summed up as one of balance, the 
equilibrium between the magnets, in Clausewitz’s terms. That balance is about 
legitimacy. Gaining and maintaining legitimacy is what each actor in the Trinity strives 
to do, and it is to this end that strategies of action are deployed. In theory, there are many 
bases for legitimacy and, therefore, a number of strategies of action that can be used. 
However, as we have seen, it is critical that the strategies of action that are developed use 
the appropriate tool kits. In the Canadian case, for example, when the Chief of the 
Defence Staff referred to the Taliban and Al Qaeda as ‘detestable murderers and 
scumbags’, we can say that he risked being seen as illegitimate, outside the accepted 
boundaries of debate. More subtly, but equally to the point, Prime Minister Harper’s use 
of phrases such as ‘cut and run’ and ‘God bless Canada’ in his first speech about 
Afghanistan also put him out of balance. The appropriateness of any strategy of action 
will, in part, determine its effectiveness. However, there are clearly limits to this 
approach. The idea that the Canadian Forces purchased billions of dollars worth of
657 Swidler, 273.
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strategic airlift with humanitarian relief foremost in mind is too farfetched to be believed. 
The realm of legitimacy is finite. This is not to say that options do not exist, but, as Kim 
Richard Nossal observes, cultural aspects of any debate “may determine the general 
bounds within which governments have to operate—determining which issues must be
/ 'C O
dealt with, or limiting the range of acceptable policy choices.” Canadian military 
missions to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—although very different from each 
other—were portayed, to varying degrees, as peacekeeping missions. Civil-military 
cooperation, in the form of quick, photo-friendly reconstruction projects, was a key 
element in these portrayals.
The bounds of action are not universal or generic; they are contingent on certain 
culturally salient symbols. That contingency is multiplied in that the saliency of those 
symbols may vary across time and geography. In our case, specifically Canadian 
symbols, rooted in a particular reading of Canadian history, were seen by all the 
Trinitarian actors as being appropriate and were, therefore, harnessed. As we have seen, 
though, the Canadian case is marked by what might be termed “low coherence [and] 
consistency.”659 People, for example, want to have good healthcare and a responsive 
military, but are unwilling to pay for both. Swidler believes that in “settled cultures” 
where “traditions and common sense” are key (as opposed to unsettled cultures, marked 
by imposed ideologies), this variability is characteristic and has differing short- and long­
term effects. In the short-term, the incoherence and inconsistency mean that norms and 
values have “weak direct control over action”. There are just too ambiguous to provide a
658 Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics o f  Canadian Foreign Policy. (Scarbourough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc.: 1985): 34.
659 Swidler, 282.
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solid basis from which an actor can proceed surely. However, in the long-term, settled 
culture “provides resources for constructing strategies of action.”660
It is critical to note that, just as cultural aspects should not be seen as 
deterministic, we must be careful not to conceive of strategies of action being the product 
of a system or structure, or much less some deus ex machina. It is individuals who must 
develop these strategies, based on their interpretation of the contents of their cultural took 
kits. This leads to a variety of responses, as each interpretation is inherently subjective. 
Again, to be effective, that subjectivity must be tempered and remain within bounds. In 
Chapter 5 we can see that at a doctrinal level, the evolution of civil-military cooperation 
progressed in line with experience and in keeping with the growing confidence of the 
Canadian Army, in relation to its idea of itself as a warfighting organisation. However, in 
terms of practice, civil-military cooperation proved to be far more chaotic, with so many 
advances and regressions that perceiving any sense of evolution is impossible. So, while 
it is clear in theory that civil-military cooperation was supposed to be about both genuine 
concern for the local population and the furtherance of the wider military mission, it often 
came across quite different on the ground. Recall that in Bosnia, Canadian troops 
‘adopted’ an elderly woman, providing aid and assistance in a human and non­
instrumental way, to the detriment of the unit’s ability to distribute civil-military 
cooperation more appropriately within its area of operations. Consider this statement by 
a Canadian company commander in Afghanistan in 2006.
I said, ‘Let’s stop, let’s ask what’s going on, what concerns [the locals] have.’ 
They wanted the school rebuilt, and we knew the clinic had been burnt, and I 
wanted to compare the replies of the locals and the answers of the district 
leader.. .1 said, ‘What do you need today?’ and a man said, ‘I’m just a farmer. I 
need a shovel.’ I turned around to my [armoured vehicle] and I said, ‘There’s a
660 Swidler, 282.
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shovel in there. I will give you that shovel right now; you tell me where the 
Taliban is right now and I will give you that shovel.’ And he’s, ‘Oh, we don’t 
know where the Taliban is.’ Yeah, right. We got shot at the next time we went in 
there.661
Confronted by real problems, and having experienced combat in that same village on 
several occasions, notions of civil-military cooperation as “manoeuvre on the cognitive 
plane” were frustrated by a desire to close with and destroy the enemy.
The overall picture that results is one of civil-military cooperation marked by 
chaos. Individual commanders and practictioners have differing ideas and approaches to 
what civil-military cooperation is and how it should be used. Often these ideas are in 
direct contrast to the doctrinal model of the day. One is tempted to describe civil-military 
cooperation as an ad hoc activity, but that would denote that it was developed in order to 
deal with a particular set of circumstances. However, there is enough evidence to suggest 
that this is not the case. Civil-military cooperation is not always tailored to the current 
situation; rather, it is often conducted in similar ways, in circumstances that are very 
different. Practices in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, despite vast differences in 
circumstances, were often similar. This prompts the use of ad lib as perhaps a more 
appropriate Latin descriptor: civil-military cooperation is practiced as the practitioner 
‘pleases’ rather than in strict accord with either doctrine or the particular circumstances at 
the time.
Implications for Policy
An ad lib approach to civil-military cooperation has several practical 
consequences. First, it can mean that civil-military cooperation may fall short of its 
doctrinal purpose—that is, to bring about changes in the behaviour of an enemy. If each
661 Major Nick Grimshaw, Officer Commanding B Company, IPPCLI, Kandahar, Afghanistan, July 2006. 
Cited in Christie Blatchford, Fifteen Days. (Toronto: Doubleday, 2007): 158.
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practitioner, over geography and over time, is acting independently, in accordance with 
his or her own understanding of the situation and civil-military cooperation’s purpose, 
there is little hope of conducting a coherent campaign of reconstruction and assistance, 
except within the broadest of boundaries. In Bosnia, one commander interpreted civil- 
military cooperation as being about ensuring compliance with legal and political 
agreements, and used it as a stick. Eighteen months later, a different commander, from 
the same country (indeed, the same regiment), in the same area of Bosnia, interpreted 
civil-military cooperation as a means of creating economic opportunities for the local 
population, with the aim of providing the young, male population something to do other 
than fight. He saw civil-military cooperation as a carrot. That both commanders were 
free to interpret and implement civil-military cooperation in this manner is a testament to 
the lack of understanding at several levels within the military and political chain of 
command.
Second, more than just producing contradictions within the military, and perhaps 
confusion within the local population, an ad lib approach to civil-military cooperation 
can lead to contradictions between what the political and military leaders are saying to 
the people of Canada, and what individual practitioners are doing. To the extent that the 
people are capable of seeing what is going on in an operation (through the media, for 
instance) this could generate problems. If the government promises that aid is going to 
‘those who need it most’, but commanders on the ground are providing it to ‘those who 
can provide the best information’, and the public at home finds out, there may need to be 
explanations made. Such a condition could lead to a tightening of scope provided to 
those in the field, with a more centralised, dictated approach to civil-military cooperation.
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So far, in the Canadian case, neither in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan, has there been 
such a drive. Instead, it seems that there has been a more robust strategy of action on the 
part of the military and political leadership, portraying the missions as being in line with 
public expectations.
This, in itself, has ramifications. The most serious implication is that rather than 
merely implementing direction, the military is seen to be shaping opinion of both the 
people and the government. As one activist, opposed to the current Canadian deployment 
to Afghanistan, remarked: “I’ve been on panels where a serving member of the Canadian 
Forces was sent to debate me and they went far beyond providing information.. .There’s a 
conflict there because you have the military becoming a lobbyist to try and influence the 
decisions of government.”662
While it is much more likely that military ‘lobbying’ of this type would influence 
the people, rather than the government, there have been politicians who have felt that the 
military has told them what they wanted to hear—using the peacekeeping toolkit—in 
order to get what they want. As Prime Minister Paul Martin recalled after his retirement: 
“I made.. .demands of [Chief of Defence Staff General] Hillier before I agreed to [the 
extended mission to Kandahar in 2005].. .1 want in, but I want out. We do peacemaking 
and reconstruction and win hearts and minds.”663 Hillier, according to Martin, gave these 
assurances. Another senior politician, though, implies that while Hillier may have made 
promises, the politicians were more than ready to accept them. “We needed lightly 
equipped, agile soldiers who would go into villages, ‘make love to the people’ and ‘kill
662 Kady O ’Malley, “Opening and N ew  Front: Is the Canadian military trying to win the media war too?,” 
M acLean’s Magazine. 11 July 2007: 4.
663 Paul Martin, cited in Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar. 
(Toronto: Viking, 2007): 191.
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the bad guys’. We sold ourselves that we could do this and that it was possible.”664 
Within a year, the Canadian Army would take several casualties and deploy heavy 
artillery and main battle tanks to Afghanistan. One of the reasons a military strategy of 
action built on ideas of humanitarian aid and reconstruction was so effective, was because 
it was in accord with expectations. The appropriateness of the message helped achieve 
the legitimacy for the military that would then lead to freedom of action to meet its own 
objectives.
Rather than being duped, as Martin might have us believe, it is more likely the 
case that, in line with what Gianfranco Poggi suggests (and has been discussed in Chapter 
3), the two actors (government and military) saw fit to collaborate, using the motif of 
4 Afghanistan as an extension of the Canadian peacekeeping tradition’—a motif 
dependent on activities such as civil-military cooperation. In so doing they developed a 
strategy for action, which took the particular form, as discussed in Chapter 7, of a 
particular strategic narrative. This narrative tries to paint a coherent picture of what is 
happening, framing it to look as if it were unfolding according to a plan. Its intent is to 
provide a common, acceptable vision in order to facilitate further activity. Of course, if 
the reality is more chaotic than such a narrative would suggest, then the strength of the 
narrative deployed must be increased. One might measure that strength in terms of the 
appropriateness of the elements from the cultural tool kit used to construct it. As one 
observer has suggested in Chapter 7, this can tend to a rather Orwellian extreme if it is 
not kept in check. Should a unit of approximately 400 soldiers, with a handful of 
civilians, scant expertise in non-military tasks, and little money actually be called a
664 Bill Graham, cited in Gross Stein and Lang, 186.
244
Provincial Reconstruction Team?665 As its Operations Officer noted, rather concentrating
on the winning of hearts and minds,
We mouth the correct words on CIMIC and how we will use it to win the 
campaign in Afghanistan, but we do not emphasize it. In times of trouble, people 
revert to what they were earliest taught; what I have seen is commanders at all 
levels revert to is kinetic operations to destroy an enemy physically. This is easy 
to do, it is easy to measure.. .and it is what we have studied our entire careers. 
Unfortunately, we are fighting for dominance of the human key terrain, and 
without coming up with a realistic, coherent, and holistic approach to how we will 
win the support of the local populace, we will never succeed. Instead, we will 
continue to kill a lot of people, be tolerated by the locals while we outgun them, 
and see Afghanistan revert to its natural state once we leave.666
This leads to a particularly difficult paradox for the military. It is axiomatic to
state that honesty is the best policy. Orwellian double-speak is nothing one wants to be
accused of if maintaining legitimacy is important. Peacekeeping missions are
peacekeeping missions, and combat missions are combat missions, no matter what a well-
crafted press release might state. Civil-military cooperation, in this case, would either
continue to be a sporadic, amateur practice, or develop into the more doctrinal sound
influence activity that some envision. To act in this manner would be honourable.
However, it is entirely likely, based on the expectations of the government and the people
of Canada, that the Canadian military would no longer find itself on operations where
combat was the hallmark, such as Afghanistan. The government and the military
leadership, after all, had taken great pains to downplay, if not successfully cover up,
combat activities, such as the sustained encounter with Croatian forces in Medak 1993
and the record-breaking sniper operations as part of Operation Anaconda (discussed in
665 See also Owen Savage, “Yes, but is it Peacebuilding? Evaluating Canadian CIMIC in Afghanistan,” in 
Christopher Ankersen, ed. Civil-M ilitary Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations Emerging Theory and 
Practice. (London: Routledge, 2007): 121-155.
666 Response to questionnaire by Zilkalns.
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Chapter 6). If appropriate activities, such as civil-military cooperation, were not to 
form the core of military missions, there would be no missions at all. As one political 
advisor put it, “It is just not politically viable to engage in conflicts where you do not
• * • * rroengage in the humanitarian dimension.” In other words, the balance of legitimacy is a 
delicate one. Does the Army attempt to legitimate its actions with reference to images in 
keeping with Canadian myth, argumentum ad captandum, thereby guaranteeing its own 
freedom of action? Or does the Army refrain from deploying such strategies of action, 
tell the truth, and risk being seen as illegitimate in the long-term, in that there might 
appear to be no reason to keep the Army around, if all it is going to do is combat? This is 
a real dilemma and one which platitudinous recommendations are likely to be unhelpful. 
Suggesting that the Army and the Government ‘do the right thing’ is as spurious as it is 
condenscending.
Equally spurious is the recommendation that what is necessary is a re-education 
of the Canadian public, so that the Pearsonian scales might fall from their eyes. 
Legitimacy might then be restored, because the Canadian people would finally ‘get it’. 
Since it is not clear exactly where and how myths are developed, nor how one might 
radically and abruptly alter those myths in practical, concrete terms, advice of this nature, 
while present, is not helpful. It assumes both a method and a point of ‘correct reference’ 
that are not, themselves, unambiguous. To suggest otherwise is to try and take the 
politics out of politics. Perhaps the best that can be recommended is to remind all 
actors—the military, the government, and the people—that they are jointly responsible
667 See Carol Off, The Ghosts o f  M edak Pocket: The Story o f  Canada's Secret War. (Toronto: Random 
House, 2005).
668 Interview with Heidi Hulan, former Political Assistant to Lloyd Axworthy (Ottawa, Ontario, 18 March 
2003).
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for what military activities take place. No one is excluded from the process and the 
degree to which they are aware and involved can make significant differences, at least in 
terms of what is carried out on the ground.
Theoretical Implications
The first theoretical implication arising from the research conducted in this thesis 
is that Clausewitz’s Trinity—both in its primary and secondary forms—provides a useful
• • • • th •framework for investigation. Far from being a relic of the 19 Century, the Trinity, when 
treated with the dynamism intended by Clausewitz, is relevant to contemporary military 
practice. Even in cases that seem distant from the battles of the Napoleonic era, the 
actors, functions, and relationships described in On War remain relevant. For instance, 
Ulrich Beck considers that Kosovo was a post-national war, where “in the place of 
‘either-or’ appears ‘both-and’: both war and peace, both police and military, both crime 
and war, both civilian and soldier.” While this may be true, it does not follow that when 
a “war is post-national” it “can thus no longer be understood through the Clauswitzian 
conceptualisation.”669 Despite the ‘post-national’/cosmopolitan objectives attributed to 
some contemporary conflicts, because they are carried out by armed forces from nation­
states, the structures suggested by Clausewitz still apply.
The second theoretical implication relates to the dichotomy posed by Huntington 
and Janowitz and their ‘functional versus societal imperative’ debate. In the Canadian 
case, at least, it would appear that armed forces cannot choose either imperative as the 
sole basis for their actions. To rely solely on the functional imperative may risk being 
perceived as being too far outside the bounds of acceptability by the government and the
669 Ulrich Beck, “War is Peace: On Post-National War,” Security Dialogue. 36.1 (2005): 8 .
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people. On the other hand, if the societal imperative is applied too strictly, this may lead 
to conflicts within the military itself, as it would run contrary to their established self- 
identity goals. Activities such as civil-military cooperation can be considered as attempts 
to square this circle. They are designed as bridges between the imperatives and as such, 
suffer from a ‘neither one nor the other’ quality. This quality is evident in the tortured 
mess that is Canadian civil-military cooperation practice today. In that sense, then, we 
might redefine the notions of functional and societal imperatives. If the function of the 
military is defined by the government and society in such a way as to demand that 
humanitarian or peacekeeping tasks are performed, we can begin to see a merging of the 
imperatives. This merger would not have been possible in the original Huntingtonian 
versus Janowitzian formulation because of the particular social and political environment
• thwithin which they were conceived (ie. Amerca in the mid-20 Century).
Similarly, depending on the particular social and political environment, replete 
with its own boundaries of legitimacy, Feaver’s dichotomy o f ‘work’ and ‘shirk’, may 
not fit. Certainly, in the Canadian case, it does not. Before any working or shirking may 
be carried out, a phase of interpretation and negotiation must take place, in order to 
determine exactly what is being required of the military. Sometimes, no exact 
determination is found—or sought—and the resulting ambiguity seen as an opportunity 
for exploitation rather than resolution.
Because many of these theoretical frameworks developed within the field Civil- 
Military Relations—imperatives or ‘principle-agent’ theories—are based on observation 
of American political and military activity, it would be instructive to carry out similar 
research in different countries. This would allow greater comparison across cases and
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could shed light on the particularity of the observations made here. With so many 
national militaries involved in civil-military cooperation, in Afghanistan alone, there is an
fk 70opportunity to design comparative projects, using a Clausewitzian framework.
A final step towards an extension of the findings is produced here. Largely absent 
from this study has been any discussion of the identities of the actors themselves. In 
Chapter 6, we did see an attempt to reconstitute an institutional image or identity for the 
Army, moving away from Somalia. The course of these attempts was somewhat 
meandering, winding between the poles of warrior and citizen. Civil-military 
cooperation poses a challenge to that effort. For some—but importantly, not all—of 
those involved with civil-military cooperation, the feeling of satisfaction and reward was 
evident. They believed that by building a school, or handing out toques to freezing 
children, they were doing good. For many, both in the relatively static peacekeeping 
environment of the Balkans and in the dynamic counterinsurgency environment of 
Afghanistan, surrounded by the confusion and frustration of the seemingly unwinnable 
military situation, they could conduct one more patrol, stand on guard for one more 
sentry shift, or skirmish with one more Talib. Civil-military cooperation offered 
something different, but also something more. It was a chance to exercise agency, to 
achieve something, even if only in a limited sense of the word. In Afghanistan, for 
instance, the operation was about—or at least had been touted as being about—sending 
girls to school, something unthinkable before the arrival of the Coalition. Therefore, 
what could be greater than helping to build a school at which girls might someday study?
670 My edited volume on civil-military cooperation highlights the diversity in national experience, but does 
not control for a single conceptual or methodological approach. See Christopher Ankersen, ed. Civil- 
M ilitary Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations: Emerging Theoiy and Practice. (London: Routledge, 
2007).
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Similarly, in Kosovo and Bosnia, a major theme of international effort there was to 
achieve the reintegration of the various ethnic groups. By opening a community centre or 
electrifying a village allowing refugees to return home, soldiers involved in civil-military 
cooperation were getting the job done. Again, for some, this was a source of pride.
How does this fit in with the idea of a warrior ethos? Perhaps in the Canadian 
case, the warrior ethos had eroded enough, through years of neglect and lack of practice,
A 71to be ripe for redefinition. However, there is an alternative way of looking at this. 
There is no global, objective definition of what it means to be a warrior, despite the 
existence of a persistent Classical narrative, largely based on readings of Greek epics. As 
Christopher Coker admits, “morality is embedded in a social context. Ethical codes are 
not arrived at by universal agreement any more than they are discovered by universal
fil') • •reason.” In this light, we can see that civil-military cooperation as a practice is in 
keeping with a new military ethos. The highest calling for the Canadian military, it 
seems, is “duty with honour” and “honour can only be bestowed if [soldiers] acquit 
themselves in a manner that reflects the values, beliefs and expectations of fellow 
Canadians.”673 Perhaps Canadians, like Nietzche, see virtue as more than sitting ‘quietly 
in the swamp’. They expect their soldiers to go beyond the idea of discipline and martial 
prowess, and embrace other qualities, such as compassion and humanitarianism. That 
they have not clearly plumbed what these concepts might mean, or understood the 
implications of their existence, is not to say that they are expected any less strongly. A
671 British General, Sir Hew Pike, was one who believed this, claiming “the Canadians have surrendered 
any claim to be a war-fighting force. Their army... is now really just a peacekeeping force.” Cited in Martin 
Shadwick, “British Candour, Harsh Reality,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, (Winter) 1997: 34.
672 Christopher Coker, The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror. (London: Routledge, 
2007): 146.
673 Canada. Canadian Forces. Duty with Honour: The Profession o f  Arms in Canada. (Ottawa: Queen’s 
Printer, 2003): 77.
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controversial study conducted by the Army, based on interviews from over 800 officers 
involved in overseas operations during the 1990s, concluded with an explicit warning. 
Like it or not—and several respondents to the survey had clearly expressed that they had 
not liked what they perceived to be a move away from ‘real soldiering’—times were 
changing:
Military forces must wholeheartedly accept the roles of humanitarian assistance 
and aid to the civil power in disaster or environmental crisis, in addition to their 
traditional roles of war and deterrence. They must internalise the expectations of 
these roles and broaden the measure of what it means to be in the military. The 
addition of roles to the military is a call to redefine themselves in terms of the 
future, to redefine what professional and job satisfaction means. In other words, 
what it means to ‘feel good’ about being a soldier should now have an expanded 
dimension. The traditional warrior ethic and the comments of ‘wasting their time 
with peacekeeping’.. .must change. The soldiers who complain of not ‘feeling the 
hero’... as a result of humanitarian service must not be encouraged to cling 
to .. .obsolete expectations.
Actually, the entire idea of what it is to be hero in Canada may be the pivotal
point here. Canadians appear ambivalent about heroes, in the traditional sense. John
Ralston Saul uses the game of hockey to illustrate the point:
You feel the Canadian audiences are only marginally interested in a Heroic 
approach to the game. They watch it as they know it is played at its best—a 
flying, rough, corps de ballet...The game has thus become one of those basic 
physical mythologies which reveal and reflect the larger myths. If Canadians are 
anti-heroic, they will treat their basic game as anti-heroic and team oriented.674
Not for Canadians the image of a warrior as hero, then? Ralston Saul may yet be wrong. 
In the Classical tradition heroism is about sacrifice. Indeed, as Coker puts it, sacrifice is 
necessary for there to be anything sacred.675 And it is here that heroism returns to the 
Canadian experience, although perhaps in altered form. Heros may not be those who die
674 John Ralston Saul, Reflections o f  a Siamese Twin: Canada at the end o f  the Twentieth Century. 
(Toronto: Penguin, 1997): 144.
675 Coker 120.
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defending Canadian soil, or capturing foreign territory. They are those who sacrifice in 
the service of Canadian values. And, in at least some instances, this has been internalised 
by the heros themselves. A single example will suffice to illustrate the point. Captain 
Nicola Goddard, an artillery Forward Observation Officer, was killed in an ambush in 
Afghanistan on 17 May 2006. She was trained to direct artillery fire and call in air 
strikes, tasks she did on several occasions in Afghanistan.676 But her mission, in her own 
words in a letter to her parents, was to be “part of something so much bigger than 
[herself]”:
we are where we are now, with the choices that we have available to us. It seems 
to me that we have such a burden of responsibility to make the world a better 
place for those who were bom into far worse circumstances. It is more than 
donating money to charities -  it is taking action and trying to make things 
better.677
For sacrifice to define heroism, it must be done for something meaningful, otherwise it is 
mere suicide. Meaning, to be understood and shared widely, and therefore form a basis
• 678for social action, clearly cannot be merely defined “on purely idiosyncratic grounds,” 
but must accord with the expectations of society. Heores may be exceptional, but they 
must also be legitimate. When meaning such as this is internalised within the military 
and valued by its members, an ethos is created. Warrior or otherwise, perhaps a new 
ethos—one in which activities like civil-military cooperation can rightfully hold a 
place—is forming in the Canadian Army.
676 Christie Blatchford, Fifteen Days. (Toronto: Doubleday, 2007): 167.
677 Cited in J. Tim Goddard, “Eulogy For Captain Nichola Kathleen Sarah Goddard, 1 9 8 0 -2 0 0 6 .” 
[http://www.ucalgary.ca/oncampus/weekly/june2-06/eulogy.html; accessed 3 August 2006].
678 Friedrich KratochwiI, “On Legitimacy,” International Relations. 20.3 (2006): 303.
252
Civil-military cooperation, as we saw in the beginning of this study, is a living
contradiction. It embodies, at least in theory, both war and peace, reconstruction carried
out by those trained to destroy. In this sense, it is an uneasy practice to understand, let
alone carry out. To some, in the thick of combat or faced with an overwhelming array of
complex social and economic factors, it appears as a solution in search of a problem,
something imposed from above, something one does, while not fully knowing why. It is
a compromise: a bridge between conflict and stability, between physical and cognitive
planes. In that sense, perhaps, it is very Canadian, akin to another Canadian invention:
the houseboat. These awkward but pleasant craft are neither great houses, nor great
boats. And yet they serve a purpose. So it is with civil-military cooperation. As a
practice it is neither truly civil nor wholly military, and yet it serves a purpose. Martin
Shaw, writing about the West’s contemporary approach to warfare warns:
We have a choice: we can continue with war as a means.. .becoming ever more 
mired in brutal struggles that we cannot win. Or we can follow the logic of our 
commitments to global institutions, democracy and human rights, and renew our
fJl 0determination to avoid war. We cannot have it both ways.
Civil-military cooperation is an attempt to do just that.
679 Martin Shaw, The New Western Way o f  War. (Cambridge: Polity, 2005): 3.
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Annex A: 
Research Design and Methodology
It is important, in a doctoral thesis, to record how the study was conducted. In 
order not to break up the overall narrative flow of the thesis, the use of a methodological
/OA
annex is preferred . This annex will describe the methods used, the reasons why they 
were selected, and provide commentary on their utility and suitability.
This thesis draws conclusions from a series of case studies. From the outset it is 
important to state that a case study is not a method, per se. It is often conflated with 
ethnography or participant-observation (which are methods of data collection), but this is 
an inaccurate categorisation.681 Stoecker suggests referring to case studies as ‘frames’ 
rather than methods , while Cresswell considers them to be one of five qualitative
/'O'l
traditions. Indeed, within one case study, it is the possible for several research
methods to be employed, including a mixture of qualitative and quantitative strategies.684
In this thesis, this pattern was certainly followed, as interviews, documentary research,
and observation were used.
Having made it clear what a case study is not, it is possible to look at definitions
of what a case study is. Yin defines a case study as
An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident, [and which] relies on multiple sources 
of evidence.685
680 Patrick Dunleavy, Authoring a PhD: How to Plan, Draft, Write and Finish a D octoral Thesis or 
Dissertation: How to Plan, Draft, Write and Finish a Doctoral Dissertation. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2003).
681 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 1994): xiv.
682 Randy Stoecker, “Evaluating and Rethinking the Case Study,” Sociological Review, 30.1 (1991): 96.
683 J.W. Cresswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. (London: Sage, 1998).
684 Yin, 9.
685 Yin, 13.
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This definition captures the case study’s connection with empirical events and its ability 
to examine situations in their ‘authentic’ contexts. If Yin’s definition were applied 
minimally, however, one might expect case studies to largely be matters of description. 
Others point out that the fundamental aspect of the case study is that it allows the 
researcher to “explain wholistically [sic] the dynamics of a certain historical period of a
AKA •particular social unit.” Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg stress that the case study achieves a 
rich understanding of a particular phenomenon. They define a case study as “an in-depth, 
multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social 
phenomenon.”687
The specific way in which the depth of study is achieved is the use of many 
different sources, ranging from documents, to interviews, to observations. The 
multifaceted aspect pointed out by both Yin and Feagin et al in their definitions allows 
for a rich picture to be developed. Yin goes so far as to describe this as the case study’s 
“unique strength.”688
Indeed the case study tradition allows the researcher to see a wide spectrum of 
statements and perceptions, which “permits the investigator to examine how humans 
develop definitions of the situation.”689 By examining such sources as policy statements, 
private correspondence, and reports, complemented by interviews and observations, the 
case study researcher is able to “preserve the unusual and serendipitous” (Cresswell 
1998, 142) which is important if a detailed understanding of complex and highly
686 Stoecker, 98.
687 J.R. Feagin, A.M. Orum, and G. Sjoberg, The Case fo r  the Case Study. (London: University o f  North
Carolina Press, 1991): 2.
688 Yin, 8 .
689 Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg, 11.
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personalised situations is desired.690 A case study allows the “emic meanings” 
constructed and held by those involved to be told more fully and completely than other 
methods might allow.691 At the same time, though, because ‘public’ documents are also 
analysed the ‘impersonal’ or collective discourses are also captured.
Within the arc ascribed by these definitions, two key features stand out: case studies 
allow a researcher to look at something in depth and in context. It is precisely this 
combination of description and explanation that made the case study the most appropriate 
tradition for this thesis.
Opposition to case studies centres on the apparent lack of generalisability, owing 
to the low V  of instances examined. However, case study proponents are quick to point 
out that the idea of generalisability is often misunderstood (or at least misapplied). As 
Feagin, Orum, Sjoberg remind us “the study of the single case... remains indispensable to
(L Q 'J
the progress of the social sciences.” Stake asserts that case studies rightly focus on 
particular instances which may or may not be typical of larger phenomena and that the 
idea of generalisability need not be central in all academic work.693 Yin believes that 
case studies are generalisable, but only to theory, not to entire “populations or 
universes.”694 Stake agrees, stating “the purpose of a case report is not to represent the 
world, but to represent the case.”695
Even so, generalisations can be made, as long as they are tempered. Cresswell 
prefers to use the term assertion, rather than conclusion, to describe the outcome of a case
690 Cresswell, 142.
691 R.E. Stake, R.E. (2000). “Case studies,” in N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln, eds. Handbook o f  
Qualitative Research. 2 nd ed. (London: Sage, 2000): 441.
692 Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg, 11.
693 Stake, 437; 439.
694 Yin, 10.
695 Stake, 448.
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study. Assertions are “interpretations of the ‘lessons learned’ [and] may be couched in 
terms of personal views or in terms of theories or constructs in the literature.”696 
Williams believes that case study researchers “can generalize, but make moderatum 
generalizations.”697 A term that is often used is ‘naturalistic generalisation’, which 
Cresswell defines as making the case understandable. In popular parlance, naturalistic 
generalisations might be dubbed as the ‘take aways’ from the case or “what the reader
/■QO #
learns about or from the case.” Yin clarifies the confusion between claims of
generalisability by stating
The case study, like the experiment, does not represent a sample, and the 
investigator’s goal is to expand and generalise theories (analytic 
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalization).699
The emphasis on ‘tentativeness’, then, is in keeping with the case study’s focus on the
particular, albeit as a part of a larger theoretical and ‘real-world’ context.
This thesis is comprised of three instrumental case studies; that is case studies that “focus
on a specific issue rather than the case itself. The case then becomes a vehicle to better
understand the issue.”700 Stake asserts that in instrumental case studies
the case is of secondary interest, it plays a supporting role, and it facilitates our 
understanding of something else. The case is still looked at in depth, its contexts 
scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, but all because this helps the
701researcher to pursue the external interest.”
In this thesis, the issue is understanding how a state develops and implements a particular 
military practice. The cases focus on three different episodes where one state (Canada)
696 Cresswell, 249.
697 M. Williams, “Interpretation and Generalization,” Sociology. 34.2 (2000): 215.
698 Cresswell, 251.
699 Yin, 10.
700 Cresswell, 250.
701 Stake, 436-437.
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developed such a practice (civil-military cooperation) in three different missions 
(Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan). Selecting “one aspect of the case for presentation” is
709also known as “embedded analysis.”
The issue of case selection, then, is not so much one of sampling. Stake states 
“selection by sampling of attributes should not be the highest priority.. .opportunity to
70^learn is of primary importance.” Accordingly, I selected revelatory cases, or cases 
which allow the researcher to “observe and analyse a phenomenon previously 
inaccessible to scientific investigation.”704 It was not my intention to strictly compare the 
three cases from the outset; they are meant to be separate cases involving the same 
central actor. If I were focus on case comparison, then there is a risk that “uniqueness
70S •and complexities will be glossed over.” Indeed, rather than comparison per se, it was 
my intention to see how ideas and practices changed over time and across cases.
706
Therefore it was my intention to “simultaneously carry on more than one case study.”
I feel that this choice has proven to be fruitful.
I chose to examine this problem using qualitative research methods and styles of 
analysis and presentation. While no definitive list of characteristics of qualitative or 
quantitative methods could exist, using a list of contrasts between the approaches devised 
by Bryman, it is possible to show why qualitative methods are better suited to the current 
study707.
702 Stake, 250.
703 Stake, 447.
704 Yin, 40.
705 Stake, 444.
706 Stake, 436.
707 A. Bryman, Social Research M ethods.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 284-285.
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709
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711
■ This study deals with ‘words’ not ‘numbers’. While the study is empirical in 
nature, the ideas and phenomenon in question (that is, the process of 
developing a military practice) do not come “naturally in quantities.”
■ The study focuses more on the participants’, rather than the researcher’s, 
points of view. While no complete separation of the two is ever possible (i.e. 
perfect objectivity is unachievable), this thesis attempts to tell the story from 
the perceptions and discourses of the parties. The study is ontological in 
nature; that is, it holds that “something is real when it is constructed in the 
minds of the actors involved in the situation.”709 This means that a degree of 
“closeness to the subjects” was sought, something that is generally avoided in 
quantitative work.710 Stoecker claims “our ‘subjects’ respond to us in 
idiosyncratic ways and we miss essential and valuable information if we are
711too ‘objective’ to notice their...responses, and our responses in turn.”
■ The cases focus on dynamic events where actions, meanings and discourses 
change over the period of study. ‘Snapshot’ techniques (even longitudinal 
ones, such as surveys) may miss the subtle and idiosyncratic variations that 
develop in complex relationships. Of course, the use of survey data has been 
necessary when gauging the feelings of the people in this thesis; however, 
even here, precision and cross-tabulation is not the aim.
R. Tesch, Qualitative Research. (London: Falmer, 1995): 1. 
Cresswell, 254.
Bryman, 284.
Stoecker, 96.
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■ Meaning, and not strict behaviour, is the focus. Qualitative research is 
seen by some to be better at providing explanations of how meaning is
71 7generated and reproduced within a social context.
■ The study uses “rich, deep” data and not necessarily “hard, reliable” data.
Bryman characterises this as a difference between qualitative researchers 
concentration on context, rather than “the precision offered by
711measurement.” Examples of the kinds of data sought in this study include 
personal opinions and impressions, ‘performances’ and rituals. This contrast 
is tied to the notion of generalisibility, which has been discussed at some 
length above.
■ The target phenomena are micro-level interactions, not macro-level trends.
Tesch stresses that a case study is “concerned with one piece of data and what 
it means, not with regularities or patterns across many pieces of a similar 
kind.”714 This process is best achieved using qualitative methods of data 
collection and analysis.
It has been mentioned above that a strength of the case study as a research frame
is that it allows for the use of a wide variety of data sources. Table 1 illustrates the types 
of sources used in this thesis.715 Comments as to issues of access are included.
Data Category Source Applicable Case Comments
Documents •Official, published 
(reports, publications, 
testimonials/publicity 
material)
Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Afghanistan
Freely available; 
includes doctrinal 
publications
712 Stoecker, 93.
713 Bryman, 285.
714 Tesch, 94.
715 The categories and sources o f  data in Table 1 have been adapted from Yin, 80-90 and Bryman, 369-384.
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Data Category Source Applicable Case Comments
•Official, unpublished 
(‘war diaries’, 
orders/instructions, 
plans)
•Unofficial, published 
(personal accounts in 
professional 
j oumals/newspapers, 
etc)
•Unofficial, private 
(correspondence, 
diaries/journals, 
retained files, etc)
Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Afghanistan
Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Afghanistan
Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Afghanistan
Special access 
required; negotiated 
access with 
participants during 
interviews
Freely available
Negotiated access 
with participants 
during interviews
Interviews •Field level 
participants
•Headquarters level 
policymakers
Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Afghanistan
Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Afghanistan
Travelled to 
Ottawa, Kingston, 
Bosnia, and 
Afghanistan
Observations •Field Observations Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Afghanistan
Served in Kosovo. 
Travelled to 
Bosnia and 
Afghanistan
By drawing on a variety of data sources, the study has been able to depict the 
nature of the relationships between the government, the people and the military. Official 
documentary sources will help to define the ‘public transcript’, or the public face of this 
relationship, while private documents and interviews allowed a glimpse at some of the 
‘hidden transcripts’ that exist. Finally, observations in the field allowed me to discern the 
subtle ways in which these transcripts are ‘performed.’ In one way, the diversity of data 
permitted a degree of triangulation; on the other hand, and perhaps more importantly in 
this case, the diversity should help to reveal the contradictions and inconsistencies in the 
discourse of civil-military cooperation.
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Three specific data collection methods are worthy of discussion here. Since 
personal accounts and perceptions are critical to this study interviews were conducted in 
an “open-ended”716 or “unstructured”717 fashion. The methods of interviewing roughly
7 1 8  7 1 Q 77 H •followed the guidelines set out by Kvale , Stroh , and Denscombe, all of which I 
found to be particularly helpful and accessible, in that they are written for postgraduate 
researchers. However, I would add that in many cases I needed to adapt my interviewing 
approach to accommodate whether it was a face to face interview, one conducted over the 
telephone, or by email.
* • • • 771 • •In order to see the relationship in its “natural setting” I engaged in observing 
how military forces conducted civil-military cooperation as a practice. This I was able to 
do impressionistically in Kosovo in 1999 (where I served alongside civil-military 
cooperation specialists) and more formally in Bosnia in 2002 and in Afghanistan in 2004. 
The logistical preparations and requests for authorisation were far more complicated than 
any textbook can prepare a researcher for and should not be discounted in research 
design. The fact that I had been a military officer for twelve years provided me with 
distinct advantages in terms of access to soldiers in operational situations.
The area where I had to rely far more on survey data was in producing the chapter 
on the people and their role in shaping civil-military cooperation as a practice. While I 
could not conduct relevant surveys on my own, I did perform meta-analysis of a number
716 Yin 84.
717 Bryman 285.
718 S. Kvale, Interviews. (London: Sage, 1996).
719 M. Stroh, “Qualitative Interviewing,” in D. Burton, ed. Research Training fo r  Social Scientists. 
(London: Sage, 2000): 196-214.
720 M. Denscombe, The G ood Research Guide. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998).
721 M.V. Angrosino and K.A. Mays de Perez, “Rethinking observation: from method to context,” in N.K. 
Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln, eds. Handbook o f  Qualitative Research. 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2000): 673.
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777of large ‘n ’ surveys. In so doing, I restricted my analyses to those surveys that were 
conducted in accordance with sound statistical practices (such as sampling, cross­
tabulation, and confidence checking) rather than ‘instant polls’ often used on media 
websites, for example. This is a realistic approach for most researchers working alone 
with limited funding.
It was essential that I obtained both public, or declaratory, rhetoric as well as 
privately held (or at least less publicly expressed) opinions and beliefs from military and 
government sources. Accordingly, two types of data analysis seem most appropriate: 
discourse analysis and hermeneutics.
Discourse analysis covers a variety of methods, but in general it “emphasises the 
way versions of the world, of society, events and the inner psychological worlds are
77*3produced in discourse.” Exact methods can range from the heavily coded to the barely 
structured, some using computer software, and others not. I adopted a “less codified” 
version of discourse analysis that relies on “sceptical reading” or “reading for the purpose
774.lurking behind the ways that something is said or presented.” The particular relevance 
of discourse analysis to my research is that allows for flexibility, reveals multiple
77  Smeanings, and is both “anti-realist” and “constructionist.” This accords with the 
ontological nature of the material under examination.
The second analysis method is actually a method of data collection and analysis. 
Bryman states that “the central idea behind hermeneutics is that the analyst of a text must
722 This is in line with the approach described in Philip P. Everts, D em ocracy and M ilitary Force. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002): 15.
723 Bryman, 360.
724 Bryman, 361.
725 Bryman, 360.
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seek to bring out the meanings of a text from the perspective of its author.” The 
analyst is examining texts “with a view to interpreting them to find out the intended or
• 7 7 7  • •expressed meaning, in order to establish a co-understanding.” When this interpretation 
also includes a detailed understanding of the context (through an examination of other 
texts), as well as the author’s point of view, it has been described as “critical 
hermeneutics.”728 This is a close approximation of the method I employed in completing 
this thesis.
If discourse analysis can be ‘less than structured’, so too can hermeneutics. 
However, that is not to say that it is without a process. At its most fundamental, 
hermeneutics might be described as “dialoguing with the data” (Tesch 1995, 93), where
• • 7 7 0the researcher focuses first on the particular, relating it to the larger context. In so 
doing, the meanings of both the particular and the context are better understood. This 
process of relating the ‘piece’ to the ‘whole’ and vice versa continues and interpretations 
are made and refined throughout the process. This is known as the hermeneutic circle 
and it continues until the researcher has “reached a sensible meaning, a valid unitary
7T0meaning, free of inner contradictions.” Stevenson, though, reminds us that there is no
absolute or knowable end-state, and that the researcher’s judgement must be used in
7T 1determining when to stop the cycle of analysis. Hermeneutics can seen as particularly 
relevant to my study; as Tesch points out, in cases where “the research interest is the 
comprehension of the meaning of text/action” a hermeneutic case study approach is the
726 Bryman, 283.
727 Klave, 47.
728 Bryman, 383.
729 Tesch, 93
730 Klave, 47. See also Tesch, 94.
731 N . Stevenson, “Questions o f  Hermeneutics: Beyond Empricism and Post-Modernism,” in D. Burton, ed. 
Research Training fo r  Social Scientists. (London: Sage, 2000): 20-24.
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best way forward. In particular, the hermeneutic method can be useful in open-ended 
interviews, by “elucidating the dialogue producing the interview texts to be interpreted, 
and then by clarifying the subsequent process of interpreting the interview texts 
produced.”733 (Klave 1996, 46).
In order to overcome criticisms of validity or verification, the qualitative 
researcher must take positive steps to ensure certain standards or ‘best practices’ are 
followed. This means that in addition to performing the methods ‘correctly’, aspects of 
research design and quality control must be put in place to ensure that others might have 
confidence in the findings of the study. There are many such standards mentioned in the 
methodological literature. Yin, for instance, takes as his starting point the hallmarks of 
quantitative methodology and believes they are equally applicable in qualitative works, if 
in a somewhat modified form.734 Two of his criteria—construct validity and reliability— 
appear most applicable. By construct validity Yin means using multiple sources of 
evidence and establishing a clear and logical chain of evidence. Additionally, he 
recommends having ‘key informants’ review the final product for accuracy. Yin’s 
reliability criteria centre on accurate and thorough record keeping.
Other authors mention quality criteria specifically designed for qualitative 
projects. Cresswell lists seven criteria that should be used to judge the quality of such 
work.
■ Prolonged engagement with sources;
■ Triangulation or the use of multiple data sources and analytic methods.735
Triangulation is similar to Yin’s construct validity;
■ Peer review;
732 Tesch, 16.
733 Klave, 46.
734 Yin, 31-32.
735 See also Stake, 443 and Bryman, 274.
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■ Negative case analysis, where the working hypothesis is revised as the case 
develops;
■ Member checks;
■ Clarification of researcher bias; and
■ The use of rich descriptions (to aid in determining whether or not the case isn'lc
applicable in other situations).
Bryman lists four desirable qualities of qualitative research:
■ Credibility, achieved through member or participant validation;
■ Transferability, achieved through the use of “thick descriptions”;
■ Dependability, achieved through good record keeping and a “audit approach”; 
and
■ Confirmability, achieved not through ‘total objectivity’, but by demonstrating 
that the researcher has at least “acted in good faith” and not let bias or
7*^ 7presumptions completely distort the research.
I have tried to incorporate as many of these quality control factors into this study as 
possible. While I have subjected parts of the thesis to both peer and participant review, I 
have not done so for the entire thesis. Furthermore, while the ideal of triangulation was 
the aim, it was not possible or practical in every circumstance. On the whole, I feel, data 
has been triangulated, but in each instance to strive for such a standard would prove 
paralytic: it would prevent an author from making any claims and diminish the creative 
aspect of such a work. There must be scope for individual judgment, even in social 
science.
Lest this all sound too scientistic, I should mention that despite my attention to the
formal components of research design and data collection, my intent and much of my
practice followed the advice of Hedley Bull, who advocated what he called the “Classic
Approach,” that is an
approach to theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law, and that is 
characterized above all by explicit reliance on the exercise of judgement and by
736 Cresswell, 201-203.
737 Bryman, 272-274.
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the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict verification and proof there 
is very little of significance that can be said about international relations, that 
general propositions about this subject must therefore derive from a scientifically 
imperfect process of perception or intuition, and that these general propositions 
cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status 
appropriate to their doubtful origin.
Hopefully this attitude pervades the work and that the thesis serves Bull’s several
purposes “communication between specialists seeking understanding of the
• 710
subject...education, persuasion [and] public entertainment.”
The intended audience of this work is a mixed one, comprising scholars, decision­
makers and practictioners. In the descriptive parts of thesis there is probably nothing 
new to practitioners. For them it is hoped that the analytical aspects of the work can 
provide some insight into how what they do fits in to the wider picture. Some policy­
makers would welcome a stronger link between academic inquiry and political action. 
Paul Nitze believes “it is by action—in my terms, by the practice of politics—that 
theory.. .can be kept in touch with reality.. .The two are inseparable; theory and practice 
being complementary, they constitute harmonic aspects of one whole.”740 Not everyone 
agrees on this point. Christopher Hill, for instance, claims that “the more [scholars] 
strain for policy relevance, even if only to justify our existence in the eyes of society at 
large, the more difficult it becomes to maintain intellectual integrity.”741 If there is truth 
in Hill’s statement then surely it can be found in the idea that it is the strain that is 
potentially damaging, not the mere fact that academics work in areas of policy interest 
and concern. As Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic put it, “The issue.. .is whether the
738 Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach,” World Politics. 18.3 (1966): 
361.
739 Bull, 365.
740 Paul H. Nitze, cited in Jospeh Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International 
Relations Theory’ and the Issue o f  Policy Relevance. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001): 1
741 Christopher Hill, cited Lepgold and Nincic, 1.
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production of knowledge with concrete bearing on practical problems may undermine the 
intellectual foundations on which that knowledge rests.”742
742 Lepgold and Nincic, 81. See also R.C. Rist, “Influencing the policy process with qualitative research,” 
in N.K.. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln, eds. Handbook o f  Qualitative Research. 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2000): 
1001-1017.
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